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Abstract 
Every one of the eight monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
remained standing in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings, giving rise to claims 
of a “monarchical advantage” or “monarchical exceptionalism.”  This dissertation 
examines the claim of monarchical advantage as it relates to popular protest, 
asking three research questions: are monarchies better than non-monarchies 
in forestalling popular protests in the 21st century MENA? Are monarchies better 
than non-monarchies in withstanding protests that do occur? Do monarchies 
exhibit patterns of response to protests that differ from non-monarchies?  Making 
use of interviews and an original data set of protests and regime responses in the 
linchpin monarchy of Jordan, the dynastic monarchy of Bahrain, and the republic 
of Tunisia, this dissertation finds that while both monarchies successfully 
withstood protests, the monarchies were not better at preventing protests or at 
controlling protests than the republic.  The pattern of persuasion and coercion in 
preventing and controlling protest does not vary systematically between the 
monarchies and the republic in this sample.  This dissertation finds little evidence 
of monarchical advantage with respect to popular protest during the Arab Spring.
1 
Chapter 1 
Defining the Problem: Mechanisms and Methods 
The massive protests of the Arab Spring uprisings put long-standing 
authoritarian and hybrid regimes in the Middle East to the test. Seemingly solid 
understandings of authoritarian regimes and their ability to retrench or upgrade 
came into question. One fact soon became clear: as authoritarian presidents fell in 
Tunisia and Egypt, and Libya, Syria, and later Yemen, descended into civil war, 
all the eight monarchies in the region remained standing. Many of these 
monarchical regimes were no less susceptible to the socioeconomic and political 
conditions that led to Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia and 
massive protests in Egypt’s Tahrir Square. Still, no monarchies fell during the 
Arab Spring wave of protests. 
The Arab Spring uprisings were the result of the diffusion of shared 
collective action frames that mobilized protests against states that had repeatedly 
broken promises about delivering political and economic reform.1 Dafna Rand 
                                                 
1 The term typically used here is “modular” and is most frequently associated with Mark 
Beissinger’s work on the “color revolutions”. Mark R. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in 
Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of the Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” 
Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 2 (June 2007): 259–76. Beissinger borrows the term from Tarrow 
(1998; 2005). For both Tarrow and Beissinger, “Modular action is action that is based in 
significant part on the prior successful example of others” (Beissinger 2007, 259). Cf, Sidney 
Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the 
Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sidney Tarrow, The New 
Transnational Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
 
 
2 
identifies common drivers of political change in monarchies and republics across 
the region and affirms that  
the autocrats in the region were not all uniformly ‘robust’. 
[Instead]…most were nervously trying to manage the varied political 
changes occurring around them. Some were doing so more successfully 
than others. …But their ability to stay a step ahead of the game was 
precarious at best.2  
 
Although these shared frames and related protests repeated in monarchies and 
non-monarchies across the region, the outcomes were markedly different.  
The “monarchical advantage” thesis has been proposed to explain some of 
the most notable differences in outcome of protests across regime type in the Arab 
Spring. This notion is not terra incognita. Scholars have done exhaustive work 
cataloging cases of monarchical resilience and failure in the past.3 Some scholars 
suggest that monarchy remains stable in the region because it is traditional and 
culturally legitimate, seeing it as but an extension of tribal and other patrimonial 
systems supposedly inherent to the region.4 Others argue that monarchies are no 
more indigenous to the region than liberal democracy, but that they have a 
                                                 
2 Dafna Hochman Rand, Roots of the Arab Spring: Contested Authority and Political Change in 
the Middle East (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), viii. 
3 See Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle 
Eastern Monarchies (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999); Andre Bank, 
Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik, “Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East:  A 
Configurational Comparison, 1945-2012,” GIGA Working Papers 215 (February 2013): 1–35; 
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New 
Explanations,” in Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder/London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2000), 37–52; Gabriel Ben-Dor, “Patterns of Monarchy in the Middle East,” in Middle 
East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 71–84; Marc 
Lynch, “Does Arab Monarchy Matter?,” Foreign Policy (blog), August 31, 2012, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/31/does-arab-monarchy-matter/. 
4 Victor A. Menaldo, “The Arab Spring and MENA’s Historical Development: Oil Curse or 
Monarchical Exceptionalism?,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, September 6, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1977706. 
3 
particular staying power due to their unique affinity for state-and nation-building.5 
Some argue that monarchies are particularly adept at divide-and-rule, coalitional, 
and clientelistic politics. Others highlight how some monarchies design 
institutional safeguards - including the peculiar institution of the royal family – to 
insulate themselves from the ebb and flow of authoritarian politics. Still others 
argue that monarchies only seem exceptional because they benefit from 
hydrocarbon rents and the support of international patrons because of a regime’s 
geostrategic importance. Less frequently examined is the relationship between 
monarchy as a regime type and how it confronts threats from popular 
mobilization.6  
Why This Matters 
The feeling of limitless possibility that swept the Middle East in the Arab 
Spring has been replaced with dashed hopes and retrenched autocracy. The 
greatest puzzles remaining in the wake of the Arab Spring center on why some 
regimes fell, others survived despite protests, and some have collapsed into the 
worst humanitarian crises in a generation.  
That feeling of dashed hopes varies, for example, among activists in 
Jordan. But, if the experience of those activists in Jordan is generalizable, the 
observation that “the revolution has moved on” is paralleled by questions about 
how that revolution managed to fail in the first place. Perhaps the greatest 
                                                 
5 Anderson, Lisa, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East,” Political 
Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 1–15. 
6 See Russell E. Lucas, “Path Dependencies or Political Opportunities? Monarchical Resilience in 
the Arab Uprisings” (Middle East Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 2013); Adria Lawrence, 
“Collective Protest and the Institutional Promise of Monarchy” (Association for Analytic Learning 
about Islam and Muslim Societies (AALIMS), Princeton, NJ, 2014), 
http://aalims.org/uploads/LawrenceMonarchy040114.pdf. 
4 
theoretical and practical implication of this work presents answers to the 
questions on scholars’, policymakers’, and activists’ minds: are monarchies just 
inherently more stable than their republican counterparts or are they only 
surviving by ingenuity? Is this a coincidence among monarchies in the Middle 
East or does the phenomenon called the monarchical advantage actually exist? 
There are several ways in which monarchical advantage could affect and 
respond to popular mobilization and protest. Monarchical advantage could enable 
monarchies to prevent popular mobilization and protest. Monarchical advantage 
could enable monarchies to withstand protests by allowing the regime to control 
protests that occur. Finally, monarchical advantage could be the result of 
monarchies responding to protests by emphasizing preventive, controlling, 
persuasive and coercive actions at levels distinct from those seen in non-
monarchies. Monarchies survived the Arab Spring uprisings. This dissertation 
will show that the monarchical advantage allegedly behind their survival is not 
explained by any of the above mechanisms.  
The Research Questions 
Are 21st century monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa better 
than non-monarchies in forestalling protests? Are they better than non-monarchies 
in withstanding protests that do occur? If monarchies can withstand protests that 
do occur, is it because they exhibit patterns of response in preventing and/or 
controlling protests that differ from non-monarchies? 
 
 
5 
Testable Hypotheses 
If 21st century monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa prevent or 
withstand protests better than non-monarchies, what should we expect to see if 
this monarchical advantage is present? To answer these questions, I examine a set 
of three hypotheses.  
If the monarchical advantage is to hold, one or both of two hypotheses 
must be true. Hypothesis (H1) states that MENA monarchies are better than 
MENA non-monarchies at preventing protests. Hypothesis (H2) states that 
monarchies are better at withstanding protests than non-monarchies. The premise 
of the monarchical advantage argument in the Arab Spring is the fact that all of 
the Arab monarchs survived while four of the Arab presidents did not. If we find 
no evidence for Hypothesis H1 – if monarchies were not significantly better than 
non-monarchies at forestalling protests – then Hypothesis H2 must be true – 
monarchies must be better than non-monarchies at withstanding and controlling 
protests.  
As a matter of course, this dissertation will not directly examine 
Hypothesis H2. It serves as the logical starting point for investigating the 
monarchical advantage – monarchies survived the Arab Spring, so they must have 
withstood protests. I conclude, as a logical matter, that if H1 is false (monarchies 
are not better than non-monarchies at preventing protests), then H2 must be true 
(that monarchies are better than non-monarchies at withstanding protests). I will 
demonstrate that, once we accept that monarchies saw high levels of mobilization 
6 
– indicating that they are not better at preventing protests (H1) – that it becomes 
logically inescapable that they must be better at withstanding protests (H2). 
We are accepting that Hypothesis H2 is supported, given the outcomes we 
have observed. As a result, I will not be examining Hypothesis H2 directly. But I 
will still examine how and why monarchies’ ability to withstand protests operates 
and ensure that this, though true, is not also spurious. Therefore, this dissertation 
examines two subhypotheses related to Hypothesis H2. First, are monarchies 
better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling 
protests (Hypothesis H2a)? Second, do monarchies, display a distinct and 
discernable pattern in their response to protests, compared to republics 
(Hypothesis H2b)? 
What would be indicators of the monarchical advantage regarding the 
prevention of protests, if it exists? The maximalist version would posit that 
monarchies can so effectively forestall mobilization that protest is comparatively 
rare and no public demonstrations occur. This is demonstrably false. A more 
nuanced version of Hypothesis H1 posits that monarchies are better able to 
forestall mobilization such that protests take place at much lower levels of 
intensity compared to protests in MENA republics. By “lower levels” I mean 1) 
fewer protests; 2) smaller protests; 3) less geographic dispersion of protests; 4) 
less demographic and ideological diversity of the protest coalition, and finally 5) 
protests whose goals were less extreme and less likely to be regime change and 
more likely to be a change in policy or in policymakers. 
7 
What would be indicators that monarchies, compared to republics, more 
effectively controlled protests?  More specifically, what would be indicators that 
monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at 
controlling protests (Hypothesis H2a)? If H2a is true, we should see 1) fewer 
protests, 2) shorter protests; 3) less geographic dispersion of protests; and 4) 
protests whose goals were less extreme and less likely to be regime change and 
more likely to be a change in policy or in policymakers. 
There are clearly overlapping indicators for Hypotheses H1 and H2a, but 
there are important differences. The most essential difference is one of timing. 
Where Hypothesis H1 applies to prevention of protests that have not yet occurred, 
Hypothesis H2a applies to protests that have occurred or are underway.  
Fewer protests, for example, is an indicator for both H1 (prevention) and 
H2a (control). It is an indicator for H1 because if a regime is able to successfully 
interrupt the process of mobilization before collective action can take place, we 
should logically see fewer incidents. Yet, fewer protests are also part of control, 
because controlling protests that are occurring could logically result in fewer 
protests in the future. Again, however similar the indicators are, it is important to 
recognize the temporal distinction I am drawing, because control (Hypothesis 
H2a) only takes place after protests have already occurred. 
Protests less extreme in intensity of demands are likewise an indicator of 
both H1 (prevention) and H2a (control). A proactive regime, backed by a robust 
surveillance and security apparatus will likely work diligently to prevent the most 
serious forms of dissent among activist networks. So long as this occurs in the 
8 
form of increased surveillance of civil society, arresting activists and breaking up 
networks prior to protests, this is a matter of prevention and an indicator of 
hypothesis H1. At the same time, regimes can fail (or neglect) to prevent such 
intensely critical actions until they become placards and chants at demonstrations. 
Because these demands are occurring after mobilization is complete and 
collective action has occurred, it becomes a matter of control and can thus 
likewise be an indicator of hypothesis H2a.7 
What would be indicators of our second subhypothesis to H2 – that 
monarchies display a distinct and discernable pattern in their response to protests 
(Hypothesis H2b)? Regimes respond to protests in some ways preventatively, 
before protests have gotten underway, and in other cases in a controlling manner, 
once protests are already happening. Regimes also use greater and lesser degrees 
of persuasion and coercion to prevent and control protests. If H2b is true, 
monarchies should respond to protests by emphasizing preventive, controlling, 
persuasive and coercive actions at levels distinct from those seen in non-
monarchies. Likewise, if H2b is true, the severity of government repression 
should be different for monarchies in comparison to non-monarchies. 
I will examine these strategies based on a two-dimensional matrix. Did 
monarchies use more or less prevention or control than their republican 
neighbors? Did monarchies use more or less persuasion or coercion than their 
                                                 
7 Prevention and control are temporally distinct processes that are constantly weaving into and out 
of one another as regimes confront protests. Preventing protests will tend to stifle the spread of 
dissent and should theoretically therefore be illustrated by the appearance of fewer protests. There 
is of course a reflexive effect as well. Control of protest in an initial site could likewise control the 
dispersion of protests and prevent future mobilizations. We don’t know if control will prevent 
dispersion and future mobilizations. At this point it becomes an almost impossible measurement 
problem. 
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republican neighbors? The four hypotheses and their associated indicators are 
displayed in Table 1.1. 
10 
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In all, if I am correct about hypothesis H1 (prevention) being false, and, by 
logical extension, coupled with observation, that hypothesis H2 (withstanding 
protests) is true, then, when it comes to whether that ability to withstand protests 
is a function of control (H2a) and patterns of response in exercising prevention 
and/or control (H2b) there is no evidence of monarchical advantage via these 
mechanisms.  
Case Selection 
The substantive chapters of this work feature examinations of three cases 
– Jordan, Tunisia, and Bahrain – to examine the hypotheses and answer the 
research questions I have posed.   
Jordan represents a good case to examine the monarchical advantage as a 
linchpin monarchy whose economy is not based on hydrocarbon rentierism.  
Jordan is also interesting because it experienced significant and sustained 
collective action in the Arab Spring but did not succumb to protests. Moreover, 
Jordan has a history of protest dating at least to the 1980s, and is generally seen, 
especially in policy circles, as comparatively open and liberalizing in terms of 
mobilization.  
Jordan is also an interesting case because Jordan continued to experience 
significant and sustained collective action even after several republics had fallen, 
Syria and Libya had descended into civil war, and monarchies in Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia, and Kuwait had seemed to have successfully mollified their own protest 
movements. Finally, many analysts went to great pains to downplay the 
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“Jordanian Spring” and hold the Hashemite regime up as a model of the 
predictive power of the monarchical advantage thesis. 
Tunisia serves as a comparative case of a republican authoritarian regime 
that fell to popular mobilization and, like Jordan, has an economy that is not 
dependent on hydrocarbon rentierism. Crucially, Tunisia was the starting point for 
the Arab Spring uprisings, and the point from which demonstration and diffusion 
effects swept the region after the departure of Ben ‘Ali. This provides us with a 
crucial baseline of the Arab Spring as the earliest protesters conceived of them 
and as they tried to conceptualize the constraints the regime was likely to place 
upon them. Because the Ben Ali regime fell within a month, I believe Tunisia 
should provide a glimpse into the dynamics of a republic which failed to both 
prevent and control protests. Comparing Tunisia’s approach to the protests to that 
of Jordan and Bahrain should illuminate potential differences in strategies.  
Including Bahrain allows us to examine intra-monarchy variance. More 
specifically, Bahrain was chosen because, although a monarchy like Jordan, is 
different from Jordan in three ways. Bahrain is a dynastic monarchy – in contrast 
to Jordan’s linchpin monarchy – and one which, also like Jordan, experienced 
sustained protest activity but still survived.1 It is true that Bahrain relies at least in 
                                                 
1 First conceptualized by Herb (1999), dynastic monarchies are those in which members of the 
ruling families monopolize the highest state offices, including the premiership and the heads of the 
cabinet ministries. This familial power further extends as “the ruling families also distribute 
members throughout lower positions in the state apparatus, especially in the key ministries” (Herb 
1999: 8). Consensus and tension among members of the ruling family (and their respective 
fiefdoms), and agreed upon succession mechanisms, further characterize dynastic monarchy and, 
for Herb, help to explain their unique resilience (Herb, ibid., 8-10; Lucas, Russell E. 2004. 
“Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime 
Type.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 36: 108-110). “Linchpin” monarchies, by 
comparison, are defined by Russell Lucas as those in which the ruling family generally 
participates only in the political institutions of the monarchy – not in the state bureaucracy (the 
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part on hydrocarbon rents and international and regional patronage (two of the 
other proposed mechanisms of the monarchial advantage). Jordan enjoys regional 
patronage from the United States and Saudi Arabia, like Bahrain, but it does not 
enjoy hydrocarbon rents, leaving it in a more precarious economic state than 
Bahrain. Finally, Bahrain allows us to examine the role played by ethnic 
cleavages in monarchies’ prevention or control of protests. It is true that Jordan 
also features frequently-instrumentalized demographic cleavages. But in Bahrain 
we have a regime that, as Michael Herb has observed, among the dynastic 
monarchies, “is the monarchy in which the ruling family enjoys the least support 
amongst its people – or, to be more precise, amongst the Shiite majority of the 
Bahraini citizenry” and, after all, the Al-Khalifa “have built a regime on the basis 
of the repression of the Shiites.”2   
The initial wave of the Arab Spring protests that swept the Pearl 
Roundabout in Bahrain was met with significant violence by the Bahraini police 
and security forces and ultimately led to the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) “Peninsula Shield” forces, led by Saudi Arabia. But because 
Bahrain has seen some of the most sustained protest activity of the region since 
2010 – some of which continued long after the GCC intervention – it remains a 
viable and valuable case to examine the monarchical advantage with regard to 
preventing or controlling protests. Moreover, Bahrain allows us to test Herb’s and 
                                                                                                                                     
military excepted). The monarch exists above the fray of everyday politics, but serves as a 
linchpin, holding the system and competing social cleavages together (Lucas, ibid., 108). 
“Finally,” Lucas notes that “linchpin monarchies encourage social pluralism and mobilize it along 
vertical lines to participate in the governing of the state, underneath the leadership of the 
monarchy” (Lucas, ibid., 108). 
2 Herb, Michael, “Monarchism Matters,” Foreign Policy: The Middle East Channel, November 
26, 2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/26/monarchism_matters. 
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Lucas’ contentions that the institutional differences between dynastic and linchpin 
monarchies translate to greater regime survival in dynastic monarchies as 
compared to those in linchpin monarchies.  
Methodology 
I utilize various methods to answer my research questions. In Chapters 3 
and 4, I examine hypotheses H1 (prevention) and H2a (control) using narrative 
process-tracing and semi-structured interview data. I carried out interviews in 
Jordan from June to September 2016 in Amman, Madaba, and four other sites in 
the country. In all, this yielded interviews from over 25 people. The sample 
included students, NGO directors and other civil society actors, freelance 
researchers, journalists, lawyers, and activists, including members of the 
Jordanian Hirak (movement).  
These methods allow me to examine collective action and regime 
reactions as well as the “view from the ground” of protests in a monarchy. In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I again examine hypotheses H1 and H2a using narrative process 
tracing, this time comparing Tunisia and Bahrain to each other and to Jordan.  
In Chapter 7, I further examine H1 and H2a with an original dataset of 
collective action events.3 The dataset was constructed using both the interview 
data gathered in Jordan as well as a variety of news sources including al-Jazeera, 
The Guardian, BBC Arabic news service, Agence France Presse, Reuters, The 
New York Times, The Washington Post, as well as local news outlets in Jordan 
(e.g., Ammonnews, Petra News Agency, al-Dustour, The Jordan Times, and 
                                                 
3 The codebook for this dataset is included in Appendix A. The complete dataset is available at 
http://bit.ly/Brown_CAEvents 
15 
prominent Jordanian blogs like The Black Iris and 7iber and, where applicable, 
Facebook and Twitter accounts of relevant people and groups. Finally, I cross-
referenced these media accounts as far as possible using government and NGO 
publications – including, for example, Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, International Crisis Group, and the Report of the Bahrain Independent 
Commission of Inquiry, and, finally, previously published scholarly accounts of 
the pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring periods regarding both protest activity and 
regime responses to that activity.  
The dataset – as the codebook included in the appendix demonstrates – 
coded single “collective action events” based, where data was available, on the 
following six dimensions: Date, Event Description, Size of the Action, Demands 
of the Action, Targets of Regime Response, and the Regime Response.  Both the 
demands of the action and the regime response were open-coded. Finally, based 
on the nature of the regime response and the timing relative to the event, each 
event was open-coded to reflect one of four possible categories: Persuasive 
Prevention, Persuasive Control, Coercive Prevention, or Coercive Control. This is 
presented in the data as the “Matrix Code”. 
Ultimately, the Matrix Code of each collective action event forms the data 
presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 features the principal examination of 
Hypothesis H2b using the open-coded “Matrix Code” to explore variations in 
regime responses to popular protests across the cases. Ultimately, these event 
count data are graphically presented in what I am calling the Prevention-
Control/Persuasion-Coercion Matrix. The matrix consists of the aforementioned 
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Matrix Code operationalized as event counts.  The final comparative data in 
Chapter 7 come from the Political Terror Scale. All of these data are used to 
examine Hypothesis H2b (monarchies display a distinct and discernable pattern in 
their response to protests, as compared to republics) and to visually demonstrate 
those comparisons between the cases.  
Outline of the Dissertation 
To answer these questions, the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 
will ground my research questions in the context of the broader the literature on 
monarchical advantage, authoritarian regime dynamics, and social movement 
theory. Chapter 3 will present a detailed narrative of Jordanian activism both 
before and during the Arab Spring wave. Chapter 4 then systematically explores 
hypotheses H1 (prevention) and H2/H2a (control) as they relate to the Jordanian 
case, using narrative process tracing as well as data collected through semi-
structured interviews.  
Chapters 5 and 6 replicate this process in Tunisia and Bahrain, making 
comparisons to each other and to Jordan along the way. Chapter 7 will further 
examine hypotheses H1 and H2a with the collective action event count dataset 
and will present and examine hypothesis H2b (monarchies display a distinct and 
discernable pattern in their control of protests, as compared to republics) using my 
Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion Matrix and the Political Terror Scale. 
Finally, Chapter 8 will revisit the research questions and each of the 
hypotheses, summarize the findings, draw conclusions, and discuss the 
implications of my findings for theory and for empirical politics. Based on the 
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analysis ahead, we cannot say that there is no monarchical advantage. I will show 
that monarchical advantage does appear to be supported by the ability of 
monarchies to withstand protests. But I will also show that I have found no 
evidence of monarchical advantage with respect to prevention of protests, control 
of protests, and the distinct patterns of monarchies’ responses to protests, 
compared to non-monarchies. 
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Chapter 2 
The Monarchical Advantage in Context 
Why should the monarchical advantage matter? Why should it matter to 
scholars, to policymakers, and to the general reader? The monarchical advantage 
provides a potential explanation for the variety of outcomes in the Arab Spring. 
But it also fits within the established literature on the dynamics of non-democratic 
regimes, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In this chapter, I will 
first discuss the scholarly terrain surrounding the monarchical advantage. Then I 
will examine the connection to relevant work on authoritarian regime dynamics 
that will impact the analysis to follow. 
As I affirmed in the previous chapter, the Arab Spring was the result of the 
diffusion of shared collective action frames that mobilized protests against states 
that had repeatedly broken promises about delivering political and economic 
reform.1 Crucial to this observation is the idea that the Arab Spring could, and 
did, spread regardless of regime type. Dafna Rand identifies common drivers of 
political change in monarchies and republics across the region and affirms that  
                                                 
1 The term typically used here is “modular” and is most frequently associated with Mark 
Beissinger’s work on the “color revolutions”. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular 
Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of the Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions.” Beissinger 
borrows the term from Tarrow (1998; 2005). For both Tarrow and Beissinger, “Modular action is 
action that is based in significant part on the prior successful example of others” (Beissinger 2007, 
259). Cf, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass 
Politics in the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sidney Tarrow, The 
New Transnational Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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the autocrats in the region were not all uniformly ‘robust’. 
[Instead]…most were nervously trying to manage the varied political 
changes occurring around them. Some were doing so more successfully 
than others. …But their ability to stay a step ahead of the game was 
precarious at best.2  
 
Although these shared frames and related protests repeated in monarchies and 
non-monarchies across the region, the differences in terms of outcome were 
markedly different.  
The “monarchical advantage” thesis has been proposed to explain some of 
the most notable differences in outcome of protests across regime type in the Arab 
Spring. This notion is not terra incognita. Previous authors have done exhaustive 
work cataloging cases of monarchical resilience and failure in the past.3 Some 
scholars suggest that monarchy remains stable in the region because it is 
traditional and culturally legitimate, seeing it as but an extension of tribal and 
other patrimonial systems supposedly inherent to the region.4 Others argue that 
monarchies are no more indigenous to the region than liberal democracy, but that 
they have a particular staying power due to their unique affinity for state-and 
nation-building.5 Some argue that monarchies are particularly adept at divide-and-
rule, coalitional, and clientelistic politics. Others highlight how some monarchies 
design institutional safeguards - including the peculiar institution of the royal 
family – to insulate themselves from the ebb and flow of authoritarian politics. 
Still others argue that monarchies only seem exceptional because they benefit 
                                                 
2 Rand, Roots of the Arab Spring, viii. 
3 See Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern 
Monarchies; Bank, Richter, and Sunik, “Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East:  A 
Configurational Comparison, 1945-2012”; Maddy-Weitzman, “Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? 
An Analysis of Old and New Explanations”; Ben-Dor, “Patterns of Monarchy in the Middle East”; 
Lynch, “Does Arab Monarchy Matter?” 
4 Menaldo, “The Arab Spring and MENA’s Historical Development.” 
5 Anderson, Lisa, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East.” 
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from hydrocarbon rents and the support of international patrons because of a 
regime’s geostrategic importance. Less frequently examined is the relationship 
between monarchy as a regime type and popular mobilization.6 It will be the 
purpose of this chapter to examine past and current work on the monarchical 
advantage.  
Development of the Monarchial Advantage Thesis 
We may divide the existing literature into those scholars who affirm that 
there is a monarchical advantage and point to inherent qualities of monarchy as an 
explanatory variable (or those that affirm that there appears to be a monarchical 
advantage but who do not explicitly specify an explanation inherent to the regime 
type) and those that deny that there is such an advantage or exception and point to 
other explanations. I will begin with the latter. 
Dynamics of the Monarchical Advantage Over Time 
In a 2013 article, Andre Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik outline 
three historical stages in the monarchical advantage literature.7 The 1950s and 
1960s witnessed modernization-theory approaches to these newly independent 
monarchies. Hence Huntington’s “king’s dilemma” posited that these regimes 
could not institutionally handle the pressures of modernity expected and thus we 
should expect a teleological process of rapid breakdown and the transition to 
“modern” democratic republics.8 The second stage saw a marked culturalist turn. 
                                                 
6 See Lucas, “Path Dependencies or Political Opportunities? Monarchical Resilience in the Arab 
Uprisings”; Lawrence, “Collective Protest and the Institutional Promise of Monarchy.” 
7 Andre Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik, “Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle 
East:  A Configurational Comparison, 1945-2012,” GIGA Working Papers 215 (February 2013): 
1–35. 
8 Bank et al (2013): 8. 
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Those espousing a historico-religious legitimation explanation point to a peculiar 
kind of legitimacy garnered by the Jordanian, Moroccan, and Saudi Arabian kings 
through ideological connections forged between monarchy and Islam.9  Others 
point to patriarchal and neo-patriarchal social structures as independent 
variables.10 Finally, others credit a “monarchical political culture” – one that 
“allows for credible commitment ‘through the strategic use of constitutions, 
formal political institutions, Islamic principles and informal norms.’”11  
This culturalist current carried scholarship into the early 1990s, where we 
witness a turn to four main analytical perspectives and explanations for the 
survival of monarchies: Geostrategic explanations (i.e., external military support 
of either global or regional powers); Political-economic/Rentier State 
perspectives; Institutionalist or intra-family explanations; and Legitimation 
(including Religion, Tradition, Ideology, and Material Legitimation).12 I will 
return to these explanations and Bank et al’s work in the section on those 
proponents of monarchical advantage theory. 
Though often cited as a progenitor of the debate on monarchical 
advantage, though a wider lens, one can see that Lisa Anderson’s seminal piece 
has little to say about the survival of this regime type being inherent to 
characteristics of the regime, per se, and even less to say about monarchies under 
stress from popular mobilization. What Anderson does do, and well, is to 
                                                 
9 Bank et al., ibid. Cf, Lewis 2000. 
10 Bank et al., ibid; Cf, Ben-Dor 1983, Sharabi 1988. 
11 Victor A. Menaldo, The Arab Spring and MENA’s Historical Development: Oil Curse or 
Monarchical Exceptionalism?, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, September 6, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1977706. Cited in Bank et al., ibid. 
See also Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” The Journal 
of Politics 74, no. 03 (2012): 707–722, doi:10.1017/S0022381612000436. 
12 Bank et al., 8-11. 
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interrogate the argument that monarchy survives and thrives in the Middle East 
among all other regions because it is culturally traditional and therefore 
legitimate. She finds these arguments, as well as Huntington’s “king’s dilemma” 
argument that monarchy as a regime type was doomed to failure in the face of 
modernizing forces, lacking.13 For Anderson,  
the relative strength of monarchy in the Middle East is not due to its 
evocation of regional traditions – hereditary monarchy as understood 
today is not a traditional regime type in the Middle East – but to its 
affinity with the projects of nation building and state formation, which 
consume the attention of all the rulers of the Middle East and North 
Africa. Huntington may be right that monarchy is ultimately too brittle and 
restrictive a regime to accommodate the political demands of new social 
groups. In the less than long run, however, monarchy is particularly well 
suited to the requirements of state formation, especially in its early 
stages.14 
 
Joseph Kostiner summarizes that “monarchs were thus able to exercise the 
two fundamentals of monarchical rule: generating state development and 
exercising patrimonial segmentary social control.”15 In fact, Kostiner reverses the 
lament of Hisham Sharabi that Arab regimes, particularly monarchies, are but 
repackaged (and apparently more resilient) neopatriarchy, arguing that this 
actually serves as a profound stabilizing factor.16 For Kostiner, Lisa Anderson’s 
thesis describes how the monarch served as the linchpin tying together these 
segmentary societies: “He was thereby also able to become the medium through 
                                                 
13 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968. 
14 Anderson, Lisa, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East,” 4. 
15 Kostiner, Joseph, ed., Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2000), 9; See also Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: 
Vertigo, 1974): 17-18 quoted in Anderson, Lisa, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in 
the Middle East,” 4. 
16 Kostiner, ibid. 
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which such groups were integrated into their state: the center that kept ties and 
open contacts with all the groups in society.”17  In Anderson’s words: 
The monarchies no less than the republics in the Middle East reflect the 
imperatives of state formation where state institutions are few and weak. 
The monarchies provide a regime compatible with (though not, obviously, 
required by) those imperatives – centralized, personalistic, actually or 
potentially coercive. Moreover…the monarchs of the Middle East can 
oversee vast changes in the name of preservation, inventing traditions as 
they go along. Indeed, one of the interesting recent preoccupations of the 
oil-rich Arab states around the Gulf has been in academic research that 
contributes to ‘reconstruction of the local heritage [turath].’ Finally, 
insofar as state formation requires building coalitions with representatives 
of social groups, monarchies are relatively well equipped to reassure the 
previously privileged, a stratum often of particular importance in the early 
stages of national transformation.18  
 
Yet Anderson still argues that monarchs that remain in power are no more or less 
adept at the politics of state formation than their counterparts in presidential 
republics. 
Marc Lynch, despite organizing a POMEPS briefing on the “Arab 
Monarchy Debate,” is avowedly skeptical of what he sees as the taken-for-granted 
nature of the advantages of monarchy. He is particularly skeptical of the 
arguments that attach unique legitimacy to monarchies, but also skeptical of the 
arguments that monarchies are better at divide-and-rule and selective co-optation 
and repression coupled with controlled legislatures. His skepticism crucially 
stems from the observation that these are identical to those means used by 
presidential republics.19  
Sean Yom has deployed a more structural argument – and in turn 
downplayed the cultural and institutional alternatives – wherein the exogenous 
                                                 
17 ibid. 
18 Anderson 1991: 13. 
19 Lynch, Marc, “Does Arab Monarchy Matter?” 2012.  
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factors of rentierism and geopolitics (international patrons) are those that account 
for the survival of monarchies. In his view, if you remove oil rents and external 
support, monarchies would fall just like any other in the region: “In short, the 
Arab monarchies are exceptional but not because they are monarchies. They are 
beneficiaries of geological fortune, geographic providence, and strategic attention 
by outside powers.”20 
Yom and Gause argue that there does appear to be a monarchical 
advantage while rejecting cultural and most institutional explanations. The 
authors argue that “cross-cutting coalitions of popular support” are one persuasive 
institutional argument, but they object to it, arguing that it “restates the 
unobjectionable adage that autocrats pursue policies to maximize their survival. 
Royalism presents different institutional options than republicanism, but not all 
kings adopt them; if they did, no ruling monarchy would collapse.”21 
Nevertheless, they argue that the failure of both previous monarchs and current 
presidents to cultivate and maintain these coalitions led to their downfall. 
Ultimately, they lean toward structural geostrategic explanations of rentierism and 
the backing of foreign patrons as maintaining autocratic monarchical rule.22 
Finally, it might also be asked at this stage how the monarchical advantage 
operates through time and whether the previous collapse of monarchies in the 
Middle East (Egypt 1952; Libya 1969; Iraq 1958; North Yemen 1962, and the 
Pahlavi regime in Iran 1979) disproves the monarchical advantage theory. This 
discussion also serves as a useful point of transition between detractors and 
                                                 
20 Yom “The Survival of the Arab Monarchies” ibid.  
21 Yom and Gause, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On,” 2012: 75.  
22 Yom and Gause, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On”: 2012.  
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adherents of the monarchical advantage theory. It certainly seems that the period 
between 1945 and 1979 was not kind to monarchies, but that the monarchical 
advantage suddenly somehow sets in after the fall of the Shah in 1979. It certainly 
could be an accident of time and history: these monarchies had to contend with 
the real and spreading threat of Arab nationalism as a viable organizing 
alternative, and at this time, most of the regimes were hesitant to use the full force 
of repression at their disposal.23 Herb takes a qualitatively different tack, noting 
that all of the monarchies that fell did so because of one fundamental and 
overarching reason: they were not dynastic monarchies. Examining several 
alternative hypotheses, he argues that it is not rentierism, nor the rise of an 
educated urban middle class that best explains the continuing survival of most of 
the standing monarchies, but dynastic monarchism as an institution. Those 
monarchies that survived are rentierist and non-rentierist just as those that fell. 
The surviving monarchies have larger (and still growing) educated urban middle 
classes.  
Andre Bank and his colleagues have re-tested these arguments and found 
that while breakdown was rare and occurs only under specific historical 
circumstances – and thus all other conditions beyond anti-government protests 
and lack of family participation differ depending on the case in question – many 
of the existing explanations are found deficient. In Egypt (1952), all of the 
supposedly stabilizing conditions (e.g., external military support, rentierism, 
historical-religious legitimacy) were absent and the regime experienced strong 
                                                 
23 See Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New 
Explanations,” in Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder/London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2000), 37–52. 
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anti-government protests, contributing to the breakdown of the monarchy. 
Conversely, in Iran (1979) we see strong stabilizing conditions (US military 
support, high rent revenues) but also high levels of anti-government protests, and 
the monarchy fell. Finally, in Iraq (1958) and Libya (1969) we see two regimes 
with high rent revenues and claims to historical religious legitimacy to bolster 
them, yet both monarchies fell.24  
Libya and Afghanistan both failed as a result of conflict of succession 
within the regime, something that Herb argues dynasticism might have prevented. 
The Libyan monarchy in particular was similar in many ways to the dynastic Gulf 
monarchies – “…small, oil-rich, and bedouin…”25 The military was thoroughly 
staffed with loyal bedouin and tribal allies. The monarchy did have some measure 
of religious claim to legitimacy and a parliament coexisted with the monarchy, 
but they played no role in the fall of the monarchy. Opposition activity was 
present but low in comparison even to standing monarchies like Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia. Significantly, the regime didn’t make a concerted effort to repress 
protests nor did they truly attempt to convince the public that the survival of the 
regime was in their best interest. When it came down to it, a lack of dynastic rule 
meant that there was no succession plan for the octogenarian King Idris in 1969. 
This looming and compounding crisis also led to a critical relaxation in the 
monitoring of the military’s loyalty, providing an opening for Qaddafi to emulate 
his Arab nationalist hero, Nasser in leading a military coup.26 
                                                 
24 Bank, Richter, and Sunik, “Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East:  A 
Configurational Comparison, 1945-2012.” 
25 Herb 1999: 183. 
26 Herb 1999: 183-196. 
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Similarly, in Afghanistan, a power struggle within the regime caused the 
downfall of the monarchy. Like Libya, the Afghani monarchy made significant 
liberalizing inroads, opening and cooperating with a parliament and encouraging 
fair elections. In the Afghani case, there was a concerted effort to operate 
according to the dictates of dynastic monarchism, but the downfall of the regime 
didn’t come from the Muhammadizi clan failing to monopolize key cabinet posts. 
Instead, the difference was in the system of separation of powers or division of 
power between the palace and the premiership.27 The gradual erosion of dynastic 
power in the top state offices led directly to the fall of the monarchy. For Herb, 
this is a crucial distinction that doesn’t occur in the successful dynastic 
monarchies.28 
In Egypt and Iraq, the pattern changes somewhat but the outcome of 
monarchical breakdown remains the same. Egypt was characterized by a corrupt 
network of king and cronies at the top of the regime overseeing an equally corrupt 
and hollow parliament. Unlike the Libyan and Afghani cases, the Egyptian 
military’s officer corps was knowingly staffed with the new urban educated 
middle class rather than the landowning elite or bedouin and tribal allies. The 
parliament was seen as no more than a patronage machine and was widely 
disdained. The Egyptian monarchy (unlike the Iraqi) did make a concerted 
attempt to employ Islam as a legitimating tool. This can be seen in the throne’s 
courting of the bastion of Egyptian ulama, al-Azhar, pitting religious elites in 
                                                 
27 Herb 1999: 201. 
28 Interestingly, Herb notes that this same separation of powers pattern has occurred in Bahrain, 
increasing intra-regime tension, which seemed to play out within the regime during the uprising 
and will be theoretically interesting and crucial to watch. 
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tension with the regime’s sometimes-opponent Wafd party.29 This failed because 
of the incompatibility of King Farouq’s hedonism with al-Azhar’s values along 
with the institution’s desire not to be seen as a mere appendage of the corrupt 
regime, especially in light of the growing successes of the Muslim Brotherhood.30 
Islam was off the table as a legitimating mechanism. The other avenue of 
legitimation – liberalization by opening a parliament – failed as dramatically in 
the Egyptian case as it later would in the Iraqi case.31 Finally, to add insult to 
injury, King Farouq was incompetent; a fact that, Herb observes, the public and 
especially the Free Officers could no longer countenance. Ultimately, what led to 
the downfall of Egypt was predictably familiar as an intraregime conflict: “…the 
divorce of those who profited from the standing order and those who defended 
it…”32 Iraq took the problems of the Egyptian monarchy and made them worse, 
being the only case which Herb and Kedourie argue that the fall of the monarchy 
was inevitable.33 Again the Iraqi military officer corps was staffed with the new 
middle class while the regime represented the landed elite and wealthy politicians. 
The Iraqi public and the military officers saw the regime as manufactured and a 
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British vassal; disdain for it was therefore widespread. The corrupt parliament 
(again, even more corrupt that the Egyptian parliament) did nothing to aid the 
survival of the monarchy either. In the end, neither the Iraqi nor the Egyptian 
monarchies made an attempt to assuage the anger of their populations by shifting 
their alliances away from the shaykhs of the landed and tribal elite and away from 
the British and toward the growing nationalist blocs. Monarchs in both Egypt and 
Iraq likewise overestimated the control they had over the military and their ability 
to keep the army in its barracks.34 Ultimately it was those nationalist blocs, led by 
the educated urban middle class with the officer corps as its vanguard that toppled 
these regimes. Lastly, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman presciently observes another 
commonality between the Egyptian and Iraqi cases. All scholars now note in the 
retrospect that both the Egyptian and the Iraqi monarchies sat atop societies 
undergoing profound social and economic changes instigated by the twin 
demographic pressures of a population explosion and concomitant urbanization. 
Add to this the expansion of the educational system (and thus an increase in the 
politically conscious), stagnating economies, rampant frustration amongst the 
cadres of officers in the military, all in the midst of a corrupt, “dysfunctional and 
discredited” regime, and we have a recipe for revolutionary upheaval not unlike 
those patterns that appeared in the Arab Spring.35 
Finally, the Pahlavi Shah’s monarchy in Iran is an interesting and unique 
case. As Herb argues,  
the Iranian revolution is unlike any other in the Middle East, for the ancien 
regime collapsed while its leader, the Shah, retained control of the organs 
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of the state. The army did not rebel, as it did in Iraq and in Egypt; nor did 
the regime split, as it did in Afghanistan and Libya. Street demonstrations 
and strikes, absent any mutiny within the army or fracture in the regime, 
overthrew the monarchy.36 
 
Herb attributes the decay and downfall of the Iranian monarchy to serious 
miscalculations and missteps by the Shah; missteps so egregious that Herb asks us 
to question whether the Shah was lacking any political (or common) sense about 
the consequences of his policies. For Herb this is nowhere more pronounced than 
when we recognize that  
When [the Shah’s] policies bore their bitter fruit he did not ruthlessly 
repress, despite the urgent pleas of his generals to defend the regime. Only 
thus could a regime facing no threats from within the organs of the state, 
nor from armed insurgency, nor from foreign powers, fail in the face of 
demonstrations in the streets.37 
Said Arjomand blames the dramatic influx of oil revenue for bestowing 
unprecedented autonomy on the Pahlavi monarchy such that the Shah felt he 
could ignore those socio-political forces that might have been his natural allies: 
the rising middle class.38 The Shah mistakenly did not entertain the possibility of 
liberalization through a parliament because he saw no reason to gather and 
incorporate the opinions of his subjects. However, he did seem to be cognizant 
that a single-party regime was more stable, thus creating the hizb-i-Rastakhiz to 
facilitate (or create the image of) political participation. The Shah was of a single 
mind to create radical modernization from above using his increasing oil wealth, 
                                                 
36 Herb 1999: 217. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988) cited in Maddy-Weitzman, ibid., 44. 
31 
and his “efforts to create political participation were little more than determined 
expressions of autocracy.”39 
By 1977 it was clear even to the Shah that the monarchy was in serious 
trouble and he was without a “moderate middle” to support his rule against the 
united leftist and religious opposition.40 In this vein, 1977 and 1978 saw a 
massive increase in liberalization measures, designed to take the sting out of the 
“reforms” the Shah had pushed through before. Included in these liberalizations 
were the promise of free and fair parliamentary elections. But as Herb observes  
each new concession, instead of garnering the Shah the support of the 
moderate middle, seemed an admission of weakness to the opposition 
elites on the left and on the right who correctly gained the impression that 
more and greater pressure would induce a collapse. …The Iranian 
monarchy fell because the Shah unnecessarily provoked his people, then 
would not defend his regime from them.41 
Ultimately, as Bruce Maddy-Weitzman concludes, the failure of these 
monarchies was a natural result of their lack of leadership skills, the looming 
alternative of Arab nationalism, attractive to those opposition groups shunned in 
nearly every case by the regimes, the urban, educated middle class, who 
eventually played a central role in overthrowing the monarchy. Because the 
monarchies did not seek to ally themselves with this rising nationalist current, and 
failed to position themselves as “the repositories of the national will and the 
nation’s hopes” they could not build the theoretically crucial elite pacts and cross-
cutting coalitions that would so deftly serve later monarchies. Put simply, by the 
end they had so alienated all sectors of society that they could not hope to perform 
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the crucial act of balancing their rule among multiple pillars by “manipulat[ing] 
diverse political forces.”42 
Proponents of the Monarchical Advantage 
Much of the literature identifies crucial institutional variables that explain 
the characteristics and dynamics of Arab authoritarian regimes but that they also 
frequently make no differentiation between regime types in describing those 
dynamics and characteristics. In a discussion of whether past failed monarchies in 
the region are any indicator of the reliability of the monarchical advantage, we 
have also uncovered explanatory variables that will naturally bleed over into our 
review of the arguments in favor of the monarchical advantage.  
In a smooth transition from the broader authoritarian elite dynamics 
literature to the monarchical advantage literature, Daniel Brumberg observes that 
Arab autocracies are indeed characterized by “protection rackets” which he 
defines as clientelist institutions that represent “an exchange by which regimes 
provided a diverse range of groups – ethnic or religious minorities, the business 
sector, and secular activists – with a haven from the uncertainties of an open 
democratic process” that elites fear would produce institutions that could undercut 
their de facto power and patron-client privileges.43 While the general strategy is 
still one of divide-and-rule, Brumberg observes that each individual racket 
differed from regime to regime based “on their institutional mechanisms, and in 
terms of the groups that received protection.”44 While Brumberg doesn’t 
explicitly set out to discuss only the sustaining mechanisms of monarchical Arab 
                                                 
42 Maddy-Weitzman, 49. 
43 Brumberg, Daniel “The Sustaining Mechanisms of Arab Autocracies” 2011. 
44 Ibid. 
33 
autocracies, he does ultimately point to “structural difference between monarchies 
and presidential, party-machine systems” as explanatory of the monarchical 
advantage: Presidents have no real moral bond with the people, and even if they 
wanted to break free from the regime and demonstrate that they were indeed 
different, individually legitimate, trustworthy, etc., they are still implicated with 
the ruling party and other apparatuses by the nature of the institutional 
arrangement. Monarchs, by contrast, operate at a physical and symbolic distance. 
This argument, which I will refer to as the “above-the-fray” argument or 
characteristic, will return throughout the proponent literature. Ultimately, 
Brumberg concludes that republican presidents are “especially poor manipulators 
of the protection racket system” and, conversely, that “protection racket politics 
have a certain elective affinity for monarchical systems.”45  
Lisa Anderson’s arguments underlie Brumberg’s. Focusing on the 
particular elective affinity of monarchies for state- and nation-building, Anderson 
presents the monarch as the anchor of the nation  
Unlike nationalist regimes, monarchies acknowledge, sustain, even 
encourage heterogeneity among their subjects. Monarchs are better able to 
serve as the central focus in balancing, manipulating, and controlling 
societies characterized by such vertical cleavages, particularly when those 
are reinforced by “antiquity of blood.” The continued emphasis on tribal 
and family divisions in the Arabian peninsula [for example] not only 
reinforces the legitimacy of the constitutive principle of [kinship] but also 
permits the monarchs to exercise their skills as patrons and mediators.46 
 
In doing so she also points out that the differences in legitimation between 
monarchies and republics mean that monarchies can avoid the modern, nationalist 
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convention of political sovereignty that makes all citizens interchangeable. 
Instead,  
monarchies promote and defend definitions of the roles of kinds and their 
subjects that emphasize inequality, diversity, and personal fealty. As a 
result, kings not only endorse societal diversity, inequality, and 
multiplicity as constitutive principles of politics: they deliberately create 
and maintain complex social structures in practice47 
 
I believe Anderson would agree with Brumberg by saying that the 
dynamics she is describing bolster Brumberg’s assertion that monarchies are 
simply better at cultivating the crucial cross-cutting coalitions and other elite 
pacts that stabilize monarchical rule. Ultimately, she points out that the pattern of 
monarchical rule is one of patron client relationships. It is interesting to note 
compared to Herb, that she makes no distinction between linchpin monarchies 
that seek social bases of rule among clients in the business, religious, and other 
sectors, and dynastic monarchies that consolidate and bolster their rule through 
the cultivation of existing kinship loyalties. Gabriel Ben-Dor attributes this 
characteristic behavior of monarchies as stemming from the fact that “there is 
more fluidity within the royal elite, and there is more contact between that elite 
and other elites in society than is normally the case for classic ‘active’ 
monarchies.”48 In any case, Anderson observes that monarchies are able and 
willing to favor particular communities (e.g., religious minorities in her example) 
because “such favoritism reinforces the arbitrary power of the king to create and 
legitimate social distinctions and to sustain the resulting groups as his clienteles 
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and constituencies.”49 By presenting himself as protector, the king establishes a 
patron-client relationship that can likewise be used in times of opposition when 
the palace must confront the emergence of non-kin groups. Such groups might 
build themselves around particular economic or political-ideological 
commitments (e.g., labor unions, inchoate parties, interest groups, or newspapers).  
In any case, the reaction from the monarchy is the same: to accommodate 
“these developments in royal fashion, using their patronage to encapsulate and 
incorporate potential challenges based on ideology and interest.”50  
In a 2012 article, Herb argues that the monarchical advantage is explained and 
characterized by two things: first, the monarch’s ability to make credible promises 
of reform, and second, citizens’ view of monarchies as perhaps not ideal but 
ultimately better than republican alternatives.51 The first is a result of the ability of 
the monarch to promise reform and carry those reforms – or at least some 
semblance of them – through, while maintaining power. This theme – an 
operational variant of the “above-the-fray” argument – will likewise return 
numerous times in the literature and represents the ability of the ruler to make 
credible and liberalizing changes without endangering his own power; A monarch 
can make credible changes to the institutional make-up of the regime and 
maintain his power while the sands shift beneath his feet.52 Herb observes, as 
many dissenters have, that this could be similar across regime type, but the key is 
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how citizens view the endpoint: an absolute monarchy can feasibly become a 
constitutional monarchy; a president cannot innovate in this same way. This same 
argument is presented by Brumberg and in a 2013 Working Paper by Adria 
Lawrence. Lawrence also observes that monarchies have this unique institutional 
feature that other authoritarian regimes lack in that they can liberalize by 
becoming constitutional monarchies without destabilizing the leadership. 
Moreover, becoming a constitutional monarchy, according to Lawrence, 
“complicates coordination among regime opponents and affect[s] the kinds of 
claims [opponents] make”.53 
The second – the citizens’ view of monarchies as not ideal but better than 
republican alternatives – is advanced as the difference between protests in 
republics and in monarchies. This is essentially a matter of comparative regime 
legitimacy. The aims of protests were different in monarchies versus republics 
because there was some respect retained for monarchs as opposed to presidents 
(or at least caution about the costs of revolution if the result might be a republic 
on the level of Mubarak’s Egypt, Ben ‘Ali’s Tunisia, or Asad’s Syria). For Herb, 
this shows that the monarchical advantage in terms of protests has nothing to do 
with oil. In a 2013 working paper, he reiterates this argument by saying that the 
monarchical advantage stems from preference in Arab public opinion for the 
reform rather than the overthrow of monarchies. 
Russell Lucas argues that monarchies simply have an easier time adapting 
to emerging challenges and interests because of their capacity for greater 
institutional flexibility, and – echoing others’ arguments – the greater ability to 
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liberalize without a real threat to the palace. Particularly in constitutional 
monarchies, parliaments allow monarchs to tolerate a challenge from opposition 
because the opposition is competing for control of the parliament, not to wrest 
control from the monarch. This contributes to and is a part of the aforementioned 
“above-the-fray” argument, as the monarch can remain out of quotidian politics of 
the legislature and use divide-and-rule strategies to control opposition elites. 
Clientelist strategies force different elements of the regime coalition to compete 
for the monarch’s attention and favor, making any regime splits centripetal and 
reinforcing. Comparing dynastic versus linchpin monarchies, Lucas argues that 
the former are able to rule through patronage and co-optation alone, while the 
latter, in addition to those strategies, are better able to use liberalization as a 
stabilizing tool.54 
Bank et al., examine four existing explanations, as noted above: 
Geostrategic; Political-economic/rentierist; institutionalist/intra-family/dynastic; 
and Legitimation. Geostrategic explanations argue variously that external military 
support from global powers (American or, historically, the Soviet Union) or 
regional powers (Egypt, Iran, and/or Saudi Arabia) serve to bolster authoritarian 
monarchies against forces that might otherwise topple them or comparable 
republics. In a slightly different take, this external support can go beyond broadly 
bolstering a regime and manifest in the performance of domestic politics. Brand 
and Yom both point to unconditional foreign aid that finances repression and co-
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optation of the domestic opposition.55 Snyder likewise points to military aid as a 
tool used to support “domestic patronage networks” and argues that arms deals 
negotiated between the parties serve to strengthen the relationship and ensure 
continued support.56  
Political-Economic/Rentier state explanations frequently work in 
conjunction with Geostrategic explanations, one complimenting and extending the 
other. In short, political economic or rentier explanations speak to authoritarian 
regimes that are blessed with hydrocarbon or other mineral deposits on which to 
rely for revenue. These regimes are supposedly more stable because they are 
either able to weather what domestic and regional storms do arise or because they 
do so by using that disposable wealth to buy off a population which they don’t 
have to tax in the first place. Rentier explanations were the unquestioned standard 
(at least according to Herb’s view of the field). Herb interrogates the theory, 
pointing out that rentierism only predicts that these states will be authoritarian, 
not that they will be immune to revolution. Gause points out the crucial 
distinction for our purposes, however, when he say that “[oil] wealth and how it 
has been used, explains why these purportedly fragile regimes have been able to 
ride out the domestic and regional storms of the last two decades.”57 As the 
emphasis demonstrates, it is not merely the passive presence of wealth, especially 
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hydrocarbon rents, but how the wealth is used. What do hydrocarbon rents buy 
such regimes? The answer to this question is similar to the arguments by Brand, 
Yom, and Snyder about what military support affords regimes. For Herb, there is 
another element that should be noted: the dynastic monarchies had the structures 
of dynastic rule in place prior to oil and the ruling families were thus ideally-
placed to capitalize on this wealth and construct a modern state around the family 
as an institution.  
Institutionalist or intra-family explanations encompass the distinction 
between what Herb calls dynastic monarchies and what Lucas calls linchpin 
monarchies.58 In examining the cases of failed and surviving monarchies, Herb 
observes that the vast majority of stable monarchies have in common the dynastic 
characteristic of their institutions – that the royal family “monopolizes the central 
positions in both the administration and the security apparatus.”59 For Herb, 
dynasticism – the unity and solidarity of ruling families who monopolize the 
highest offices of the regime and place members ubiquitously through even the 
lower posts of the regime apparatus and who thereby “have developed robust 
mechanisms for the distribution of power among their members, particularly 
during successions, and exercise a thus far unshakable hegemony over their 
states” – represents the most persuasive explanatory variable for the survival of 
some monarchies and the collapse of others.60 Dynastic monarchies are able to 
weather storms because of their ability to circumvent challenges to power from 
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within. Because no outsiders are able to control the higher institutions of the 
regime, they also cannot build up positions of power at the top of the regime from 
which to launch or coordinate a coup. In no case of monarchical breakdown does 
Herb find an instance of dynastic monarchism. As Bank et al. – and I – argue, this 
does not explain the survival of non-dynastic monarchies in Jordan and Morocco.  
Finally, Legitimation, which Schlumberger identifies as composed of four 
“core competencies” for survival: 1) Religion, which is particularly useful when 
used against Islamist opposition and is frequently invoked in Jordan, Morocco and 
Saudi Arabia; 2) Tradition, frequently invoked by the dynastic monarchies and 
consistently reinvented and redeployed as it suits a regime;61 3) Ideology, which 
has historically been more often employed by the republics whom Schlumberger 
notes based their claims to leadership on revolutionary and often socialist and/or 
Arab nationalist ideologies, but is also frequently used by monarchies (Bank et al 
highlight Jordan’s King Hussein and the debates about Hashemitism and dynastic 
modernism);62 Finally 4) Material Legitimation serves as a nexus between 
rentierism and other political-economic explanations and the allocation and 
distribution of state resources, ensuring the support and loyalty of influential 
social groups. Bank et al also include opposition as the “other side of the equation 
– the acceptance of those strategies by the target audience.”63 
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In their comparative historical analysis, Bank et al. conclude that there are 
two main explanatory variables common to all cases of breakdown: anti-
government protests and lack of family participation. All other cases differ 
depending on the case in question. What their analysis ultimately shows, 
unsurprisingly, is that explanations of breakdown and survival require complex 
interactions with other conditions or factors, which naturally makes 
generalizability difficult. Breakdown is rare and occurs only under very specific 
historical circumstances. Bank et al cast doubt on historical-religious legitimacy 
arguments (breakdown occurred in two out of four monarchies that exhibited 
strong historical-religious legitimacy), and confirm Herb’s argument about the 
weakness of the rentier theory in explaining revolution (breakdown occurred in 
three out of the four monarchies exhibiting high rent revenues). Finally, while 
family participation (dynasticism) is absent in all cases of breakdown, they 
undermine Herb’s argument to some degree by pointing out that it is neither 
sufficient nor necessary as a condition for breakdown. It is not necessary because 
there was family participation in the North Yemeni Imamate before its 
breakdown. It is not sufficient because the linchpin monarchies survive without 
high levels of family participation. They do also note, however, that outside 
support alone cannot guarantee survival in the face of strong anti-government 
protests, but if external support were absent and legitimacy were eroded at the 
same time, even the stable linchpin monarchies can be destabilized, similar to 
Egypt’s fate in 1952.64 Speaking to the present survival of the linchpin 
monarchies in Jordan and Morocco, Bank et al. point to the explanatory variable 
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of historical-religious legitimacy even in the absence of resource rents and 
dynasticism.  
For Herb, however, the explanation for the survival of the Jordanian and 
Moroccan monarchies is an institutional one and a logical extension of his 
argument about the primacy of dynastic monarchism. In lieu of the stability 
afforded by dynasticism, the linchpin monarchs are adept at balancing forces 
within their regime while ensuring that the monarchy as an institution is not 
threatened. Hence, Herb makes the case that the successful non-dynastic monarch 
must be accomplished in statecraft. For him, the difference between the surviving 
linchpin monarchies and the failed monarchies such as the Shah’s is that the 
Jordanian and Moroccan kings realize that they must play the game. Comparing 
the Pahlavi monarchy with the Moroccan, Herb says 
It is perhaps most revealing to set [former Moroccan king] Hassan’s 
survival against the Shah’s fall. The Shah, awash in oil, did nothing to 
build political organizations – and parliament and parties – that could 
create support for his regime. Instead, he tried to build a single-party 
monarchy, and failed. King Hassan, poorer and wiser, might play a cynical 
game with his parliament, but at least he plays it. The Shah thought 
himself above such things, but found out he was not. In the absence of 
dynastic monarchism, kings must be politicians, and good ones: they must 
strive to make themselves useful and popular among their people.65 
 
This is of course at least a two-player game, and the opposition (and the 
dynamics between opposition, palace, elites, and the public) must be considered. 
Here things return to a somewhat traditional examination of authoritarian elite 
dynamics. The job of the linchpin monarch is to ensure that the game continues, 
that the opposition realizes that its preference ordering should take into account 
the potential chaos that revolution and deposing the monarch would evoke. The 
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opposition must “balance between the rewards of playing the game, the demands 
of their cadres, and the need to maintain a popular base (by which they maintain 
their value in the game). Meanwhile both must attempt to ensure that the cynicism 
of the public about the dynamics between the ruler, elites, and opposition or about 
the efficacy of the parliament should be prevented if not eliminated or at least 
minimized. As Herb warns,  
Cynicism is the danger of this sort of political game. When everyone 
recognizes that it is a game, they cease, or may cease, to think that the 
parliament provides a method of constraining the power of the elite – 
monarch and party leaders alike – in a way that impels this elite to pay 
some heed to the interests of others in society.66 
The Jordanian monarchy even more starkly demonstrates not only the 
differences between dynastic and non-dynastic monarchies, but also the steps that 
non-dynastic monarchies must take if they are to avoid the fate of their 
predecessors. Like the Iraqi Hashemite regime, Jordan’s king Hussein 
experienced similar disdain from the urban educated middle classes and public 
who saw the Hashemite regime as an artificial transplant and vassal of the British. 
Luckily for Hussein, the British commander who organized the Jordanian military 
had staffed its ranks with loyal bedouin rather than townspeople. These bedouin 
were easily convinced to choose the king over their officers when a coup attempt 
occurred. Hussein continued this pattern of making the military a thoroughly 
loyal, Transjordanian, (and decidedly non-Palestinian), non-nationalist institution, 
allowing the king to effectively repress rather than negotiate with the nationalist 
and Palestinian opposition forces over the years.67 This rural bedouin support was 
not static, however, and even the Hashemite monarchy was rocked by significant 
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riots in response to IMF economic policies in 1989. Importantly, Herb observes 
that the riots were “worst in traditionally loyal royalist cities like Ma’an, Kerak, 
and al-Tafilah.”68 Taking proactive steps that the failed monarchies did not or 
could not, Hussein responded with liberalization, albeit a controlled one – that 
sought to assuage the traditionally loyal bedouin constituencies but also to 
broaden his base of support to new pillars, namely the Palestinians, partially for 
their unwillingness to participate in the riots of 1989. The king maintained his 
tight hold on the bedouin-palace alliance by ensuring that electoral districts were 
drawn to favor those same districts that rebelled in 1989. The monarchy’s 
liberalization program at the time also included drafting a pact to delineate the 
constitutional monarchy, still giving prominence to the throne but promising to 
respect and expand pluralism in the parliament.69 The monarchy in Jordan, at least 
during Hussein’s rule, attempted to better its chances for survival by enshrining 
succession mechanisms similar to dynastic monarchism but the regime ultimately 
still benefits from the socio-political cleavage between Palestinians and East Bank 
Jordanians. By staffing the military with East Bank loyalists, the monarchy can 
solidify its rule while maintaining its ability and willingness to repress challenges, 
thereby avoiding the mistake of passivity that we observe in the Shah’s Iran, as 
well as monarchical Egypt and Iraq. 
Clearly there is some debate on the question of the monarchical advantage. 
The scope of this project is such that it cannot engage and satisfy the entire 
debate. We must restrict our examination to particular elements. Given that the 
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comparison between a republic (Tunisia) and both a dynastic (Bahrain) and 
linchpin (Jordan) monarchy, is a central element of this dissertation, it is 
necessary to examine, at least briefly, the literature on general authoritarian 
regime dynamics. 
Dynamics of Autocracy in the Middle East 
There is a substantial body of work on the dynamics of non-democratic 
regimes and not all that literature can or should be covered here. The events of the 
Arab Uprisings were astounding to many not only because they uprooted the 
dictators of two of the most repressive regimes in the region, but also because of 
protesters’ brazen confrontations of entrenched regimes – regimes that many 
believed would never fall. Steven Heydemann’s work on “authoritarian 
upgrading” – still a useful analytical tool – is a relic of that time period as we saw 
many dictators enter their third decade of rule with either no end in sight or a 
monarchy-like succession plan in the wings. Clearly, nondemocratic regimes in 
the Middle East had found a way to “stick around”. 
Ghalioun and Costopoulos are scathing in their description of the post-
populist forms that the authoritarian and hybrid regimes in the Middle East have 
taken. In the course of their criticism, they observe that the contemporary Arab 
regimes are not as dependent upon popular legitimacy as they might have been in 
the past, but instead exist as repositories of clan-based clientelistic power, 
bolstered by coercion. The very raison d’être is to “put the state in the service of 
elites corrupted against the nation. Such an organization of power presupposes 
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and demands the dis-organization – which is to say the oppression – of society.”70 
Reiterating, Ghalioun directs this charge against all autocratic regimes in the 
region, effectively denying a monarchical advantage. It is interesting to note, 
however, that he highlights the very coalitional politics and patron-client variables 
that others have identified as peculiar to some monarchies. 
Ghalioun describes the strategy as the feudalization of the modern Arab 
states precisely because of the lack of turnover or renewal of these entrenched 
elite-regime relationships, which has resulted in a de facto hereditary aristocracy. 
But the crisis of “stagnation of power” is justly leveled, in his eyes, against both 
monarchies and republics in the region.71  Interestingly, contrary to the assertions 
of many previous scholars that the monarchical advantage and authoritarian 
durability in the region were the results of traditional cultural foundations, 
Ghailoun names the chaotic “modernization from above” that effectively severed 
the connection between citizens and the reference points of tradition: the state 
grows stronger and more centralized while society and the individual grows 
weaker, the two separated from their ostensibly common foundation.72 An 
interesting comparison here can be drawn to the different relationships between 
institutions and the monarchy and between the monarchy and the people in the 
two principal types of monarchies: linchpin and dynastic monarchies. 
But Ghalioun’s work simply tells us that regimes throughout the region 
share in this endemic stagnation of power, not how it relates to and shapes their 
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methods of rule and their durability. Albrecht and Schlumberger, together with 
Sharabi, demonstrate that the predominant strategy of nondemocratic regimes in 
the region is neopatrimonialism, which relies on corporatism and co-optation to 
maintain political power.73 Co-optation as a strategy is generally understood to 
mean a strategy of patronage and nepotism wherein elites outside of the regime 
are brought into the ruling/incumbent elites’ orbit in exchange for rewards; a 
process of rent-seeking. Importantly, however, political power is always carefully 
segregated from the co-opted elites, thus making them dependent upon the ruler 
for continuing patronage. It will be important later to draw attention to the 
parallels of this argument among those who support that there is a monarchical 
advantage by arguing that these characteristics may be common across regime 
type, but monarchies do it better. 
Hamladji addresses the lacuna directly, pointing out what we know – that 
authoritarian Arab regimes are particularly adept at combining policies of elite co-
optation and opposition repression to ensure durability – and what we don’t: how 
the mechanisms of elite co-optation stabilize the regime rather than destabilize 
it.74 In Ellen Lust-Okar’s examination of incumbent-opposition dynamics, we find 
a description of the very elements on which monarchical advantage theorists 
focus but as yet advance no explanation for. We know that institutions affect how 
and whether groups within a regime are able to have their demands met from 
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within the system. It follows, for Lust-Okar and Widener that institutional 
arrangements that foreclose meeting the demands of all opposition groups will 
make contentious politics against the state more likely.75 But this would seem to 
damage assertions that co-optation and corporatist policies and institutional 
structures are supportive of authoritarian regimes. For Lust-Okar, however, the 
real difference between corporatist and non-corporatist arrangements is not the 
desire of the opposition to mobilize against the regime, but rather the ability of 
opposition elites to overcome the collective action problem.76 This would seem to 
lend credence to the institutional aspect of my hypothesis: that cross-cutting 
coalitions are useful for incumbent regimes to create collective action problems 
and obstruct mobilization.77  
Linz also proves particularly useful in this first cut where his definition of 
authoritarian regimes explicitly includes the central processes of co-optation, 
whereby co-opted leaders come to act and represent an imagined, “semi-
opposition” composed of “those groups that are not dominant or represented in 
the governing group but are willing to participate in power without fundamentally 
challenging the regime.”78 As Hamladji correctly notes, elites might seek to 
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participate with the hope of garnering strength vis-à-vis the regime, but its very 
cooperation – and often collusion – with the regime discredits any credibility it 
might have had as a legitimate opposition. Because these effectively co-opted 
elites cannot act as an effective opposition, they paradoxically come to act more 
like pillars of the regime “allowing it to function as a kind of permanent coalition 
between different tolerated groups…[and playing] the double role of supporting 
the regime by increasing its responsiveness and sharing with it the responsibilities 
of unpopular policies.”79  
Lust-Okar again helpfully fills in crucial details. She makes the connection 
to social movement theory – in particular, political opportunity structure 
frameworks – which describe exactly the thing in which many monarchical 
advantage scholars are concerned: the ability of regime incumbents to structure 
institutions 1) to determine “insiders” and “outsiders” 2) to play groups off of 
each other, and 3) thereby control the ability of the opposition to mobilize against 
the regime.80 To wit, regimes choose from among three ideal institutional 
arrangements or strategies which she calls “Structures of Contestation” (SoCs): 
• Exclusive, unified SoC: No political opponents are allowed to 
participate in the formal political institutions; power is centralized 
around the incumbent elites alone; 
• Divided SoC: Elites allow some opponents to participate in the 
regime while continuing to exclude others, and; 
• Inclusive, unified SoC: All opponents are incorporated into the 
regime, but the incumbent elites carefully limit their participatory 
role.81 
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Presumably, the divided SoC represents what the monarchical advantage 
theorists like Yom and Gause consider the role of cross-cutting coalitions. Lust-
Okar is careful to point out that these structures of contestation are malleable and 
independent of regime type and individual leadership style. Therefore, incumbent 
elites can change the institutional structure from among these ideal types in order 
to better maintain control. For our purposes vis-à-vis the monarchical advantage 
argument, these structures of contestation represent institutional arrangements that 
likely play some significant role in ensuring regime resiliency. The trick for my 
particular argument lies in unpacking the mechanics of these types of categories 
and determining whether these represent cross-cutting coalitions, and whether it 
matters (for the argument about mobilization as the dependent variable) if they are 
not. The utility in pairing social movement theory, particularly the more 
institutionalist subtypes, with these arguments should be obvious from the 
similarity of language. 
Albrecht and Schlumberger focus closely on these co-opted elites. The 
authors identify these potential coalition members as Politically Relevant Elites 
(PREs): those that are most closely affiliated with the regime leadership.82 Going 
some way in identifying the puzzle of the mechanisms by which co-optation 
strategies serve to stabilize regimes, they show that the aim of such strategies is to 
both extend the influence and reach of the regime into different sectors of society, 
thereby restricting populism and widening the regime’s power base, while also 
attempting to seal the individual leader off in an uncontested office, away from 
the co-opted elites. Importantly, as we also noted in Lust-Okar’s model, these 
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coalitions are in constant flux as the leader continuously reshuffles elites so that 
no individual or group becomes strong enough to develop an independent power 
base; keeping those with proven loyalty in their posts; all as the regime 
internalizes new political and economic developments. As internalized 
developments change, the composition of the elite coalitions likewise changes, 
including, for example, technocrats and private-sector business elites.83 
What becomes clear in these practices is that regimes reinforce these 
informal co-optation strategies by intertwining them within formal institution 
building strategies. As Albrecht and Schlumberger note, one difficulty (or 
strength, as it were, for the authoritarian regime) in the region is the incongruity 
between formal and informal institutions and between institutions and real power. 
In many regimes, centralization around personalized rule is commonplace, where 
formal institutions exist (such as parliaments, political parties, and governmental 
committees) but power is systematically diverted around to informal institutions 
or back to the leader. In some regimes, for example (Albrecht and Schlumberger 
note Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), by pairing PRE co-
optation strategies and institutional strategies, parliaments do, in effect, represent 
society at large, but seats are tightly controlled and "filled with the representatives 
of strategically important social groups" and "...function essentially as indicators 
of public opinion. Without risking much, the regimes can assess whether specific 
policies face serious resistance among the social groups and segments that their 
power is based on."84 Regimes likewise use these same strategies to create the 
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semblance of competition or contestation paired with co-optation by allowing 
NGOs and even new political parties to form. But these are governed by the same 
PRE co-optation strategies. 
Regardless of the individuals co-opted or the coalitions to be constructed, 
the purpose of these institutions is to “serve as a tool for creating networks and 
loyalties and as channels for upward social mobility.”85  Albrecht and 
Schlumberger discern allocative and inclusionary co-optation strategies, with the 
aim of the former to transform institutions from forums for competing ideas or 
programs into arena for the allocation of access to decision-making power and 
rent-seeking, and the aim of the latter to create “a more pluralist formation of 
heterogeneous and competing interests within the PRE [that] matches perfectly 
with the core trait of patrimonialism: the strategy of ‘divide and rule’ by which 
rulers balance competing elite factions.”86 In sum, it seems that the stability 
provided by clientelist and co-optation strategies is focused on “a process of 
widening the regimes’ social bases and has greatly helped leaders maintain their 
ruling positions: a successful strategy for avoiding change of regime is change in 
regime.”87 
The reader will note, however, that few if any of these observations are 
reserved exclusively to either monarchical or republican authoritarian regimes. It 
would appear, based on the literature, that there is no distinction between regime 
types in terms of the cross-cutting coalitions and broader regime strategies of co-
optation and clientelism as they pertain to regime survival. 
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Chapter 3  
Jordanian Protest – Ex Nihilo? 
In April 2002, tit-for-tat violence persisted between Palestinians and Israel 
as the al-Aqsa Intifada continued to flare, two years on. Protests against Israel’s 
bombing campaign and against perceived American bias and complicity in the 
campaign – as well as anxiety at the Bush administration’s march to war with Iraq 
– materialized across the Arab world. In Amman, the confluence of shifting 
weather and inflammatory Friday sermons brought crowds into the streets. 
Waiting for them outside the mosques were police, adorned in riot gear, who 
warned potential protesters to remain calm, to avoid approaching the Israeli 
embassy – presumably the intended destination of the protesters – and of the 
continued ban on all marches declared by the Interior Ministry the previous day. 
As reported by the New York Times, the police commander instructed the crowd 
in no uncertain terms: “We understand your feelings…. We don’t want sedition. 
Please stay where you are and shout the slogans you want and don’t move.”1 
The crowd – composed predominantly of “angry young men” – complied 
with the orders until “after milling about briefly, thousands of young men surged 
toward the line of police officers blocking the route to the embassy, and mayhem 
ensued.”2 Police began with numerous salvos of tear gas but immediately 
escalated to running baton attacks, supported by a water cannon. The melee 
intensified as protesters climbed onto roofs to retaliate against the police, “where 
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they hurled stones and plastic garden furniture down at the police.”3 Police chased 
protesters and bystanders into buildings, arresting people as they went.  
 The April 2002 episode in Amman might be considered indicative of the 
one strategy of Jordanian security forces in confronting protests. This episode 
occurred in the fervor of the al-Aqsa Intifada and growing anxiety at the 
American push for war with Iraq. Jordan, of course, lies in the middle. Another 
episode later in the month provides yet another angle on the kingdom’s view of 
ongoing dissent. King Abdullah called a meeting of "35 opposition politicians and 
members of the professional associations at the Interior Ministry.” When 
opposition members pressed him on his refusal to expel the Israeli ambassador, 
"the king cut [them] off: "Don't play with me, and don't play with the security of 
the country,' the official recounted him saying. Another account by opposition 
activists had the king telling [independent Islamist activist Saleh] Armouti that he 
had compiled a thick file on him."4 
By October 2002, the Hashemite regime, fearing the coming war and the 
inevitable tension from a deluge of Iraqi refugees and the kingdom’s reliance on 
Iraqi oil, began “arrest[ing] foreign and local journalists, detained prominent 
professionals for their political activities, and cracked down on ‘Wahhabis’ who it 
fears might foment opposition.”5 This is only the external expression of the 
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hundreds of “temporary laws” passed by the regime since 1999. As Jillian 
Schwedler affirms, these laws  
severely limit freedoms of expression and assembly, broadening the penal 
code to such an extent that criticizing "friendly nations" or even signing a 
petition may be punishable as a threat to state security. Professional 
associations have also come under attack, with several leaders arrested for 
criticizing state policies, notably toward Israel, Iraq and the US. Protests 
and rallies are illegal without a permit. Press freedoms have been 
dramatically curtailed with the closing of the Amman office of the satellite 
TV network al-Jazeera and arrest of foreign and local journalists 
attempting to cover the protests. 
Juxtaposed against the April 2002 episode above, from November 8-14, 
2002, police and the Darak Special Forces units placed the entire Southern city of 
Ma’an on a six-day curfew. Ma’anis report widespread abuses of property by 
security forces and, during the heaviest fighting, soldiers “fired heavy machine 
guns at buildings from which gunfire came.”6 
 As both Jillian Schwedler and the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) 
reporting attest, the November 2002 Ma’an clashes were a flare up of long 
standing tensions in a part of the kingdom known for its restiveness. As the ICG 
notes, “the November 2002 clashes were the fourth eruption of political violence 
in Maan since 1989, a period of less than fourteen years during which similar 
clashes also occurred in nearby Kerak and Tafileh.”7 Already, as early as 2002, 
Ma’an demonstrates the societal frustrations at failed economic policies and 
corrupt politics that would topple the Ben Ali regime in 2010-11. Instead of a 
polite police cordon that confronted protesters in Amman in April 2002 and 
expressed sympathy with their feelings, the regime invaded Ma’an by force.  
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 The accounts juxtaposed above show a mixture of dramatically different 
responses to dissent. Ma’an would find itself under even more aggressive siege 
nine years later, as the Arab Spring rolled through Jordan. The Jordanian 
experience of the Arab Spring would feature a mixture of concession and 
repression as the regime tried to keep its head above water. Given these, are we to 
believe the opinions of some analysts, who argue that protests in Jordan were at 
worst coincidental and at best insufficiently widespread or large to support the 
idea of a “Jordanian Spring”?   
A 2012 International Crisis Group report on the Jordanian uprising dates 
the beginning of the uprisings in 2010, but notes that protests took off in 2011 
featuring crowds "of modest size but not modest significance."8 The analysis in 
the ensuing chapters focuses primarily on the period 2010-2012, during the fever 
pitch of the Arab Spring uprisings. But based on existing research as well my own 
interview responses, Jordanians were well-practiced in collective action before the 
Arab Spring wave arrived in 2011.  
In terms of the appropriate period of analysis, all the interviewees argued 
that my assumed placement of the beginning of the protest cycle in 2011 was 
incorrect. Instead, the majority placed it in 2007. ‘Abu Shuji’a’, a seasoned 
activist from the Dhiban/Madaba area (south-southwest of Amman) even traced 
the beginning of the protest cycle in Jordan to the May 1, 2006, teachers/workers 
strike in Dhiban as the catalyst for demonstrations demanding more of the 
government.  In Abu Shuji’a’s view, 2010 appeared on the radar not from de novo 
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mobilization or by diffusion from the Arab Spring. Grassroots activism appears 
repeatedly in Jordan. The bread riots of the late 1980s and 1990s9; The 2002 
protests and crackdown in Ma’an10; the 2005 sit-ins and protests against attempts 
to depoliticize all professional associations11, the 2006, 2007 and 2009 Teachers’ 
and Farmers’ protests in Dhiban/Madaba.12  
An editorial in Ammon News in May 2010 appeared as another foreshock 
to the volatile and potentially mobilizable mood in the kingdom. The "National 
Committee of Retired Servicemen, representing some 140,000 veterans including 
officers of the highest rank…published an unprecedented attack on King 
Abdullah's record in rule."13 Even after this unprecedented “Veteran’s Letter” – 
the shock of which may have been more easily absorbed by the regime because its 
basic message was of East Bank nationalism and anti-Palestinian resettlement 
paranoia rather than regime overthrow – the regime remained afloat. As Asher 
Susser summarizes,  
all seemed like business as usual in the Hashemite Kingdom. The regime 
periodically generated expectations for reform. Parliamentary elections 
were held at more or less regular intervals, and frequent cabinet 
replacements or reshuffling repeatedly created an illusion of imminent 
change that never fully materialized. The modus operandi of governance 
in Jordan was in effect an endless process of treading water that had 
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reinvented itself for decades, continually offering an array of essentially 
meaningless cosmetic reforms.14 
 
The regime evidently believed that this veneer of illusory reform would 
buoy them through the growing public frustration at rampant corruption and 
perceived bias in the elections to the diminished parliament. On December 23, 
2010, the newly-formed government of Samir Rifa’i received an unprecedented 
111-8 vote of confidence from the 120-member Majlis an-Nuwwab (Chamber of 
Deputies). Susser aptly notes that “This was a vote of arrogance and detached 
disregard for the general public that the deputies would live to regret. …Their 
unbridled confidence in the government lost them the confidence of the people.”15 
The first sparks of a new uprising appeared, unsurprisingly, in Ma’an. 
Riots and destruction erupted due to anger over perceived government failure to 
arrest those responsible for the murder of two residents during a brawl at the Disi 
Water Conveyance Project in Shidiyeh. What appeared to be a relatively simple 
grievance, expanded by tribal backing, evolved easily to politics, as one witness at 
al-Hussein University intimated: “Angry youths were shouting that they do not 
believe in the system and that was why they were destroying public properties.”16 
For its part, the regime warned that “it would not be lenient with the ‘small group’ 
who ‘took advantage of the incidents in Maan Governorate to destabilise the area 
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and disturb the life of its residents”, downplaying and counter-framing the 
protesters’ grievances.17 
Security forces were deployed to open the main road from Ma’an to 
Aqaba after mobs had closed the road and attacked cars. A handful blocking the 
road were arrested. By the second day of rioting, police threatened that they 
would arrest those involved in riots and destruction of property and would "not 
allow the reoccurrence of violence, rioting, and vandalism". Police reported that 
rioters attacked the police station, and masked men "showered [Ma’an] Police 
Station with live rounds but no one was hurt.”18 Police responded with tear gas to 
disperse protesters and the Darak was called in to control the situation, placing 
roadblocks at the entrance to the city.19 
Four days after the Ma’an riots began demonstrations in line with the 
modular themes of the Arab Spring appear definitively in Jordan. January 7 saw a 
group of approximately 500 gathered in Dhiban/Madaba to protest increasing 
unemployment and poverty rates.20 Activists like Hatem Irsheidat and Dr. Khaled 
Kalaldeh underestimated both the popularity and the tone of the protests. 
Kalaldeh, leader of the Social Left movement, had suggested a march of 200 to 
the youth activists. Bolstered by “a new popular receptivity of protest”, the 
demonstration was attended by 5,000.21 Similarly, Irsheidat’s planned protest 
frames were soon “infused with the emerging regional language of revolt: the 
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soon to be ubiquitous call for ‘bread, freedom, social justice’.”22  Irsheidat 
likewise underscores the underestimated targets of grievances, saying  
we hadn’t planned on mentioning the Prime Minister, let along the King. 
Back then this was a red line. We were scared – there were only seven of 
us, and no one knew what might happen. But to our surprise, others started 
to join us and take part…before we knew it we were calling for the fall of 
the Samir Rifa’i government.23 
On January 11, 2011, the government announced a $169 million plan to 
reduce commodity prices, materially backing the orders of King Abdullah to the 
government to “take immediate and effective measures to improve the living 
conditions of citizens.”24 With the bolstering of events in Tunisia, however, this 
concession failed to mollify protests. Ahead of planned protests for January 14, 
the government attempted to prevent wider mobilization. Prime Minister Rifa’i 
announced that the regime “respects the people’s right to peacefully express their 
opinions as long as the process goes in accordance with the law.” But he added 
the caveat that “the government will protect the interests of the country and 
people from any attempt by whomsoever to exploit the situation to cause any 
damage to public or private priorities.”25 
A week after the initial Dhiban protests, on January 14, 2011 after Friday 
prayers, which protesters on social media explicitly identified as the “Jordanian 
Day of Rage”, the target of protesters ire was fully-articulated as both economic 
and political. The demand for reforms addressed economic grievances such as 
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unemployment; and politically, protesters across the began to call for the 
resignation of Prime Minister Samir Rifa’i, whom they called a coward. Protests 
had also, by this time, quickly spread from the Madaba governorate to Amman, 
Ma’an, Karak, Salt, Irbid, and other parts of the country. All the protests were 
reportedly coordinated by youth committees “comprised of university students 
and day labourers.”26 
Signaling a salient frame, both from Tunisia and within Jordan, the 
January 14 protests mimicked the January 7 and 11 Dhiban protests, using signs 
with a piece of bread attached to them. Chants and banners at January 14 protests 
featured significant collective action grievance frames including "Jordan is not 
only for the rich. Bread is a red line. Beware of our starvation and fury." and 
"Down with Rifa’i's government. Unify yourselves because the government wants 
to eat your flesh. Raise fuel prices to fill your pocket with millions."27 Activists 
outside Amman characterized their protest as against “the policies of the 
government, high prices and repeated taxation.”28  
But emulation in the Jordanian case went beyond just intra-Jordanian 
protest frames. Amis has carefully examined the connections between the January 
14 protests and the Tunisian uprising. On a macro-level, it is important to note 
that the January 14 protest in Amman “was the first link beyond Tunisia in the 
famous chain reaction of emulation, and took place some hours before the 
                                                 
26 “Jordanians March against Inflation”; “Activist Says 14 January ‘Peaceful’ Demos Seek 
Downfall of Jordanian Government.,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 12, 2011. 
27 “Jordanians March against Inflation.” 
28 “Jordanians March against Inflation”; “Activist Says 14 January ‘Peaceful’ Demos Seek 
Downfall of Jordanian Government.” 
62 
departure of President Ben Ali later that day.”29 Amis goes further in connecting 
the emulation of the “Day of Rage”: 
“This told you it was something different, something special,” one 
participant affirmed. “It was a transmission, an idea we took from 
Tunisia.” Conscious emulation of events abroad differentiated the new 
mobilization [in Jordan] from the activism of preceding years, and the 
protest also replicated the non-partisan and youth-led character of the 
Tunisian uprising.30 
Islamists and some other established parties and professional associations 
stayed away from the grassroots demonstrations. But on January 16 the National 
Coalition of Opposition Parties, an umbrella organization of six leftist and 
Islamist parties), the Islamic Action Front, and other professional associations 
stage a sit-in against price increases in front of the parliament.31 Like their sister 
protests on January 14, the professional associations protest on January 16 
targeted Rifa’i for resignation. Signs read "We Must Fight Corruption" and 
"Enough High Prices and Yes to a Decent Life".32 
At both the January 14 protests and the January 16, there were no reports 
of clashes or repression by security services.33 In fact, during the January 14 
protests, police and plainclothes officers formed a cordon around the 
demonstrators to contain the protests, but there were no reports of arrests or 
violence.34 After the January 16 Islamist-led sit-in, however, Speaker of the 
Lower House Faysal Fayiz reportedly requested a meeting with the organizers of 
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the protest, but they refused. Fayiz argued that the doors of the Parliament were 
always open to meet with parties and professional associations and chastised the 
protesters for not having informed the Parliament, or met with him or other MPs 
instead of protesting since the parliament is supposed to be the representative of 
the people.35 One can hardly blame the protesters for not trusting the official 
channels, considering the climate regarding corruption. 
The government announced a further $425 million subsidies package, this 
time including raises for civil servants and military and security personnel on 
January 20.36 But this again failed to mollify protests. Between 2,00037 and 
5,00038 people, mobilized by parties, political associations, and activists gathered 
on January 21, 2011, to march from al-Husseini Mosque in downtown Amman to 
the Greater Amman Municipality Headquarters even in the face of government 
subsidy concessions. Activists and the public expressed disbelief that the 
government measures were any more than “temporary measures meant to contain 
the public’s anger.”39 One former MP Mansour Murad "urged the King to 
dissolve the Lower House for 'failing to defend the public's interests' by giving the 
government a record vote of confidence last month."40 Members of the IAF, the 
Jordanian Communist Party, al-Wihda Party (a Leftist/PFLP affiliate), and 
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National Front Party as well as Professional Associations Council inverted the 
typical regime strategy and "called for greater political freedoms as a first step 
towards economic reform".41 
The aims were dismissal of the government and parties, not the monarchy. 
Some even argued that "we have lost all hope in parties, we only look to His 
Majesty King Abdullah to secure people's rights and interests" and "We are not 
against individuals; we only oppose the policies that have caused living standards 
to deteriorate." Hazaimeh reports that some bystanders expressed mixed feelings 
about the protests.42 Even at what were clearly widening protests ostensibly 
immune to the government’s attempts to mollify them, the only security forces 
present were traffic police “who blocked off King Talal street to vehicles and 
handed out water and juice to demonstrators.”43 This incident would become a 
favorite anecdote of those who denied that the Arab Spring could get purchase in 
Jordan. 
January 21 also saw parallel protests in Zarqa, Madaba, Irbid, Karak, and 
Tafileh.44 Protests in Zarqa were organized by the Higher Coordination 
Committee of the National Opposition parties and imitated the Amman march by 
marching from the Umar Bin al-Khuttab mosque.45 
This time the regime responded with positive counter-framing. On January 
26, Senate President Tahir al-Masri “said that the freedom of expression that 
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Jordan is currently witnessing is part of the country’s democratic march led by 
His Majesty King Abdallah II."46 “The recent marches and sit-ins in the 
Kingdom” added al-Masri, “reflects [an] awareness of Jordanians and their 
keenness to protect their march and reject uncivilized behaviour during these 
marches."47 Protests continued for the fourth consecutive Friday with thousands 
flooding the streets of Amman. Some were urged by the Islamic Action Front 
(IAF). But trade unionists joined with the Islamists, with banners and chants 
including “Send the corrupt guys to court” and “Rifa’i go away, prices are on fire 
and so are the Jordanians.”48 Another 2,000 – 5,000 people gathered in repeat 
demonstrations Karak, Irbid, Ma’an, Aqaba, and two other cities after Friday 
prayers on January 28 all denigrating the price increases and calling for early 
parliamentary elections and the ouster of Prime Minister Rifa’i.49 Separate 
protests were held on January 29 by “independents and opposition groups” 
including public sector day laborers and military retirees.50 
King Abdullah conceded to one of the – at least symbolic – demands of 
the protesters by dismissing Prime Minister Rifa’i and his cabinet on January 31, 
2011. Rifa’i was replaced with Ma’arouf Bakhit who was “allegedly not tainted 
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by allegations of corruption.”51 A second concession came on February 2, when 
the Interior Minister announced that protests in Jordan would no longer require 
government permission. Protesters would still be required to inform authorities of 
any planned gathering within two days, but this decision no doubt sought to 
appease protesters by appealing the April 2002 Public Gatherings Law – a ban 
against all marches.52 The new government, under Bakhit also quickly 
“announced the historic concession of an independent teachers’ union.”53 
The shuffling of Prime Ministers to assuage those suffering from bruised 
pocketbooks and chafing under promises of political reform with nothing to show 
for their patience is not a new strategy in Jordan. In fact, this “time-honored shock 
absorption tactic” forms a crucial part of the ‘above the fray’ argument inherent in 
the monarchical advantage thesis.54 The king is supposed to be a neutral arbiter 
between the chaotic forces of a demanding public and the government, 
represented by the parliament and the Prime Minister. In this way, a simple 
reshuffling of the deck of candidates for Prime Minister allows the king to appear 
to be advancing concessions or reforms, though they will turn out to be short of 
the mark or merely cosmetic.  
Also on February 2, 2011 the regime received a propaganda boost when 
"about 3000 tribal leaders and key figures – including lawmakers, retired security 
personnel and academicians – renewed their allegiance to the king in an emotional 
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letter, praising his reform efforts."55 Demonstrations continued apace, now 
demanding the resignation of newly-appointed PM Bakhit, calling him not 
satisfactory for reform because even if he is perceived as less corrupt, protesters 
doubt his democratic bona fides.56 
By mid-February 2011 the tenor and intensity of protests, which had, by 
this point continued for seven weeks, increased. February 18 saw pro-government 
counter-protesters attack pro-reform protesters with sticks and stones.57 
Undeterred, 5,000 – 6,000 pro-reformists protest in Amman (BBC places the 
number between 7,000 – 10,000) on February 25, calling for lower prices, new 
elections and constitutional reform. Chants and banners included “The people 
want to reform the regime”; “We want a fair electoral law”; and “the people want 
an elected government.” Though Islamists were reportedly joined by the 
supporters of 19 other political parties, Sheikh Hamza Mansour of the Islamic 
Action Front helped spearhead the vocal support for reform, which “has become a 
necessity that cannot wait.”58 
On March 24-25, 2011, an estimated 500 university students, unemployed 
graduates and other members of the variegated hirak set up a protest camp at 
Gamal Abdel Nasser circle (hereafter “Diwar Dakhilliyeh” (interior ministry 
circle)). Ziad al-Khawaldeh whom Al-Jazeera identified as the "Jordanian Youth 
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Movement" spokesman, said that the demands focus on the resignation of the 
pusillanimous parliament led by PM Marouf al-Bakhit, the dissolution of the 
much-feared General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and devolution of powers to 
the people, particularly those powers of choosing the Prime Minister.59 Banners 
seen at the encampment included those calling for a “New Jordan: Clean of 
Corruption and Corrupt Officials” and chants including “Intelligence Department: 
We Want Your Hands Off Politics!”60 The political aims of the March 24 Youth 
were consistently composed of seven broad demands: “a representative 
parliament, elected government, ‘real’ constitutional reforms, corruption 
prosecutions, tax reform, ‘lifting of the security grip’, and ‘realization of national 
unity’.”61 
The initially peaceful character of the protest encampment – which had 
included protesters singing patriotic songs beneath pictures of the king and 
waving Jordanian flags62 – began to devolve with the arrival of loyalist counter-
protesters throughout the afternoon and evening of March 24. The two groups of 
protesters were separated by regular police and occasional breakthroughs of 
violence by loyalists were repelled by the police. Loyalist rock-throwing was 
coupled with slogans framing the reformist mission as driven by sectarianism 
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(accusing the hirak of being either Palestinian Islamists or Shi’a agents 
provocateurs from Iran.63  
During the afternoon and evening of March 25, the numbers of pro-reform 
and loyalist protesters swelled, as did the security presence. Security services 
closed off traffic to the area and police formally warned the encamped March 24 
Youth protesters to disperse. Tension continued to ratchet up as the Darak 
(gendarmerie/riot police) – who, as respondents noted, compared to the police are 
at the least not trusted by the people, if not feared – arrived behind the pro-reform 
protesters, who were now pressed between the Darak, the regular police (who 
then joined with the Darak in repression), and the pro-regime protesters.64  
Participants also described loyalist protesters arriving shortly after by bus and 
dozens of cars from typically-loyalist areas like Karak.65 For the first time (at least 
on a mass and public scale and in the capital) the pro-reform protest camp was 
attacked by a pro-government, loyalist mob in diwar dakhilliyeh, leading to one 
casualty and 100 wounded. Importantly, multiple reports note the involvement of 
pro-government counterprotesters, in the violent clearing of the square. Naseem 
Tarawnah, reluctant to use the sobriquet “baltajiyya” because of the negative 
connotations and connection to the violent breaking up of the Tahrir Square 
protests in Egypt – labeled these zu’ran (“troublemakers”). But the pro-
government protesters insisted on referring to themselves as baltajiyya 
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(“thugs”/“hatchetmen”).66 Amis suggests that they “actively asserted [this] 
baltajiyya identity – in emulation of the Egyptian pro-regime thugs who attacked 
demonstrators in Tahrir Square in February 2011 – a reminder that Arab Spring 
‘mirror effect’ inspiration was also available to anti-reform elements.”67   
Juxtaposing this to the police response to protests on January 21, 2011, 
when they handed out water and juice to protesters, as Marsh, Finn, and Chulov 
noted, this "Violence was the first of its kind in Jordan in more than two months 
of protests which have seen the king sack his cabinet and pledge reforms."68 
Amis, Tarawnah, and others noted that after the Darak-led pro-government forces 
cleared the square, “uniformed police and plain-clothes thugs were seen openly 
celebrating together, chanting loyalist slogans.”69 
IAF leader Hamza Mansour blamed the killing of one of the Brotherhood's 
members directly on the Prime Minister, Marouf al-Bakhit, and his cabinet and 
called for their resignation immediately.70 Prime Minister Bakhit took this 
opportunity to counter-frame by placing blame at the feet of Islamists and accused 
them of taking orders from Egypt, saying "Enough playing with fire. I ask you, 
where are you taking Jordan?"71  
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Interestingly, after the violence at diwar dakhilliyeh, the government 
reportedly “decided to ban its supporters from demonstrating in the capital, while 
the opposition was allowed to demonstrate in specifically designated areas in 
Amman.” The King, for his part, took the opportunity to condemn the violence 
and “vowed to fight attempts to ‘sabotage’ the country’s reform drive.” 400 police 
were deployed to break up hundreds of rival pro-reform and pro-government 
protesters outside municipal offices in Amman on April 1, 2011. Pro-reform 
slogans included "Down with oppression. The people want regime and 
constitutional reforms, and trials for the corrupt. We want national unity." Rival, 
pro-government demonstrators carried large pictures of King Abdullah and 
expressed their “loyalty and allegiance” to him, along with their “commitment to 
the kingdom.” No violence was reported by authorities or by observers from 
Jordan’s National Centre for Human Rights. Pro-reform activists were uncowed 
by the violence of the previous week, saying that it in fact emboldened them 
instead.72 
Despite the ban on loyalist demonstrations in the capital and the 
government’s official regret concerning violence, two weeks later, eyewitnesses 
in Zarqa placed the blame for a clash between Islamists and loyalists on 
plainclothes security personnel who were alleged to have provoked the violence. 
Eighty-three policemen were wounded, allegedly by Salafis armed with clubs and 
knives. Police responded with tear gas. Al-Jazeera identified the “Islamists” as 
“Salafis” (a group technically banned in Jordan) and points out that the rally in 
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question is only one of several held in recent weeks across the country, arguing 
that “these are separate from the 14-week-old wave of anti-government protests 
demanding democratic reforms.” Nevertheless, the alleged behavior of the regime 
toward the Islamists’ challenge during the rally – which denounced the 
government’s ties to the US and demanded the institution of Shari’a in the 
kingdom – tells us something about the willingness and tactics of the government 
toward dissent that approaches apparent red lines.73  
Also on April 15, in Amman, more than 2,000 protesters demonstrated in 
Amman – 1,000 of those outside the Amman municipal building after Friday 
prayers, again demanding more representative and plural reforms.74 Though 
protests ostensibly continued through April and May, they were underreported. 
Early-to-mid-June, saw a return to regularly reported protests. Particularly in the 
southern town of Tafileh – usually a stronghold of regime support, considering, as 
one activist interviewed by Amis noted, “they are loyal all their lives…[even] the 
royal guards are drawn from Tafileh – routine protests continued with renewed 
vigor.75  
In the face of continued and renewed protest, King Abdullah appeared in a 
television address on June 12, 2011. The king appeared to concede to many of the 
core demands of the protesters, at least in theory. He pledged to allow elected 
rather than royally appointed ministers "at some unspecified point in the future". 
                                                 
73 “Clashes Erupt in Jordanian Town,” accessed January 15, 2018, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011415153839185473.html. 
74 “Clashes Erupt in Jordanian Town.” 
75 Ian Black, “Jordan Denies Reports about Attack on King Abdullah,” The Guardian, June 13, 
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/13/jordan-king-abdullah-attack-denied; Amis, 
interview with Dr. Khaled Kalaldeh, Amman August 2011, quoted in Amis, “Hirak! Civil 
Resistance and the Jordan Spring,” 182. 
73 
He instructed the Prime Minister to “take ‘practical, swift, and tangible steps to 
launch a real political reform process, in line with the king’s vision of 
comprehensive reform, modernization, and development’” and create an electoral 
law that will allow for "active party representation.” But the king gently warned 
that the path of reform had to pass through the legitimate channels of the regime, 
saying "We seek a state of democracy, pluralism, and participation through 
political reforms...away from the dictates of the street and the absence of the voice 
of reason" and "warned that sudden change" as the government apparently 
believed was advocated by protesters, "could lead to 'chaos and unrest'.”76 
Oppositionists downplayed the promises as only promises; just as amorphous as 
those the king perennially promised in the past.  
In support of promised infrastructure, job-creation, and medical care 
subsidy reform projects, King Abdullah visited restive Tafileh the following day 
(June 13, 2011). Surprisingly, protesters – angry at the failure of the government 
to initiate real reforms and fight corruption and calling for the resignation of the 
Prime Minister and the cabinet – now paired their continuous crossing of 
rhetorical red lines with a physical crossing, throwing stones and empty bottles at 
the royal convoy as it passed through town. Eyewitness reports described clashes 
between crowds and security forces, and Ammon News reported that at least 25 
people had been injured by security forces. Regime spokesmen moved quickly to 
control this narrative, instead insisting it was simply enthusiastic youth attempting 
to greet the king who had unexpectedly mobbed the motorcade.77  
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Events come to a boil again a month later. On July 15, 2011, members of 
the March 24 coalition, unbowed by the repression of March 25, 2011, attempted 
another sit-in at al-Nakheel Square, near the Greater Amman Municipal 
Building.78 This time, however, security forces refused to allow another 
occupation of public space, however small. They attacked both protesters and 
journalists as soon as the sit-in began. Beyond “dealing out beatings…on sight”, 
protesters reported the presence of plain-clothes mukhabarat agents, who warned 
them that snipers positioned on the rooftops would begin firing down on the 
protesters if they did not disperse within two hours.79  
The Public Security Department ultimately admitted responsibility for the 
incident and four policemen were arrested as a result. But the government 
maintained that “the pro-reform protesters and the Muslim 
Brotherhood...[provoked] the police and [instigated] the violence.”80 It is notable 
that the two subsequent protests – July 16, and July 20 – saw no violent repression 
from the security forces.81 Both dates saw protests in both the capital and in 
tribally-loyalist centers like Karak and all of the protests not only pursued the 
overarching frames of the previous months’ protests but also directed attention to 
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the security services’ overreach on both March 24-25 and July 15.82 It appears 
that the regime gave protests a wider berth after the July 15 incident. 
On July 22, 2011, the London-based expatriate Jordanian opposition 
coalition calling itself the Jordanian Overseas National Assembly (JONA) upped 
the ante without a physical protest. JONA released a statement calling for the 
overthrow of the king and to “hold [him] legally responsible for all corruption in 
Jordan’…and to establish the ‘Jordanian Arab Republic’. The statement also 
called the royal family ‘a gang of parasites’ and accused it of ‘occupying the 
land’.”83 Varulkar presents this as the first group to call for the explicit overthrow 
of the regime before October 2011. 
Three weeks later, King Abdullah welcomed proposed constitutional 
amendments, but critics continued to characterize them as insufficient. Jamal 
Halaby immediately points out that “the 42 proposed changes…would still allow 
King Abdullah to retain most of his absolute powers, according to a 15-page 
document distributed by the royal palace.” The proposed changes did not address 
protesters' demands allowing public election of the prime minister, instead 
retaining the ability to appoint the post solely to the king. In what oppositionists 
characterized as its typical fashion, the government said that a separate document 
would address this core issue “at a later unspecified date”. “King Abdullah said 
the basis of Jordanian reform ‘is wider public participation’ and ‘the separation 
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between the branches of government.’” Outside the palace in Amman, about 200 
pro-reform activists protested the changes. Meanwhile, four injuries were reported 
in clashes between reformists and “hundreds of government loyalists” in Karak.84  
No protests were reported again until October 1, 2011. An Islamist 
opposition rally led by veteran oppositionist Layth Shubaylat in Sakeb (Jerash 
province) was allegedly attacked by regime-coordinated baltajiyya attack. Though 
Shubaylat had a history of criticism of the monarchy and calling for the fall of the 
king, this alleged attack occurred despite the tone of the protest being one of 
political reform, not open demands for the removal of the regime.85 Varulkar 
describes the significance of the situation and Shubaylat as an activist personality 
at length: 
[Shubaylat’s] talk in Jerash was part of a series of lectures he gave 
throughout the kingdom in recent weeks, in which he spoke to thousands 
and presented a document of principles – a kind of "road map" for 
political reform in Jordan. In these talks, he leveled unprecedented 
criticism at the king, saying that the king had no legitimacy without the 
consent of the people, and calling upon him to give back the lands he had 
taken from the people, to abolish the corruption that has spread among his 
court officials, and to stop the interference of the security forces and the 
intelligence apparatuses in public life.86 
It is no doubt significant that Shubaylat represents a notable and centralized threat 
to the regime; a prominent individual brazenly crossing rhetorical red-lines 
against the regime. According to Varulkar, Shubaylat told journalists at a press 
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conference shortly after the attack in Sakeb that “the security apparatuses had 
tried to dissuade him from his activity.”87 
This alleged repression sparked a dramatic cascade of marches and 
demonstrations from many movements in Amman, Jerash, Al-Tafileh, and Dhiban 
in solidarity with the Shubaylat rally. As Varulkar notes carefully, these events 
were also notably characterized by their increasingly aggressive tone, threatening 
revolution rather than (or along with) reform. In one march from the loyalist al-
Tafileh neighborhood in Amman to the offices of the Royal Court protesters 
chanted “al-Tafaila will not obey and can topple the regime.”88 More widely, the 
Popular Association for Reform released a communiqué in the same spirit, saying 
that “the monopolist [character] of the Jordanian regime, and the fact that [power] 
is concentrated in the hands of the king, mean that the king is solely responsible 
for the corruption, violence and brutality [in the country]…Every drop of civilian 
blood spilled will fuel the [people’s] fury…”89 
The regime’s fears of Shubaylat and the growing calls for revolution 
rather than reform were undoubtedly confirmed two days after the Sakeb rally 
incident. On October 3, 2011 the “Second National Convention for Reform” – a 
rally “held at the home of former parliament member Ghazi Abu Jneib Al-Fayez 
in Al-Lubban” (approximately 20 kilometers south of Amman, between Amman 
and Madaba) and was “attended by approximately 1,000 representatives of all the 
protest movements, tribes and political forces, including prominent oppositionists 
such as Ahmad ‘Uwaidi Al-‘Abadi and the former general guide of the Jordanian 
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Muslim Brotherhood, Salam Falahat.”90 A meeting crossing such diverse 
ideological boundaries should be concern enough, but the meeting reportedly 
crossed significant rhetorical boundaries as well: calling for a constitutional 
monarchy (or at least serious limitations on royal power), for revolution rather 
than reform, assertions by al-‘Abadi that “the people wanted to topple the 
Hashemites” (note, not just the king, but the entire regime implicated here) and 
calls by Dr. Sabri Jar’a “who called on the king to ‘apologize and resign’.”91 
Varulkar notes that Al-Fayez “said in his opening speech that ‘the Hashemite 
kings are a red line’ (meaning that questioning their legitimacy, as opposed to 
criticizing them, is taboo). After several participants left in protest over this 
remark, Al-Fayez recanted and said that ‘the only red line is the homeland’.”92 
Former prime minister and (perhaps more importantly) former head of the 
feared General Intelligence Directorate (GID) (mukhabarat), Ahmad ‘Obeidat 
also likely drew a panicked reaction from the regime when he led a march of 
more than 2,000 in front of the Grand Husseini Mosque in Wasat al-Balad, 
downtown Amman.93 ‘Obeidat was also present at and helped to organize – along 
with the Islamic movement and the “Four-Tribe Coalition” – a follow-up rally on 
October 15, 2011, reported attended by 2,000 people in the village of Salhoub in 
Jerash province. Like the Sakeb rally, this was allegedly attacked again by 
mukhabarat-dispatched baltajiyya. This time, however, the baltajiyya allegedly 
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opened fire on the rally, injuring dozens of people.94 The regime, through state-
run media, disputed this allegation, downplaying the numbers injured and 
claiming instead that the anti-regime tone of the rally angered villagers, who then 
attacked the rally, and the rally participants first began shooting and throwing 
rocks.95 State-owned daily newspaper Al-Rai portrayed the event as an overblown 
violent confrontation between tribes in Salhoub, a claim which greatly angered 
the rally activists and was disputed.96 Also reported are marches in Karak, 
Tafileh, Ma’an, Jerash and al-Salt. 
A press conference held primarily by leaders of tribal movements became 
a panel of increasing criticism of the monarchy after the Salhoub incident. Some 
warned the king not to “mess with the tribes. That is a dangerous [move]. If the 
regime takes it, we will all be harmed. Be careful.” Another tribal representative 
ominously warned “From now on…the thrones of the monarchy will be shaking.” 
Yet another stated unequivocally, “the contract between us and the Hashemites 
will soon be wiped out.”  
 King Abdullah evidently took these events seriously, but did not initially 
stray far from the standard playbook in seeking to mollify the protests and the 
tribes. Cross-pressured by the tribes and a call from 70 MPs, the king dismissed 
Prime Minister al-Bakhit on October 17, 2011 "amid charges of incompetence, 
economic problems, a cover-up and suspicions that the regime had orchestrated 
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attacks on pro-democracy demonstrators."97 In his place, the king appointed 
former judge at the International Court of Justice and former legal adviser to the 
king’s father, the late King Hussein.  
Former prime minister Samir Rifa’i had been fired for connection to 
corruption to mollify protesters, and the supposedly clean former general 
Ma’arouf al-Bakhit had been appointed in his place. The logic of replacing al-
Bakhit with al-Khasawneh was clearly an attempt to find a prime minister to 
appease the protest coalition, particularly the tribes. Khasawneh, having been out 
of Jordan serving in The Hague, might have appeared to be an impartial outsider 
rather than a corrupt insider. Yet he was also a close advisor to the nostalgically 
popular King Hussein. Most importantly, Khasawneh has openly welcomed the 
participation of Islamists, particularly the IAF and promised to dialogue will all 
elements of the protest coalition, Islamists or otherwise, hirak and traditional 
opposition parties.98  
These represented only a few of the several attempts at reform 
spearheaded by King Abdullah throughout October. At least one five-day meeting 
at the southern resort town of Aqaba resulted first in an attempt at rapprochement 
with the Islamist Movement, matching PM Khasawneh’s promise of dialogue. 
Most concerning to the regime was the threat by the Islamists to boycott 
municipal elections that had been planned for December 2011. This would not be 
the first time Islamists or others would boycott elections based on the much-
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maligned electoral law. In this context, “the regime [knew] that if this party, the 
largest and most prominent in Jordan, boycotts the elections, it will severely 
damage its credibility and fan the flames of the protest even further.”99 Dozens of 
prisoners were released, as a further concession.  
On October 21, 2011, a variegated protest coalition organized a 
demonstration of approximately 10,000 in Amman, invigorated by events in 
Salhoub. Perhaps more dangerous than the volume of protesters were the chants 
and banners at the protest, including “O regime, listen, the Jordanian people will 
not obey and [are] capable of toppling a regime” and “You Can’t Scare Us”. Days 
after the October 21 protest, the leader of the tribal Faction of 36 said “the king is 
not at all interested in reform, and must be replaced.”100  
Where the regime departed from the standard playbook in dealing with 
protest and reform, King Abdullah also fired the head of the General Intelligence 
Directorate, the royal court chief, and “replaced 43 of the 60 members of the 
Jordanian senate.” Many of the 43 senators were replaced with members from the 
southern provinces, tribes, and military veterans, many of whom were part of or 
close to the protest movements.101 Moreover, the regime made overtures to former 
PM and GID director-turned-oppositionist Ahmad ‘Obeidat, inviting him to serve 
in the Senate – a position he declined. The king met with representatives of the 
army veterans and tribes “praised the contribution to the homeland, and instructed 
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to raise their pensions.”102 Finally, the king announced on October 26 that after 
the upcoming elections, “the parliament’s opinion would be considered in 
appointing the prime minister.”103 
Varulkar is careful to note that the sentiments of this hirak-and-tribal 
coalition-led protest movement was not shared among all Jordanians, let alone 
among all tribes. Despite the public denouncements of the tribal actions by some 
members and leaders of the tribes, “the regime seems to be troubled by the 
weakening of its tribal support-base, and has made efforts to organize pro-regime 
demonstrations among the tribes.”104 One such incident noted by state-sponsored 
daily al-Rai and Varulkar, featured thousands of members of Jordan’s largest 
tribe, the Bani Sakher, at a rally in front of the king’s office in Amman, 
expressing loyalty to the monarchy and support for the extant reforms.105 Another 
rally occurred October 30 in al-Tafileh, the same site of some of the most virulent 
protests.106 
By November 2011, Varulkar notes that the dramatic escalation of the 
protests had resulted in “the regime [having] taken numerous steps to appease the 
Islamic movement and the tribes, including attempts to buy them off with money 
and positions of power.”107 Moreover, Varulkar notes that the regime, and 
especially King Abdullah, appeared to be willing to approach – at least 
rhetorically – previous boundaries of reform, including curtailing the king’s 
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powers – demands that former prime minister Ma’arouf al-Bakhit denounced as 
"’harmful to the balance and the foundations of the political regime,’ ‘a violation 
of the constitution,’ ‘nonsense,’ and an attempt to incite the public.”108 Prime 
Minister Khasawneh continued to hold several high level meetings with the 
Islamist movement and the National Reform Coalition leader Ahmad ‘Obeidat. 
By this time, the meetings between the Islamists and the regime were public 
knowledge. Rumors naturally began to circulate which only confirmed Al-
Dustour columnist Hussein al-Rawashdeh’s assertion that the Islamist movement 
sought to have “one foot in the court of the popular [protest] movement and 
another in the political arena, with all the options and deals this entails. They do 
not want to leave the influential pressure [group represented by the protesters] on 
the street, and they cannot afford to jeopardize their popular support” yet the 
Islamists appeared to have every intention of cooperating with the regime.109 
Though the Islamists held a rally November 18, 2011 to dispel rumors that they 
had been convinced to abandon the uprising, Varulkar notes that this march was 
notably held separate from the marches of the tribal hirak.  
While some of the tribes and Islamists may have agreed to decrease or 
remove their presence in the streets, the overall opposition movement was hardly 
dismantled, let alone dissuaded. Protests continued apace in several governorates, 
through the end of October, into November, denouncing the perceived cosmetic 
changes as business-as-usual, a mere reshuffling of the deck, and marching 
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“under the slogan of ‘You Misunderstood Us’, demanding to enact real reforms, 
including significant constitutional changes.”110   
By November and December 2011, Varulkar notes that the comparatively 
orderly marches and demonstrations were increasingly paralleled with outbreaks 
of violence, particularly in Southern governorates. Clashes between hundreds of 
youths of different clans in al-Zarqa and rioting in al-Ramtha by tribes over an 
accused wrongful death were paralleled in Amman by a November 4, 2011 rally 
organized by the Islamists, tribal movements, and the youth hirak and attended by 
approximately 7,000 people. The combination of these protests as well as 
apparently ensuing anarchy in the periphery – especially given reports that it took 
the security forces nearly two weeks to control the rioting and clashes in al-Zarqa 
– fed into a feeling of anxiety by both the people and the regime that the 
expanding anarchy in Syria was on the verge of spreading to Jordan.111 
At the November 4 Amman rally, the authority and legitimacy of the 
regime was challenged directly by speakers. But more important was the specific 
nature of the message in which a member of the Four Tribe Coalition warned 
“‘the people find themselves in a state of security anarchy’… [and] that the 
people were rallying around the tribes, which had begun to fill the vacuum left by 
the state.”112 Several state-sponsored daily newspapers featured op-ed pieces 
warning against the danger of pushing too far. Varulkar cites an al-Rai article by 
Roman Haddad “denouncing those who dared come out against the king” saying: 
“‘Jordan rests upon a sacred trinity [consisting of] the citizen, the king, and the 
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state. Together the three create a single [entity] – the homeland – which cannot be 
envisioned with one of its [components] missing.’” Haddad further hinted at the 
events being an externally-directed plot saying “this is an act learned and planned 
in advance, which is heading in a dangerous direction… It obliges the king and 
the state to employ special solutions, suited to this special situation…’.”113  
Another columnist, Maher Abu Tir, in Al-Dustour, likened the kingdom to a 
pyramid “‘in which each stone supports the other thanks to the [keystone] that is 
the Hashemite family. If it is taken apart, its stones will collapse over our heads, 
and no one will be spared…’.”114  
Nevertheless, more than 1,000 Jordanians, composed of opposition 
Islamists and youth hirak gathered in central Amman to close out 2011, 
demanding that the country be saved from corruption, amongst other calls for 
reforms. The cortege took the well-practiced route of marching from al-Husseini 
mosque in downtown Amman to the nearby city hall. Lebanon’s Daily Star notes 
that one banner carried by protesters read “Saving Jordan from Corruption is a 
National Duty”, presumably countering the recent nationalist rhetoric from the 
state about the damage inflicted against national unity and the gestalt regime. 
Similar protests occurred outside Amman, in the Southern cities of Karak, 
Tafileh, and Ma’an.115  
 Far from succumbing to fatigue, January 2012 saw a continuation of the 
contentious politics patterns of 2011. Contravening the supposed agreement by 
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Islamists to recede from the streets and their support for the reform coalition, 
(who had notably backed down from street-level protests in the previous months) 
Islamist youth held a “paramilitary procession” in the streets of Amman. A source 
of worry for the regime after the 2005 al-Qa’ida hotel bombings in Amman, the 
prime minister, King Abdullah, and the intelligence apparatus hold another series 
of discussions with the Islamist leadership. Islamist leadership expressed a 
commitment to nonviolence in calling for “reform in the regime”. This agreement 
again furthered rumors on the streets that the Islamists were no longer fully 
committed to the mission of the hirak.116 
Economic grievances came to the fore again in January as Jordanian 
Ahmad Al-Matarneh self-immolated outside the royal court, complaining that he 
could no longer support his family. This “Jordanian ‘Abu ‘Azizi” sparked 
demonstrations across the kingdom as well as numerous articles critical of the 
economic policies that would lead a Jordanian citizen to commit one of the 
gravest sins in Islam out of sheer frustration.117 Criticism from the tribes 
continued unabated and one of their primary rhetorical frames continued to orbit 
around King Abdullah’s neoliberal economic policies. In the view of the tribes, 
these neoliberal policies are not only leaving them behind, but also replacing their 
favored position with greater Palestinian-Jordanians into positions of power, and, 
finally, stealing what they perceive as their hereditary lands.  
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King Abdullah continued in early 2012 in attempting to mollify protesters’ 
demands – but without devolving too much power from the throne. In January and 
February 2012, the king announced early parliamentary elections. Perhaps more 
importantly in the immediate in terms of sending a message to the opposition, he 
declared his intent to fight corruption, firing GID (mukhabarat) chief Muhammad 
al-Dhahabi on suspicion of money laundering, and appeared to be heading next 
for former royal court chief and finance and planning and international 
cooperation minister Bassem ‘Awadallah. None of these moves appeared to 
appease the streets.118  
On January 11, 2012, ‘Udai Abu ‘Issa, activist in the Youth Movement for 
Reform hirak, torched a mural of the king in the streets of Madaba. Though the 
king later pardoned Abu ‘Issa a month later, he was initially sentenced by the 
State Security Court – effectively military tribunals used for civilians – to two 
years in prison for “harming the king’s dignity.”119 A week later, oppositionist 
and military veteran Dr. Ahmad ‘Oweidi al-‘Abbadi led a protest outside the 
prime minister’s residence. While the protest focused initially on demanding an 
increase in military pensions, it soon devolved into pitched battles with the 
security forces when hundreds of protesters broke down the police cordon barrier 
in front of the residence. Al-‘Abbadi’s rhetoric only grew more dangerous as he 
“threatened that the veterans would lead an armed revolution against the regime if 
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the latter did not agree to their demands by the beginning of February 2012.”120 In 
a television interview, he elaborated, saying  
A republican regime in Jordan is bound to come. I don't think it will take 
more than two years at the most. A republican regime embodies the will of 
the people through elections, whereas the monarchic regime has become a 
thing of the past, which does not reflect the will of the people. The king 
does not rise to power by the will of the people, but by his own will, and 
he therefore treats the people as a herd of subjects. We want to have a 
president of a republic who will treat the people as the ones who elected 
him, and who brought him to his position... We don't want a civil war. We 
want life in our country to be good and honorable. Therefore, the king 
must return to his senses, and realize that the will of the Jordanian people, 
and especially that of the tribes and the army veterans, is not what it used 
to be.121 
Al-‘Abbadi even denigrated the potential of a negotiated position of a 
constitutional monarchy, calling it “unacceptable”, questioning whether that 
would solve problems of corruption, and even challenging the current and 
historical legitimacy of the Hashemites to rule Jordan, saying  
“‘By their own logic they are occupiers, not by mine. He calls himself an 
occupier but he wants us to call him king?  He is an occupier and Jordan 
must be liberated from this Hashemite family… [King Abdullah I] “said in 
October 1920 in Ma’an: “I have come to visit [Jordan] in order to occupy 
[it].” I am telling them now, the visit is over’.”122   
Unsurprisingly, al-‘Abbadi was arrested, for “inciting to topple the 
regime” but not before holding a press conference in which he implored his 
followers and other hirak members to realize that an attack on him was an attack 
on the entire reform movement. He asserted, finally, that had he accepted the offer 
the regime had allegedly made to him in order to silence him, he “could have been 
a minister, prime minister, or [even] head of the [Jordanian] Senate, and earned 
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tens of millions. …The state [tried to] bargain with me, but I declined [the 
offers]…”123  
His arrest incensed his supporters and fellow tribe members. On February 
2, 2012, Hundreds demonstrate for the release of al-‘Abbadi, holding up traffic at 
8th circle and promising to stay until he was given access to his family. The group 
threatened to spread protests to other areas. A 2,000-strong rally in support of al-
‘Abbadi, saw a dramatic escalation of anti-regime rhetoric from a diverse crowd 
including his tribe members, supporters, and a cross-section of the different 
protest movements, primarily of the tribal hirak. On top of criticizing King 
Abdullah, Queen Rania and other regime members, the crowd’s chants included  
“the people want to topple the regime”; "if we want we can topple the 
regime," "death but not humiliation," "we want peaceful reforms, 
otherwise, we have an alternative plan," "today it's Al-'Abbadi, tomorrow 
it will be all of us," "revolution until the regime falls," "down with the 
regime" and "down with the king."124  
In al-‘Abbadi’s absence, another Jordan National Movement spokesman 
leveraged Qur’anic verses against kings and autocratic rule. Going further, he said 
that King Abdullah was “unworthy of his position and that his rule was 
illegitimate due to its ‘autocratic [character] and total corruption’.” In perhaps the 
most dangerous transgression, he “compared [King Abdullah] to Pharaoh who 
ignored the danger and rode on until the sea swallowed him.”125 The protesters 
pledged a civil disobedience campaign aimed at turning the Eighth Circle into 
Tahrir square.126 Predictably, once the protesters returned to eighth circle to make 
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good on their promise, events devolved as they started fires, began looting shops 
and throwing stones at police and security forces. The latter responded with tear 
gas and dozens of arrests. Varulkar again notes that al-‘Abbadi’s tribe was not 
unanimous in its support of him. At least one delegation from the tribe met with 
the Interior minister and “declared that the tribe is completely loyal to the king 
and that [it believes] that harming the homeland is a red line that must not be 
crossed.”127 
The regime was undoubtedly unnerved when veteran oppositionist Laith 
Shubaylat visited al-‘Abbadi in Jweida prison. Though Shubaylat admitted that he 
did not agree with all of al-‘Abbadi’s statements, he nevertheless stressed al-
‘Abbadi’s freedom of expression. More important, Shubaylat began rhetorically 
dismantling the king’s position “above the fray”, connecting him directly to the 
economic problems and corruption at the core of the protest demands. In one 
particular instance, he ridiculed the regime’s attempt to appease the public by 
firing and arresting former mukhabarat chief Muhammad al-Dhahabi: 
Facing a crisis, the regime has started tossing us one corrupt [figure] after 
another from among [its] 40 thieves, hoping that this will silence the 
demands of the people, which has started pointing a finger at Ali Baba 
[himself i.e., the king], without whom there would be no corrupting 
thieves here [in the first place].128 
More pointed, he demonstrated how crucial al-‘Abbadi’s critiques of the regime 
itself were, arguing that the current situation  
…requires a rapid and serious response, and that nothing will prevent an 
explosion among the masses except negotiations with the single man who 
has no peer, i.e., the king. The king must present us with his proposals for 
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reform, which [must], first and foremost, address [the king] himself and 
the people surrounding him... Reform can only start with him.129 
Curiously, though, Shubaylat retreated slightly, leaving a wide berth for the 
devolution of the regime to a constitutional monarchy rather than a republic, still 
apparently believing that the king was the linchpin that held together the nation.  
For the king to remain on his throne – and I still believe that it is important 
for the kingdom's stability that he does remain – his fitness [to rule] and 
his commitment to his throne, country, and people must be [subjected to 
the scrutiny] of the people. [The king] must be approved by the people 
[and must subject himself] to their oversight. Moreover, the constitutional 
limitations regarding who is suited for the throne must be reinstated... If 
the king does not make haste in this direction, without hesitation or 
beating about the bush, we can expect the worst.130 
Between July 15 and October 4, 2012, the regime embarked on a 
concerted campaign to round up and arrest twenty pro-reform activists either 
during or following peaceful protests. Amnesty International lists the charges 
against them as including  
‘carrying out acts that undermine the political system in the Kingdom', 
participating in an 'illegitimate gathering', 'insulting the King', spreading 
news that aims at 'weakening national sentiment or inciting sectarian and 
racial strife', and 'attempting to change the state's constitution'131 
Sa’oud al-‘Ajarmeh, a member of the Tayyar al-Urduni 36 (Jordan 36 Movement) 
for instance, was arrested in Amman in July 2012 during a protest against the 
controversial electoral law. He is alleged to have publicly criticized the king and 
others and “is ‘being tried on charges of ‘carrying out acts that undermine the 
political system in the Kingdom’ and ‘inciting others to carry out illegitimate 
acts’.” Fadi Masamreh, an activist and reporter for blog-zine Khabarjo was 
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arrested along with 19 others on September 12, 2012 for “cursing the king, 
gathering illegally, inciting against the Constitution and the government.”132 
Viewed cynically by activists and others, King Abdullah penned an open letter to 
the incoming prime minister “emphasizing the ‘government’s responsibility to 
respect freedom of expression…and the right to peaceful protest’” while the 
twenty activists arrested since July remained in prison.133  
The Muslim Brotherhood vowed to flood the streets with thousands of 
protesters on September 5, 2012, warning the regime that it faced “its ‘final 
chance to usher in democratic reforms.” At the same time, Islamists launched the 
“Higher Council for Reform” to save Jordan from the economic, social and 
political crises caused by the regime. The regime cast this move in a 
conspiratorial light, accusing the Islamists of “seeking to ‘form a new political 
regime in Jordan’,” something the authorities knew would resonate with East 
Bank loyalists concerned with King Abdullah “selling” the country to the 
Palestinians-Jordanians.134 
One month later, King Abdullah attempted to head off a planned Islamist-
led rally on October 5 by announcing the dissolution of the parliament for the 
second time in a year, calling for early elections by the end of 2012. The IAF 
responded – just as it had in 2010 – by promising to boycott the elections to 
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Times, November 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/middleeast/jordan-
protests-turn-deadly-on-second-day.html. 
133 “Arrest of 20 pro-Reform Activists in Jordan Is Part of Ongoing Crackdown.” 
134 “Muslim Brotherhood Vows to ‘flood’ Jordan’s Streets to Press Reform Demands,” Trend 
News Agency, September 5, 2012, https://en.trend.az/world/arab/2061860.html. 
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protest the sluggish-to-non-existent pace of promised reforms.135 The Islamist-led 
“Friday to Rescue the Nation” rally went forward as planned on October 5. The 
central demand was the familiar demand for the king to accelerate promised 
reforms. But, especially for Islamists and Palestinian-Jordanians, there was the 
added aim “to push for broader representation and a more democratic parliament” 
– the central reason for the promised boycott by the Muslim Brotherhood.136 
Demonstrators estimated at 10,000 – 15,000, and comprised of both 
Islamists and some elements of the tribal hirak, made this the largest protests in 
Jordan to this point.137 Al-Khalidi reported that the protesters converged from 
across Jordan to the Husseini mosque in downtown, changing “Listen Abdullah, 
our demands are legitimate” and “People want to reform the regime.” Others were 
seen carrying signs “denouncing corruption and the pervasive role of the security 
apparatus in daily life.”138 Al-Khalidi also notes that tensions had been rising 
during the week with word of a planned pro-regime counter-rally at the same 
location by “loyalists with links to the security forces”, but it was called off 
inexplicably at the last minute.139  
November 2012 saw a remarkable escalatory shift in events. Protests 
began in Irbid and other cities after the newest neoliberal maneuver saw the 
                                                 
135 Ruth Sherlock, “Thousands Rally to Demand Reform in Jordan,” The Telegraph, October 5, 
2012, sec. World, 
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regime cut subsidies, most notably on fuel – both petrol and cooking gas. The 
regime had tried to reduce subsidies once before, on September 10, only to 
reverse the decision in the face of protests. The cabinet announced an even greater 
“drop in subsidies that would result in increases of 14 percent on prices at the 
pump, and more than 50 percent in gas used for cooking.”140 This sparked 
demonstrations across the country on November 13th in which protesters burned 
tires, smashed traffic lights, and blocked roads. Most notable, however, was the 
mass and blatant crossing of the red line surrounding criticism of the king. 
Protesters throughout the country were heard questioning the continuing rule of 
Abdullah. In Dhiban, protesters burned pictures of the king, in Salt, protesters 
destroyed two cars outside the Prime Minister’s home. In Amman, thousands 
marched again to occupy Diwar Dakhiliyyeh, near midnight, changing “the people 
want the fall of the regime.”141 
 Crucially, events in Irbid turned violent as citizens alleged that police shot 
and killed 22-year-old Qasi Omari after he and a crowd of thirty other young men 
went to the police station to confront authorities about why police had used 
deliberately abusive language in breaking up the previous day’s protest.142 In a 
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series of events that will later become familiar in the case of the Bahraini 
uprising, this drastic overreach by security services was met with another flare in 
protests across the country. Beginning on November 14, protesters set fire to 
several government vehicles and a municipal building in Irbid. Teachers went on 
strike and other unions announced a planned two-hour work stoppage for the 
following Sunday (November 18). Students blocked the main road near the 
University of Jordan campus in Amman while crowds gathered again at Diwar 
Dakhiliyyeh. Protesters in Madaba tore down the king’s picture and burnt it and 
severely vandalized several banks. Protesters in Salt looted a discount store for 
government employees and protesters in Tafileh were met with riot police firing 
live ammunition in the air to disperse crowds. 
 Throughout this, security forces attempted to disperse crowds with tear 
gas.143 During the November 14, 2012 protests in Amman where crowds 
approached diwar dakhiliyyeh, riot police in helmets and body armor attempted to 
control access to the square. Hundreds of protesters crowded in front of the police 
cordon, chanting “The people know who is the corrupt [one].” Presaging the 
unrest of mid-November, Zaki Bani Irsheid, spokesman of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan asked in an interview: “Is the regime waiting for an 
explosion in Jordan so [King Abdullah’s] end will be like the Egyptian end or the 
Tunisian end? …We are insisting on creating the Jordanian spring with a 
                                                 
143 It should be noted that it is difficult to determine whether the reporting was meant to indicate 
that this occurred at most or all locations throughout the country. I believe it’s safe to assume that 
the orders could have been the same regardless of location. 
96 
Jordanian flavor, which means reforming our regime and keeping our [Hirak] 
peaceful.”144 
By November 15, 2012, in scenes that would later appear more akin to the 
Bahraini uprising that the Jordanian uprising, thousands of young men occupied 
the streets of cities and towns across the kingdom, most notably in Irbid. State-
sponsored Petra news agency reported “protests in at least seven municipalities” 
across the kingdom.145 Tit-for-tat volleys of stones and tear gas between protesters 
and security forces persisted. CNN reported seeing “police beat one man and take 
him away, and…plainclothes intelligence officials take away two [other] young 
men as demonstrators threw rocks at the police.” Meanwhile, even Jordan’s 
Public Security Department reported that “previous protests have left 14 people 
injured – 10 of them by police gunfire.”146 Most notably, demonstrations were 
unique in their chants attacking the monarchy and the call for the end of 
Abdullah's rule, calling for the "fall of the regime" and, borrowing – knowingly or 
otherwise – from Layth Shubaylat’s earlier critique "added their own dances and 
rhymes comparing the king to Ali Baba, the legendary thief."147  
“‘Hey Abdullah, don’t be fooled, look around and see what happened to 
your peers,’.” 
“‘Oh, Abdullah ibn Hussein, where is the people’s money? Where?’ … 
‘Raising the prices will set the country on fire!’.” 
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“‘Hey Abdullah, listen, listen very well, we will kneel to no one but God!’ 
along with, ‘God is mightier than all tyrants’.”148 
One protester said the grievances had spread beyond mere price increases to what 
they represent: “the audaciousness of the corruption.” Invoking the familiar 
master frame of the Arab Spring he said, “It is about democracy, freedom and 
social justice”.149 
Overall, the story from November 13 to November 16, was one of 
spreading protests that may even have begun peacefully devolved into throwing 
rocks and burning tires while police responded with tear gas. Wall Street Journal 
coverage of local media said that 280 people were arrested relating to recent 
events. Heavy security was reported in Amman on November 16, ostensibly in 
anticipation of the now-normal exchange of rocks and tear gas, but there were no 
reports of police using water cannons or tear gas to disperse protesters downtown. 
Riot police did, however, beat protesters with batons when they tried to move 
toward the palace.150 In all, Amnesty International later cited reports that dozens 
of people were detained in 2012, “solely for peacefully calling for economic and 
political reforms” and that detention without trial continued to be an ostensible 
punitive measure against peaceful and legitimate protest.151 
This chapter was not meant to result in drawing any conclusions. Yet, if 
one feels the need to do so, it should be clear that the Jordanian uprising during 
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the Arab spring wave was far from the vacuous action and series of non-events 
that many analysts have diagnosed it as. Having established in detail the timeline 
of the Jordanian uprising, the next chapter will systematically examine the events 
through the hypotheses I set out in the first chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
Jordanian Spring or Fractured Revolt? 
 
Does Jordan represent a monarchy in the Middle East that exhibits an 
advantage over republics in forestalling protests? Is the Hashemite regime better 
at withstanding protests that occurred during the Arab Spring uprisings?  
The last chapter examined the history of mobilization in Jordan during the 
Arab Spring wave. In this chapter, I leverage that process-tracing data to begin 
answering the research questions by examining the set of four hypotheses. 
Naturally, a truly comparative analysis cannot come until the other case studies of 
Bahrain and Tunisia are examined. Only the first three hypotheses will be 
examined in this chapter. The first hypothesis (H1) holds that MENA monarchies 
are better than MENA non-monarchies at preventing protests. The second 
hypothesis (H2) holds that monarchies are better at withstanding protest than non-
monarchies. We already know that monarchies survived and hypothesis H2 is 
supported. So, if the evidence does not show that they are better at preventing 
mobilization (H1), then they must be better at withstanding it (H2). This leads us 
to two sub-hypotheses, only the first of which I examine systematically in this 
chapter. If it is true that monarchies are better at withstanding protest than non-
monarchies (H2), I assess if this is because monarchies are better able to 
withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests 
(Hypothesis 2a).  
If H1 is supported, the Jordanian regime will have acted proactively and 
have been able to confine protests to relatively fewer and smaller incidents. Those 
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incidents will be less geographically dispersed. The opposition will be less 
ideologically diverse, and their goals and tone will be less extreme and less likely 
to call for regime change and more likely to call for changes in policy or in policy 
makers. These elements would indicate support for Hypothesis 1 in that the 
Hashemite regime was better able to prevent protests on a scale, intensity, and 
tone that threatened to topple the regime. 
As a monarchy, the Jordanian regime obviously survived the uprisings that 
swept the region. Again, this satisfies Hypothesis 2 but, again, H2 is not directely 
tested. H2 is tested through its sub-hypotheses; the most crucial for this chapter 
being H2a - monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are 
more effective at controlling protests. If hypothesis H2a is supported, the 
Jordanian regime will have focused on controlling the protests that emerged, 
resulting in fewer and shorter protests that are less geographically dispersed. 
Those protests will focus more on the goals of change in policies or policy makers 
below the King, and those that directly challenge the existence of the monarchy or 
otherwise cross regime red-lines will be quickly disrupted. If Hypotheses 2a is 
upheld, we should see a Jordanian regime that quickly disrupts protests, but that 
may move to concede as quickly as it represses, so long as challenges to the 
regime are controlled. 
As I will do in each chapter featuring my three cases, to aid in examining 
Hypotheses H1 and H2a, I borrow and amend Michele Angrist’s criteria as a 
testable metric for successful mobilization to overthrow the Ben Ali regime in 
Tunisia. I will operationalize her criteria after amending it slightly to act as an 
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outline for this chapter and to fit the proposed hypotheses. I begin by examining 
the intensity of protests in terms of scale (number, size, and geographic dispersion 
across Jordan). Next, I examine the character and composition of the protest 
coalition in Jordan, looking for a diversity of actors across identity and 
demographic cleavages. This will be followed by an examination of the character 
of the grievances expressed and used to mobilize protests in the Jordanian 
uprising and the intensity of protests in their demands. Finally, I will review the 
findings regarding the regime’s capacity for prevention of (H1) and control of 
(H2a) protests.   
As presented in previous chapters, Angrist shows that in Tunisia, several 
factors combined to provide a perfect recipe for the fall of the Ben Ali regime 
during the Arab Spring. Revolution in Tunisia succeeded because the regime 
alienated key constituencies while the opposition forged alliances across identity 
and ideology cleavages the regime assumed were unbridgeable. This situation was 
balanced precariously on a powder keg of economic and political grievances that 
reflected the regime’s inability to keep up with citizens’ rising expectations. The 
final ingredient in this volatile mix is the presence of broad-based protests across 
most of the country for a significant period of time. Finally, these protests 
outpaced the capacity of the security services to repress them.1 
While previous scholarship and existing data help in exploring my 
research questions and examining the hypotheses, it was necessary to gather 
original data to better understand what organizing and social mobilization is like 
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East Journal 67, no. 4 (Autumn 2013): 547–64. See also Chapter 2 in this volume for more detail 
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in a monarchy and determine what any potential monarchical advantage looks like 
“on the ground”. Fieldwork in Amman, Dhiban, and Madaba, Jordan in summer 
2016 was designed to illuminate this “view from the ground” of activists, protest 
participants, bystanders, and analysts in a monarchy experiencing protracted 
collective action. This chapter draws on data collected via approximately thirty 
semi-structured interviews collected between June and September 2016. 
Interviewees included activists, civil society agents, lawyers, academics, and 
journalists (including freelance journalists and bloggers). 
Intensity of Scale of Protests 
As Marty Harris reports,  
The first major protests in Jordan occurred on 14 January 2011, when 
nearly ten thousand people marched in cities throughout the country.2 […] 
For the next two years, Friday protests became a regular feature of life in 
Jordan, and something like 6000 demonstrations occurred in the country 
between January 2011 and mid-2014.3 In 2011, there were more than 800 
documented labour actions, with a similar number of labour protests in 
2012.4 
 
The all-too-common reason for the casual dismissal of Jordan as an 
important case in the Arab Spring is the relative paucity of protests, especially in 
terms of size. The assessment of the International Crisis Group in 2012 was that 
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the protests “featur[ed] crowds of modest size but not modest significance.”5 Ziad 
Abu-Rish asserts that collective action in Jordan during the Arab Spring wave did 
not evince the same intensity either in numbers or in calls for regime change, 
though it did not escape mass mobilization. He characterizes the nature of the 
Jordanian uprising as containing “a series of weekly demonstrations, an attempted 
Tahrir-like occupation, labor agitation, impromptu rioting, and more.”6 Finally, he 
notes that the protests in Jordan did not center on the demand for the fall of the 
regime, though that demand “surfaced episodically and in isolation.”7  
Abu Rish’s assertions regarding the smaller size, lower overall number of protests 
and infrequent calls for regime change in Jordan would seem to point toward the 
monarchical advantage. But this is only one aspect of intensity and goes only part 
way to confirming either preventing mobilization or withstanding protests by 
controlling them. 
Size of Protests in Jordan 
Protests that began in Dhiban in December 2010-January 2011 featured 
the modestly sized 200-500 participants. But as noted in the previous chapter, 
even this early mobilization, riding “a new popular receptivity of protest” quickly 
(albeit unexpectedly) swelled to 5,000.8 From 2011 onward, smaller protests 
regularly featured 200-500 protesters, to “thousands”. The largest reported 
protests ranged from 10,000-15,000.  
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Duration of Protests in Jordan 
Though these protests were comparatively small, they were sustained. 
This longevity applies both longitudinally (duration of the overall protest “wave”) 
and protests ad interim (length of protests within that wave). As Chapter 3 
established, from the initial protests as reported by interview respondents in 
2010/11, protests typically occurred every week until the end of the sample period 
in December 2011. In several cases, protests in response to security services 
overreaction resulted in multi-day, sequential protests. Examples include the 
March 24-25 diwar dakhilliyeh sit-in, the July 15-16 al-Nakheel Square protests 
in Amman in response to the crackdown on March 24-25 (which were themselves 
the subject of overreaching repression), the October 1 Islamist rally in Sakeb and 
imprisonment of Ahmad al-‘Abadi, and resulting protest cascade, and (though 
outside the sample range) the killing of Qasi Omari in November 2012.  
In terms of time, overall, the pattern is slightly less constant. From January 
7, 2011, protests continued systematically through April. Protests resume June 
through July, break in August and September, and continue in October. Protests 
resume in January 2012 until the end of February. They break until July and 
restart again consistently until the end of the year. Seen another way, the protests 
seem to cycle, winding down in May 2011, September 2011, March – June 2012. 
There may be something to be said for protest weariness by the public, a gap in 
reporting by the press, or simply the normal cyclical or wave-like modulation of 
contentious activity. There is one instance in which activists self-consciously 
acknowledged a loss of protest momentum. As discussed in Chapter 3, the March 
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24 Youth movement sought to capitalize on the momentum after the regime’s 
overreaction at diwar dakhilliyeh. The July 15, 2011 al-Nakheel Square sit-in was 
supposed to be that moment. After it was broken up by security services and 
threatened by mukhabarat agents, Amis notes that “the thirteen-member steering 
group broke off the sit-in to avoid bloodshed.” But one member, Khalid 
Kamhawi, believed that backing down was a mistake. According to Kamhawi, 
There are certain historical moments which you should capture. These 
moments, if you don’t take them when they come by, it’s very difficult to 
reproduce them. I think it showed the regime that the youth movements, 
like their elders [the Islamists and established Leftist parties] are willing to 
compromise on certain positions…because it was a battle of wills at that 
point, and whoever flinches first loses. And there was a flinch from the 
youth movement.9 
 
Illustrating Kamhawi’s point, the March 24 Movement attempted a follow-up 
rally at the Fourth Circle the following day, July 16, 2011, “but the crowd was 
small and the sense of disappointment palpable. ‘People were disillusioned with 
us’, said Kamhawi, ‘and I think they were right to be so’.”10 
 It is at this point that Amis suggests that the option for an “open-ended 
occupation style” protest disappeared from the Jordanian uprising. There would 
be no Jordanian Tahrir Square. He also suggests that it was at this point that most 
of the members of the youth hirak moved their activism underground and online. 
It is true that this move occurred, but I believe Amis’ timing of this event is 
incorrect as the data and my own interviews demonstrate that the protests 
continued for more than a year beyond the Al-Nakheel Square events. 
Protests in Jordan were as geographically widespread and 
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demographically inclusive as they were sustained. In terms of geographic 
diffusion, respondents noted that protests that would form the Jordanian uprising 
during the Arab Spring initially began not in the capital, but in smaller rural areas 
such as Dhiban and Madaba. Within days of those initial actions, protesters were 
calling for parallel and repeated protests in Amman, Karak, Salt, Irbid, and 
Ma’an. In the case of Jordan, as compared to Tunisia, protests were quickly able 
to spread to the capital.  
As reported in Chapter 3, protests in either the periphery or the capital 
would be routinely paralleled in the other. Protests were routinely reported in 
Amman, Madaba, Jerash, Ma’an, Irbid, Karak, Tafileh, and Zarqa governorates – 
comprising approximately eight out of the twelve total governorates and 
encompassing each of the three regions of the country. Contrary to popular 
assertions and common refrains among media and scholars, protests in Jordan 
were hardly “of modest size,” just as they were hardly insignificant and 
geographically sustained. The relative size of the Jordanian uprising will not come 
into focus until properly compared with Tunisia and Bahrain in the subsequent 
chapters.   
Character and Composition of the Protest Coalition in Jordan 
Abu Rish, among others, downplays the size and intensity of protests. But 
the previous chapter demonstrates that, even in Jordan, the spectrum of 
participants was wide and crossed several crucial and dangerous ideological and 
demographic cleavages. As Jacob Amis’ (inter alia) research demonstrates, all the 
regime’s usual tactics for mollifying protesters and neutering dissent – increasing 
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crackdowns on the media and activists and especially when king Abdullah fired 
beleaguered prime ministers Samir Rifa’i and Ma’arouf al-Bakhit – the protest 
coalition widened and deepened rather than dissipating.11  
At least in the beginning, this diverse protest coalition, which would come 
to be known in Jordan as the hirak (movement), from harakat sha’abiyya 
(popular movements) coalesced around core grievances "expressing anger with 
the state of the economy, ostentatious corruption, unaccountability and the 
concentration of power in the hands of the few."12 
There is some conceptual slippage in what constitutes, for analysts as well 
as Jordanians, the hirak. For many respondents, mention of the hirak elicited the 
idea of the reform/protest coalition in general terms.13 For others, like Rami 
Khouri and Sean Yom, inter alia, the hirak specifically “encompassed nearly 40 
East Bank tribal youth activist groups representing rural communities long 
thought to be unflagging supporters of the…regime.”14 Yom makes this 
distinction carefully to draw out the unique character of the Arab Spring wave 
Jordanian uprising. The hirak in this sense, then, is juxtaposed against the 
traditional opposition in the form of Leftist and Islamist activists and parties; “the 
upstart hirak represented a significant new vector in Jordanian politics. Rarely had 
so many tribal Jordanians in so many different localities pushed for change 
through nonviolent protests that defied both state repression and communal 
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pressures.”15 Amis likewise identifies these harakat sha’abiyya (popular 
movements) in the form of local activist committees which were “soon to be 
found in every major settlement in the country.”16 
Jamal al-Shalabi does not use the term “hirak”, but essentially divides the 
hirak along the same lines as Yom. Al-Shalabi identifies at least three groups 
separate from the traditional opposition forces: the army (represented by the 
“Military Retirees Committee”), the tribes (represented by the Group/Faction of 
36) and the “youth, teachers, etc.” (represented by the 24 March Youth 
Movement).17 Amis echoes Yom’s understanding of the birth of the variegated 
hirak movement.  
The novelty, depth, and influence of the harakat sha’abiyya (popular 
movements) must have been quickly evident to the regime. Even after early 
attempts to mollify protesters,  
Beyond a steady street presence, the protest movement quickly gained 
organizational depth across diverse sections of society. Even as established 
political parties and trade unions joined the fray, bringing with them urban 
and largely Palestinian-origin followings, new reformist alliances were 
emerging with grassroots connections to the towns and villages of the East 
Bank. Building on increased cooperation over the previous decade, an 
array of non-party-based reform movements came together. … In addition, 
a specific role for tribally identifying reform coalitions was announced 
with an open letter to the king, signed by thirty-six dignitaries of 
prominent tribes, calling for urgent political reform lest “the Tunisian and 
Egyptian deluge come to Jordan sooner or later”. While this mixture of 
societal forces did not immediately unite behind a coherent platform, the 
simultaneous flush of anger very much resembled what Curtis Ryan has 
called “a kind of de facto national ‘street coalition’ for change”.18 Since 
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the 1970s, Jordanians of Palestinian and East Bank heritage had all too 
often vented their frustrations with the state separately – and with one eye 
over their shoulder. Now they were marching at the same time, if not quite 
with one voice.19 
 
Though the tendency among analysts has been to point out the sui generis 
nature of the Jordanian hirak, this diversity in terms of geography and identity in 
Jordanian protests predates the Arab Spring wave. Schwedler makes note of this 
diversity even as early as the 2002 protests: “political parties, professional 
associations, civil society organizations, independent activists, and passersby. 
Protesters spanned the political spectrum, from secular Marxists to conservative 
Islamists and many events were organized and coordinated across ideological 
divides.”20  
Several of my respondents in Jordan characterized the hirak in different 
but overlapping ways. First, recall that Dhiban activist ‘Abu Shuji’a’ insisted on 
the beginning of the protest cycle in Jordan to the May 1, 2006 teachers/workers 
strike in the southern town of Dhiban as the catalyst for demonstrations 
demanding more of the government that spread into the Arab Spring time frame.21 
In Abu Shuji’a’s view, 2010 appeared on the radar not from de novo mobilization 
or solely by diffusion from the Arab Spring. Instead, he argues that by the end of 
2010, three related but separate grievance networks – teachers, workers and 
retired military – converged around the issue of thousands of workers, including 
himself, who had been fired from the ministry of agriculture at the end of 2010. 
The 2006-7 protests previously mentioned likewise sought to improve the equality 
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20 Jillian Schwedler, “More Than a Mob: The Dynamics of Political Demonstrations in Jordan,” 
Middle East Report, no. 226 (Spring 2003): 19. 
21 “Abu Shuji’a” interview with the author 29 August 2016, Madaba/Dhiban, Jordan. 
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of workers in the government and to be reinstated in their jobs. This widespread 
view, that protests in Jordan were in some ways separate and only coincidentally 
overlapping with the Arab Spring wave, recurred throughout the interviews and 
across respondents. 
Other respondents characterized the hirak in terms of composition as a 
confederation of labor unions, including teachers, day laborers, students, and, in 
some instances, specific sectors (e.g., the “electricity hirak”). By the time the 
2006-7 Dhiban protests occurred, the composition of the opposition had begun to 
change. Shifting from the traditional parties and professional associations to 
include first a widespread labor movement of which the teachers’ and workers’ 
protests were a part, later, in 2010-11, the same networks and their tactics and 
grievance frames were spliced with newly emerging groups. The seeds of the 
hirak that would take the streets in 2011 germinated among the "alternative 
opposition" which included the Jordanian Social Left Movement (Harakat al-
yasar al-ijtima'i al-Urduni), among many others.22 These groups coalesced to 
greater and lesser degrees under banners of the “Movement of the Jordanian 
People” and “The Jordanian Campaign for Change – Jayeen”.23 These groups, 
along with more decentralized youth movements – the hirak proper – and their 
willingness to work on the margins, nearer to established 'red lines',  helped to 
motivate and mobilize youth and the existing economic-grievance frame 
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networks. Ultimately, Amis notes that in an increasingly mobilizing environment, 
and 
Distinguished by cross-ideological collaboration and the participation of 
youth never before engaged in politics, the movements also followed the 
existing grain of their local communities, harnessing the solidarity of tribal 
structures (al-asha’ir). Outside the capital, they spearheaded and to a large 
extent embodied the novel activism now widely known as hirak.24 
As Amis correctly notes, the May 2010 editorial by the veterans’ 
committee was a crucial bolstering factor but also presented with more than a 
tinge of East Bank chauvinism. But it went beyond this and communicated an 
even greater danger to the regime; "it reflected the wider current of mounting 
activism, and revealed serious discontent within even this praetorian sector of 
Jordanian society.”25 
Even if the regime could somehow absorb or mollify the more nativist 
demands of the Military Veterans/Retirees Committee, it was only one of several 
dangerous movements. As both Jamal al-Shalabi and several interview 
respondents argued, the pro-East Bank Jordanian chauvinism of the Veterans letter 
led former PM and mukhabarat chief Ahmad ‘Obeidat to both stress national unity 
and criticize the nativist message while still criticizing the regime.26  
Amis’ research mirrors the responses of my interviewees in Dhiban on the 
emergence of protests and the connections between 2006-7 in Dhiban and the 
ignition of the Arab Spring wave in Dhiban. Amis notes that in the late 2000s, 
“Dhiban had become a hub of activism associated with the Social Left and the 
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25 Amis, 172. 
26 Al-Shalabi, “Jordan: Revolutionaries without a Revolution,” 98. Author interview, August 17, 
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movement for public-sector day-workers’ rights.”27 It should be evident that a 
strand of common grievances and mobilization exists between 2006-7 and 2010-
11. 
Interviewees were asked to reflect on the overall nature and history of 
Jordanian activism, aimed at understanding not only how Jordanians mobilize but 
also how the regime typically responds to contentious displays. I asked the 
interviewees about their willingness to participate in a hypothetical protest within 
the week. Roughly one third said they would participate. Another third demanded 
more information on the hypothetical protest, particularly the organizers’ goals. A 
final third asserted that there was no point and that “revolution has moved on”. 
Some of those in this third group said they would find it difficult to mobilize 
people because of increased apathy regarding protests as a useful tool. In one 
instance, a young man of approximately twenty years old, continually asked for 
clarification, ultimately asking “but what is the reason for me to protest? What is 
going wrong?”  
In retrospect, the hesitance of this young man, along with similar but more 
nuanced responses from others who indicated they would need more information 
before entering the fray, tells us several things that escape cursory analysis. First, 
in most regimes, citizens who turn to protest to bring challenges to the state must 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis. There is real cost in challenging the state, even 
in a democracy. In this case, at the very least his hesitance indicates not apathy 
but rather a realistic view that the reasons for confronting the state must be worth 
the potential price. In the case of non-democratic regimes like Jordan, this price 
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includes physical violence against not only oneself, but threats against one’s 
family. Participants also run the risk of political imprisonment, torture, or death at 
the hands of police and security forces. Second, this young man’s statement 
represents one facet of an overall theme among Jordanians interviewed. 
Jordanians, even in their apathy, remain politically savvy. In practice, this attitude 
translates to a careful and selective approach toward protest campaigns.  
Comparably, members of the last group – those who believe the revolution 
has “moved on” – many of whom were and are active in the reform movement 
and who were on the front-lines of protests in 2010– are now among the most 
difficult to mobilize. The activists within this group varied in their view of 
whether continuing their more aggressive political work was worth it in such a 
context. One activist and researcher argued that people had left the streets and 
outwardly displayed apathy. But since 2011, which she says people began to call 
“the year of getting away with it” – people are more insularly active – i.e., people 
continue to be politically aware, if altogether less outwardly active. They had 
definite opinions about politics, but the willingness to go back into the streets was 
suppressed. This has resulted, as both my respondents and other analysts have 
noted, in a move of activists and activism out of the streets and onto the internet. 
This is easily observed in the work of the 7iber (ربح (“ink”)) online magazine and 
media collective – which presents dissident voices and analysis from among 
young Jordanians and the reform coalition at large. Naturally, the website is 
periodically shut down by the regime.  
Intensity of Demands and Aims of Protests  
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Another ingredient to be examined in this case is the intensity of the 
protest movement. Intensity in these uprisings cannot be measured only in 
numbers, but also must account for the demands of protests. It is also worth 
examining the targets of mobilization to determine the gravity of the challenge to 
the regime and the realism of a strategy and aims of contentious actions.  
In the Arab Spring, mobilization occurred around policy-based grievances, 
government-based grievances (i.e., against those in charge); and regime-based 
grievances (i.e., ranging from reform of existing institutions to the removal of 
institutions), or a combination of the above. Of course, protests can be based 
initially on policy grievances and evolve to include grievances against policy-
makers or institutions. In Jordan, both historically and during the Arab Spring, 
protests have frequently centered around economic policy grievances. But as we 
saw in the previous chapter, these have quickly expanded to specific policy 
grievances (e.g., corruption). They also easily escalated to calls for the removal of 
various policymakers, including prime ministers, MPs, heads of the security 
services. The extension to policymakers is even easier if the policy-grievances can 
be pinned on them as well. The consistent collective action frames in Jordan – as 
we saw in the last chapter – easily made these connections. 
Like most of the countries touched by Arab Spring protests, in many cases, 
Jordan and Tunisia both feature uneven economic growth across demographic and 
geographic categories. The repeated unrest in the peripheral towns of Ma’an in 
Jordan, and Gafsa in Tunisia illustrate such gaps in economic development. As 
communities that feel left behind, both economically and politically, these two 
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towns have been more prone to become sites of protest. In both Ma’an and Gafsa, 
this unrest occurred despite some measure of nationwide economic advancement. 
Hence the allure and modularity of the economic and political master frames of 
the Arab Spring. Moreover, as Ma’an and Gafsa (and the previous chapter on 
Jordan’s uprising) demonstrate, economic growth does not necessarily stall 
dissatisfaction with political conditions. 
Several common patterns appeared in the interviews that warrant attention. 
First, with few exceptions, interviewees proudly identified Jordan as having a 
rather rich history of activism and protest. Particularly beginning with the 1989 
price riots in traditionally loyalist parts of the country, interviewees highlighted 
the frequency with which Jordanians have been willing to take to the streets – 
particularly regarding economic grievances. Respondents almost without 
exception pointed to the period of 1989 as crucial to understanding the salience of 
economic grievances. It is also well known that 1989 marked the beginning of the 
regime-led liberalization program, cutting into employment and livelihoods of 
those elements historically most loyal to the monarchy. As in other countries, 
especially Tunisia, these neoliberal policies returned to haunt the Jordanian 
regime during the pre-Arab Spring period. This is particularly evident in the 
Ma’an uprisings of 2002, 2006-7. But again, these economic-cum-political 
grievances would be the fertile medium from which the Arab Spring emerged 
only a few years later.  
King Abdullah’s tactics of delayed political reform and fluctuating 
neoliberalism have undoubtedly inspired unrest. Not only has Abdullah built his 
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regime on a closer relationship with business elites, to the ostensible detriment of 
traditional East Bank-dominated tribal elites, but unlike his father, Abdullah’s 
regime has been less willing to concede to public demands for liberalization. Like 
his father before him, Abdullah was faced with IMF-induced spending cuts, which 
caused protests in the early and mid-2000s. But to add insult to injury, by 2010-
11, and especially in 2012, the regime was making incredibly crass decisions to 
cut subsidies on basic necessities, all but daring the public to move into the 
streets. The public obliged. 
 The Arab Spring master frame that diffused across the region included the 
famous calls for bread, freedom, and social justice. Wrapped in this frame was a 
cry against corruption and demands for fundamental political and economic 
reform. This appears repeatedly in Jordan. The 2007 and 2009 Teachers’ and 
Farmers’ protests in Dhiban/Madaba; the 2005 bread riots in Ma’an. Even the 
riots that began in Ma’an in January 2011 after the deaths of members of one tribe 
at a water treatment facility quickly swelled into general denigration of 
government corruption and inefficiency.28 
The reason the Arab Spring diffused so readily was precisely because of 
the commonalities among economic and political grievances. Yet we also observe 
variance in regime survival. The size of resulting protests and the character of the 
protest coalition that forms to advance these grievances is the important next step 
in analyzing these events in Jordan and examining our hypotheses. 
Again, size is only one aspect of intensity and goes only so far in 
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examining either hypothesis H1 – preventing protests – or Hypotheses H2a – 
controlling protests. As a result, it is somewhat misguided to take Abu Rish’s 
characterization of the uprising at face value based on its success in overthrowing 
or seriously threatening the regime. First, there is the issue of whether economic 
grievance protests should be seen as isolated or less threatening. Second, in nearly 
as many instances, economic grievance frames and corresponding protests are 
easily expanded and escalated to political grievance frames and protests. Because 
of their tendency to transform into political demands or because of their ability to 
serve as a façade for political demands, it behooves us to take economic 
grievances and demands seriously as mobilizations in their own right. 
Of course, even if we take economic grievance-based protests as serious 
mobilizations, it remains to be seen whether those protests rose to the level of 
anti-regime protests. If they do call for regime change, we should consider this a 
blow against hypothesis 2a and should likewise examine whether it counts as a 
blow against monarchical advantage as regime control of protests. Abu Rish does 
point out that the Jordanian uprising featured occasional calls for the fall of the 
regime, though far less than in other cases. This is assumed to be evidence of the 
legitimacy aspect of the monarchical advantage or of the structural and 
institutional elements that Abu Rish identifies.29 At the least, I believe we should 
challenge the implication that the absence of mass and systematic calls for the fall 
of the regime, or the absence of coalescence around a particular grievance or other 
collective action frame, is evidence that the protests were interpreted as less 
challenging for a particular regime. At first glance, it might seem specious to 
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argue that protests that were lower in intensity could be anything but less 
challenging to the regime. But this depends on what we mean by “intensity” and 
how a regime defines and demarcates ‘red lines’. 
Protests in Jordan were indeed smaller in size of protests. Simultaneously, 
however, those protests were more numerous and certainly aggressive in their 
geographic diffusion, and represent, overall, a sustained campaign of collective 
action. Amis describes the Jordanian uprising during the Arab Spring as "a highly 
contentious but assiduously non-violent campaign of civic action, from 
demonstrations and sit-ins to strikes and boycotts."30 Ultimately, Amis highlights 
the importance of the Jordanian uprising, even absent an overthrown monarchy as 
the outcome: 
Activists demands were self-limiting, but still taboo-smashing. In turn, a 
restrained regime response - generally non-lethal if not entirely non-
violent - locked both sides in a closely fought and sometimes explosive 
contest for the “red lines” of acceptable expression in the post-2011 
climate.31 
 
The People Want the Fall of the King? 
 When did the Jordanian protests escalate from economic to political 
grievances? And when did those grievance frames include calls against the 
monarchy as an institution? Figure 2 provides an overview of the instances in 
which protesters actively advocated regime change. What should be clear is that 
this is not a one-off incident, nor is it advocated by one group. This evinces a 
pattern of direct criticism of the monarchy and calls for its removal or criticism of 
King Abdullah himself. These were explicit calls and they were diffusing across 
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the country. The pattern begins officially with the July 2011 call by the London-
based Jordanian Overseas National Assembly (JONA) to remove the monarchy 
and replace it with a republic. This could feasibly be dismissed as easier because 
the group is outside the regime’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the participants have 
comparatively less to fear from the regime in terms of direct repression as a 
response. But the incidents steadily march on until mid-November 2012.  
The idea of thousands protesting across Jordan, blocking major 
thoroughfares like al-Jama’a street (formerly Queen Rania Street) in front of the 
University of Jordan, and calling explicitly for the fall of the regime is significant 
enough. But the idea of the dabket al-fasad (“Corruption Dance”) coupled with 
songs and chants comparing King Abdullah to ‘Ali Baba, the legendary thief of 
One-Thousand and One Nights, and his forty thieves to members of the royal 
family and political establishment, and referring to King Abdullah in an 
intentionally casual and disrespectful way by chanting “Hey Abdullah, the son of 
Hussein: Where is the people’s money?” in lieu of “His Majesty and our beloved 
king” is a staggering indictment of both hypotheses of the presence of 
monarchical advantage.32  
Events in Jordan featured a combination of these things. Economic 
grievances shaded into political grievances almost effortlessly. In the case of 
Dhiban, this was accomplished by economic grievances being overtly political in 
the first place (e.g., refusal to allow teachers to form a union; refusal to reform 
labor laws to accommodate the living wages required for day-laborers). The 
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boundaries are fuzziest and transitions most slippery where a corruption frame is 
appropriate. This is true, not only in Jordan, but also in Bahrain and Tunisia, 
where we find master frames of anti-corruption. At demonstrations, chants and 
placards actively illustrate this overarching grievance. As this grievance is 
translated into action, the Prime Minister, an MP or Ministers of Labor, 
Education, or Interior are identified as targets to be removed and replaced. 
It is probable, and in some cases verifiably true, that the hirak or certain 
sections of it switched aims or targets in midstream, possibly to take advantage of 
growing momentum. As one activist noted, “the opposition became arrogant.” 
The activist intimated that, when the government met with long-time reformer 
Marwan Muasher and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, it initially met some 
demands, but the opposition stubbornly pressed for more. As a result, already 
surreptitious negotiations collapsed.33 In other words, it is possible to meet with 
initial success by pursuing, for example, policy-based grievances. It is another 
thing altogether to call for the abdication of the king, in which case the frame and 
the case can quickly become delegitimized in the eyes of bystanders. This is 
undoubtedly indicative of monarchical advantage 
Still, this suggests that Jordanians are more accustomed to and mobilized 
by frames or campaigns with clearly defined goals. Given the known repressive 
capacities of regimes in the region, any rational citizen or activist would pause to 
consider the risks and benefits to collective action.  
Yaghi and Clark describe this time as a moment when “the wall of fear has 
fallen.” From this point onward, there were few reform protests that did not 
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feature the aim of calling for the fall of the regime. If they don’t explicitly do so, 
they imply it by calling for “more than cosmetic reform” that deals with both 
constitutional reforms and economic reforms. The former entails at least 
devolution of executive power from the king to an elected – not royally appointed 
– parliament and perhaps even the formal declaration of a constitutional 
monarchy.34 
It could be argued that this was unconnected or unrelated to the wider 
protest wave of the Arab Spring if it were not for three facts. First, these events all 
shared the relatively unprecedented frame of calling for actual regime change. 
Second, along with the obvious diffusion of the signature “The People Want the 
Fall of the Regime” – a notable change from the previous years’ chants of “the 
People Want to Reform the Regime”, November 15, 2012 saw the modulation of 
that signature chant/frame, coupling it with the use of dances and rhymes 
comparing King Abdullah to ‘Ali Baba, the legendary thief of One-Thousand-
and-One Nights. One protester pointed to the obvious rights discourse of the 
wider Arab Spring, but also said it was not just about the price increases, but what 
they represent: “the audaciousness of the corruption.”35 Finally, when protesters 
connected with the burning of the governor’s house in Karak on November 14, 
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2012 were questioned about their rationale, they argued “He’s [the governor] 
representing the king and our problem is with the king today.”36 
Regime Responses 
We have seen that protests in Jordan during the Arab Spring-wave 
uprising were comparatively smaller than elsewhere in the region. But we also 
established that the protests coalition crossed several significant demographic and 
ideological cleavages. That reform coalition was able to expand protests beyond 
initial protests in Dhiban and protests were not simply confined to the capital. 
Finally, the aims of protests were not as simple and benign as other analysts have 
suggested. Instead, we see a sustained, geographically diffuse protest campaign 
focused on economic as well as political grievances. The demands against those 
grievances did not stop at policy change or removal of lower level leadership. At 
times, the hirak pointed direct and relatively unprecedented criticism directly at 
the monarchy, there were calls to instate a true constitutional monarchy, to move 
beyond cosmetic reforms. All this crossed significant red lines for the regime. But 
this is only the first part of our task. The other half of this analysis must be 
composed of the regime’s responses to the above events through the lenses of our 
hypotheses regarding prevention and control.  
If Jordan’s status as a monarchy makes it either particularly immune to 
protest or particularly well-suited to weather the mobilization, we should expect 
to see some different approach of the regime to confront protests or counterframe 
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and mitigate mobilization.  
It is not hard to posit a thought experiment or simulation in which one puts 
oneself into the position of the King and/or the head of the internal security 
services, confronted with the specter of the rapidly-diffusing, sizeable protests. 
Their goal is to keep people off the streets and prevent them from returning.  
Where protests appear on the streets, prevention ceases to be an option 
where the regime intervenes on the immediate eve of planned protests and 
prevents protests by arresting leadership. Regime action in the ensuing days or 
weeks of an event will be considered – pending deeper examination – causally-
connected and, thus, deemed matters of control rather than prevention. 
For example, one could flex the muscles of the deep state by increasing 
surveillance of known movement leaders and opposition activists, increasing the 
presence of the security services on the streets, or arrest the leaders of the 
movement(s) thereby engaging in prevention by breaking up the physical 
organizations (for example, NGOs), their social networks, and controlling the 
discursive space of the internet by monitoring or blocking traffic, or harassing 
civil society or other important agents. Alternatively, (or simultaneously), one 
could prevent by flooding the discursive space with counter-narratives to mitigate 
and counteract opposition narratives.  
Employing control mechanisms could take the form of one or more of the 
following: arresting movement leaders on the day of protests or immediately 
prior, a sample of the protesters, disperse the rest of the crowd, and then, 
crucially, mobilize counter protesters to organize against the opposition and 
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undergird whatever support exists for the government. Finally, given mobilization 
or immediately prior to a protest, one could use the blunt force of repression and 
mass arrests as a control mechanism. Again, I want to draw attention to the point 
that there is some retrograde action between the two conceptual categories, as 
repression as control in one instance could serve as a teaching tool and thus shift 
into the category of prevention or prophylaxis.  
H1 – Strategies of Prevention 
The easiest way to survive collective actions is to prevent them from 
occurring in the first place. To review, preventative actions against protests can 
take numerous forms including internet censorship, harassment and breaking up 
of potential ideational or physical spaces of mobilization, arresting activists and 
leaders prior to protests, attempting to head-off mobilization through concessions 
or the construction of counterframes, or, finally, the constraint of collective action 
through legitimate legal channels. Any of these can be done by a variety of 
methods and agents of the state. I will begin with the latter.37  
Unlike countries such as Egypt under Mubarak, where the oppressive 
emergency law was widely known and excoriated by Egyptians and the 
international human rights community, Jordan under Abdullah manages to avoid 
the same stigmatization. But this should not be confused with a lack employment 
of preventive tactics by the regime. Every regime must maintain some level of 
baseline monitoring and control of the population. The level of malevolence and 
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visibility of this monitoring varies by regime, as do the strategies and resources 
used to maintain that status.  
Since September 11, 2001 two laws promulgated by royal decree, 
bypassing the legislating channel of the parliament and known as temporary laws, 
have proffered a rather vague definition of terrorism. This declaration effectively 
criminalized even peaceful protests entirely unconnected to terrorism and equated 
the very real violence that characterizes terrorism to the damage caused by riots, 
for example. Simultaneously, these laws threaten freedom of expression and 
association, specifically by requiring protestors to gain permission prior to 
holding a protest; re-routing trials for dissidents from normal civilian courts to 
State Security Courts (effectively military tribunals used against civilians); and 
giving the government the right to shutter newspapers and silence journalists.38  
To some degree, we can consider this doing double-duty as active and 
passive prevention. These laws can actively prevent mobilization, but also 
ideationally send a message of delegitimization or demonization through the false 
equivalence of dissent and terrorism.  
 In the wake of these laws, we get a glimpse into the foundational 
Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion mechanisms in the context leading up to 
the Arab Spring. We can move beyond the level of generalities and point to 
specific instances and individuals targeted by the regime’s prevention or control 
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mechanisms. Former MP, journalist, and human rights activist Toujan al-Faisal 
was arrested under the new (Aug/Sept 2001) temporary laws after her public 
criticism of the government. Brought before a State Security Court, she faced 
charges of "tarnishing the Jordanian state', 'defamation of the judiciary', 'uttering 
words' before another deemed to be 'detrimental to his religious feeling', 
'publishing and broadcasting false information abroad which could be detrimental 
to the reputation of the state', and inciting 'disturbances and killings'."39 Because 
her actions neither directly incited protests, nor occurred in the midst of the mass 
mobilization, this is an excellent example of prevention rather than control. 
NGOs, just as often as individuals, are subject to harassment by the 
regime, including open threats. In one instance in October 2002, the interior 
ministry demanded the closure of the Jordanian Society for Citizen’s Rights 
(JSCR) and cancellation of its official registration based on its alleged failure to 
report its activities and finances, and its refusal to allow Ministry of the Interior to 
search the documents and premises of the NGO. While not occurring during mass 
mobilization, the JSCR example demonstrates the approach of the Jordanian 
regime, particularly in managing dissent in civil society.  
In another case, the government arrested three members of the Anti-
Normalization Committee to disrupt their activities. More malevolently, during 
the same time period, the government enlisted the unwilling participation of some 
of the most prominent tribal trade unions and professional associations to cross-
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pressure the Anti-Normalization Committee. It then increased pressure by 
threatening the other trade unions and professional associations to force the ANC 
to close or risk being liquidated themselves.40 Amnesty International noted that 
this move was more than likely politically-motivated, and “constitute[s] yet 
another attempt by the Jordanian government to gag civil society.”41 Because this 
occurred outside a period of mass mobilization, this constitutes a particularly 
persuasive form of prevention, rather than control. 
By the time the Arab Spring wave arrived in Jordan in early 2011, the 
regime’s strategy shifted to accommodate what it must have believed were going 
to be rough seas ahead. On February 2, 2011, the regime pursued an ingenious 
prevention campaign by diminishing or rolling back previously controversial 
aspects of the 2001 laws. In particular, the interior minister announced that 
protests in Jordan would no longer require pre-approval from the government, 
though protesters were still required to inform authorities of any planned 
gathering within two days.  
It is worth questioning why the regime would do this, given the time 
frame. First, on February 1, 2011, King Abdullah dismissed Prime Minister Samir 
Rifa’i, and his cabinet, replacing him with ex-general Marouf Bakhit with the not-
so-obvious advantage being that Bakhit has been historically not stained by 
corruption allegations in comparison with other prime ministers, especially Rifa’i. 
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As Joel Greenberg notes, citing the late veteran activist Nahedh Hattar, Rifa’i was 
viewed by many as the visible head of a “‘club of businessmen, serving their 
financial interests.’” He was seen as having “personally profited from the sale of 
state companies as part of the king’s policy of privatization” and other neoliberal 
maneuvers. Protests and calls for the removal of Rifa’i continued even as he 
attempted to defuse tensions by unveiling a package of fuel and staple goods 
subsidies along with pay raises for civil servants and promises to increase 
pensions and create new jobs.42 Clearly these measures at appeasement failed, as 
the regime announced the roll-back of the laws against protesting only a day later.  
Of equal importance to note here is the timing and regional context. By 
this time, January 14, 2011, Ben ‘Ali had already fled Tunisia. The initial protests 
of the Arab Spring wave arrived in Jordan on January 28, 2011, three days after 
massive crowds occupied Tahrir Square in Cairo, and the very day that Egyptian 
Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak would be ceding power 
to the military.43 Within days, protests began in Libya that eventually lead to a 
bloody and protracted conflict. Given these events, the logic of the decision to 
ease the punitive laws from 2001, was clearly an effort at appeasement and an 
attempt at prevention of further protests in the kingdom. The ingeniousness comes 
into focus when one considers that the regime was faced with the choice of 
appeasement and concessions, or repression and it chose the former. 
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Simultaneously, as Jamal Halaby indicates, “about 3,000 tribal leaders and 
key figures – including lawmakers, retired security personnel and academicians – 
renewed their allegiance to the king in an emotional letter, praising his reform 
efforts.”44 It is difficult to know whether that move was genuine (and truly 
emotional) or merely perfunctory or otherwise pro forma. Does this letter and the 
intention and action behind it provide a view into regime support or even a 
potential element of monarchical advantage? One might begin by asking whether 
they truly believe that the king is a legitimate and successful reformer.  
Reports at the time noted that the king supposedly met with members of 
parliament and royally-appointed Senate, personally urging reforms. A palace 
statement released at the time intimated that the king, in meeting with members of 
the government,  urged that “more should be done to address the concerns of 
ordinary Jordanians, and that ‘openness, frankness and dialogue on all issues is 
the way to strengthen trust between citizens and their national institutions.”45 He 
reportedly also consulted trade unionists and Islamists on their grievances and 
traveled to poor areas of the country to “get a firsthand look at people’s needs.”46 
According to one of my interviewees, gestures like this by Abdullah are far from 
unheard of. In some cases, the king even responded to specific concerns about 
conditions in hospitals or other institutions by appearing in disguise to see the 
situation for himself. Though the interviewee herself noted that these motions 
                                                 
44 Yaghi and Clark, 238; Halaby, “Jordan Revokes Restrictions On Public Gatherings,” Huffington 
Post, February 15, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/15/jordan-restrictions-public-
gatherings_n_823373.html. 
45 Joel Greenberg, “Jordan’s King Abdullah II Ousts Prime Minister, Cabinet in Wake of Mass 
Protests,” The Washington Post, February 1, 2011, sec. World, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/31/AR2011013103692.html. 
(accessed October 31, 2014). 
46 Greenberg, ibid. 
130 
often go no further than public relations events and few concrete reforms are 
seen.47 
Zaki Bani Irsheid, spokesman and head of the political department of the 
country’s largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic Action 
Front, echoed beliefs that the moves taken so far had been nothing more than 
political theater and the king needed to make more substantial moves toward 
reform. Before Rifa’i’s dismissal, Bani Irsheid argued that the king’s response so 
far had been “‘just a public relations campaign that doesn’t solve the crisis.’ … 
‘The regime wants a solution without paying the price, and it is offering cosmetic 
changes. We told them that what was acceptable yesterday is not acceptable 
today, and what could resolve the problem today may not be a solution tomorrow. 
Delaying and hesitation will only complicate matters.’”48 
Again, is it that the authors of the letter and other regime supporters are 
pledging loyalty to the regime at a tumultuous time to avoid trouble? Is it that 
they want to keep the status quo? Or is it that they in fact favor reform, just like 
the protesters, but believe that the king is the pathway to reform? While affirming 
the first two is more difficult, there is evidence that the third option – that they 
might favor reform but believe the king is the better bet than collective action – is 
not only believed by those who might be called pro-reform loyalists, but that the 
king’s statements (if not his actions) play to that strategy as well.  
Greenberg’s interview with retired general and reform advocate Ali 
Habashnah sheds some light on the question of how genuine these acts of 
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allegiance to the king may be. Habashnah was one of the retired generals who, in 
2010 published a manifesto outlining their opinions on reform and the way 
forward in Jordan. The editorial by the veterans was clearly presented with more 
than a tinge of East Bank nationalism – it took the opportunity to warn against the 
potential for permanent resettlement of Palestinians in Jordan – it deeply 
criticized the royal family, especially Queen Rania and in a manner comparable to 
Tunisians’ criticism of Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Trabelsi. But as Amis argues, it 
communicated an even greater danger to the regime because "it reflected the 
wider current of mounting activism, and revealed serious discontent within even 
this praetorian sector of Jordanian society." 49 That same manifesto, while a semi-
unprecedented move and described as “chauvinistic” by a number of my 
interviewees, simultaneously featured the generals asserting their loyalty to King 
Abdullah and their desire to seek reforms under the monarchy.50 For Habashnah, 
presumably among many others, the monarchy is the only force in the country 
able to unite Jordan as a “nation made up of disparate tribes and other groups.”51 
By all accounts, this action by the loyalist veterans was organic. Though it 
clearly represented a serious vein of discontent across usually reliable identity 
boundaries, the publication of the letter was certainly utilized by the regime as an 
effort at prevention through counter-framing. In July 2011, prevention through 
concessions and counterframing appear in a televised address by the King, 
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wherein he pledged to allow for the election of ministers (especially the Prime 
Minister) who had previously been appointed by the throne. Yet the king carefully 
used caveats to navigate through concession and counterframing. He Promised 
reforms “at some unspecified point in the future.” More importantly, the king 
stated, “We seek a state of democracy, pluralism, and participation through 
political reforms…away from the dictates of the street and the absence of the 
voice of reason.” He ultimately “warned that sudden change” – one the 
government apparently believed was advocated by protesters – “could lead to 
‘chaos and unrest’.”  
As an elegantly simple counterframing campaign, the king’s statements at 
once present concessions while also subtly denigrating protesters by presenting 
the status quo (or a status in the near future) as democratic, pluralist and 
participatory and the protesters’ unconventional participation as composed of the 
“dictates of the street and the absence of the voice of reason”, branding them 
rebels rather than reformers, and inherently undemocratic. With statements like 
these, the king can not only counterframe against pro-reform protesters, but signal 
to and reassure pro-reform loyalists. He implies that keeping him in power is the 
pathway to reform, rather than an obstacle. Compared with regime change, the 
king is a better bet. 
Finally, whether intentional or not, the king’s assertion that sudden change 
could lead to ‘chaos and unrest’ may have begun to lay the ground work for fear 
among Jordanians (activists and non-activists alike) that pushing any further for 
reform or – more especially regime change – could leave Jordan in a similar 
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position as Syria.52  As much is argued by Tarek al-Masri a Jordanian lawyer 
who, while interviewed by Greenberg in 2011 noted that he had mixed emotions 
about the protests in Jordan. He was “happy that the Egyptians have finally risen 
up against an oppressive ruler, but worried about a power vacuum in the streets.” 
When it came to Jordan’s protests, he affirmed solidarity with the grievances of 
the protests, but in the same breath states that he “cannot imagine the country 
without the royal family. They strike a balance between the people and the 
government. I trust them.”53 But what does it say that Jordanians express trust and 
support for the monarchy as a buffer, striking a balance between the people and 
the government, which is widely seen as corrupt, but at the same time they know 
well that, as the late activist Nahedh Hattar intimated, “the king is a member of 
the [same corrupt] club”? 54 
Abu Rish discounts the relatively lower number and size of protests in 
Jordan as evidence of a broad monarchical advantage, saying that these events 
“have little to do with the alleged benevolence of the monarchy or the loyalty of 
the population.” Instead, he argues for a monarchical advantage issuing from “the 
same sets of historical, institutional, sociopolitical, and strategic factors that help 
explain the divergent trajectories of those countries that did feature anti-regime 
mass mobilizations.”55 This is left rather vague, and Abu Rish quickly shifts to a 
discussion of the attempts by the regime to prevent mobilization and curb 
protests. 
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Members in this camp varied considerably. But frequently, individuals 
highlighted a varied mix of a “Jordanians just don’t know how to effectively 
protest” view and a related but more important and less ideologically chauvinistic 
idea. The hirak and the protests dissipated in Jordan not necessarily because of 
anything that the regime did – not directly, at least. Instead they dissipated 
because the hirak and all other protesters and parties managed to successfully 
mobilize but did not arrive on the streets with any discernable, realistic, and 
practicable platform for reform once the regime was removed from power, if the 
monarchy was indeed removed. From one social movement theory perspective, 
this would mean not that the regime foreclosed or broke up political opportunity 
structures for the protesters, but that circumstances themselves foreclosed the 
political opportunity structures. 
Though the demands of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions for regime 
change were unlikely to be considered by the regime as “realistic and practicable” 
but this fact carried more weight in Jordan than it did in Egypt or Tunisia. This 
should be considered evidence of monarchical advantage in terms of control. 
Specifically, this speaks to the ability of the regime to control the discursive space 
via counter-narratives but also to the ability to play divide-and-rule against the 
opposition.  
But the assertions of the group who believes the “revolution has moved 
on” and those who believe that the hirak failed because the protesters did not have 
a realistic or practicable plan for reform if the protests succeeded, shared these 
sentiments not out of callous cynicism, but of steely-eyed realism. 
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The fact that so many of the interviewees identified the long history of 
Jordanian activism and mobilization on the one hand, but then seemed to suggest 
that those that arrived on the streets in 2011 were relative dilettantes should give 
us pause. It could simply be that the two are not mutually exclusive and the 
mobilization in the Arab Spring wave was qualitatively different and the activists 
qualitatively less-experienced and savvy than their predecessors. Existing work on 
the composition of the hirak in 2011 attests to this fact.56 But the fact that so many 
of the interviewees who were present/involved in 2011 were experienced activists 
and well-versed in the history of mobilization in Jordan and that the protests in 
2010-11 were redeployments of frames and tactics forged and tested in 1989, the 
mid to late 1990s, and 2006-7 suggests that it cannot simply be an effect of 
inexperienced activists showing up on the streets, merely caught up in a wave and 
unprepared for the effects of or the next steps in the cycle of mobilization.  
Rather, striking against the monarchical advantage in terms of keeping the 
opposition one-dimensional, the distinct nature of the Arab Spring wave in Jordan 
was that, for the first time, the usual suspects of mobilization (the Islamists, 
Leftists, etc.) cooperated in the streets with grassroots youth movements cutting 
across several social cleavages. Respondents disagreed on the efficacy of these 
coalitions. Either the hirak was ruined by the inexperienced youth or was coopted 
and misdirected by the stalwart veteran oppositionists such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
What does this illustrate about the ability of the regime to foreclose 
particular mobilization opportunities or effectively repress mobilization? First, it 
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could be that the regime simply was not ever pushed close enough to or far 
enough over its “red line”. Second, it may be that repression is not a preferred 
tactic for the regime as it was in Tunisia. As a result, it may be that the regime 
believes that more precise tools it has at its disposal are more expedient than the 
“heavy machinery” of bald repression.  
Echoing work by Jillian Schwedler, activists intimated that the regime has 
a particular benchmark for acceptability of contentious actions. For example, the 
regime is more willing to allow protests and other dissenting actions outside 
Amman than inside. Inside Amman, the regime will readily control protests by 
restricting physical space. Outside of Wasat al-Balad (Downtown), there is no 
truly central part of Amman that serves as a central gathering point in the way that 
Tahrir Square and Pearl Roundabout did in Cairo and Manama. Though the same 
could be said for Tunis, though Avenue Habib Bourguiba, as a main thoroughfare, 
was a frequent site of protests. Protesters wishing to emulate other uprisings and 
gather in front of the Interior Ministry or the Prime Minister’s office find 
themselves gathered rather ineffectively beneath an overpass or awkwardly on a 
median in one of Amman’s eight landmark “circles”.57  
“Abdullah” a prominent young activist describes the regime’s overall 
strategy and approach as “surgical” rather than brutally overwhelming in its 
approach to policing protests – a sentiment agreed upon by the other interviewees. 
He first emphasized the ability of the regime to negotiate and renegotiate the 
neoliberal social contract, making attendant choices and changes regarding the 
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divide-and-rule patrimonialism characteristic of Middle Eastern authoritarian 
regimes. Building on this, Abdullah relates an intertwining personal story of 
encountering the regime. His general comportment, common across the 
interviews, didn’t evince an overly fearful or paranoid view toward the Hashemite 
regime that is reportedly tangible in other regimes in the region. When asked 
about how the regime represses or punishes those who cross red lines or run afoul 
of the deep state, it is clear that the first approach to the regime seems to be to 
politically and socially neutralize the threat of particularly contentious 
individuals. Abdullah, while soft-spoken but confident, is outspoken when it 
comes to his criticism of the regime and Jordanian life and politics in general.58  
Another respondent’s case is illustrative in another way: She happens to be 
from a prominent Jordanian family. This doesn’t mean that red lines do not exist 
for her. But as is evident from her own description, bolstered and validated by 
other interviewees’ observations, it does frequently mean that the regime is more 
constrained in its options for pressuring and punishing her. Having crossed the 
regime one too many times – or once too far – the regime communicated to her 
family that she might do well to take a vacation overseas. She took the 
opportunity during this time in “exile” to enter postgraduate studies in Europe. 
But she was able to return and has continued her blogging and online activism. 
Conversely, others told me a story of a prominent activist from the 
traditionally loyalist city of Karak. He was known to the regime not only for his 
activism but also for his travels between cities and governorates, bringing 
activism in booklets and seminars to networks throughout the country. When this 
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man was arrested during a large and now-infamous protest at the interior ministry 
circle, activist Abdul Rahman reported that the regime was forced to release the 
man within a day or two without being abused or egregiously tortured. This was 
not because the regime was particularly fearful of his popularity among activists, 
fearing that his death might galvanize activist networks. Rather, it was his lineage 
from Karak that earned him his freedom. More specifically, the fear that his 
familial/tribal network could swiftly mobilize against the regime and seriously 
upset the balance of power that earned him his freedom. Taking a step back to 
compare, note that the regime appears less fearful to let protests occur in Karak or 
elsewhere outside Amman. By comparison, in a story related some respondents, a 
relatively socially unconnected young man was arrested at the same protest. He 
was systematically tortured and only released under the condition that he leave 
Jordan and never return. To this day, he is reportedly still living in Turkey.59  
Despite this, Abdul Rahman, his close friend, and another activist and 
NGO leader all argued that while arrests and harassment of activists – especially 
protesters actively engaged in a protest against the regime – are relatively 
common, the regime does not engage in routine and systematic torture of activists, 
civil society actors, and other social and political intelligentsia. This is 
contradicted in the story of dentist and leftist activist Hisham Bustani. In 2002, 
Bustani was arrested and detained for six days after writing an article in a 
Lebanese magazine about an earlier detention during which he not only suffered 
abuse, but witnessed far worse at the notorious Jweideh prison. For bringing 
attention to the human rights abuses he observed in the prison – including “guards 
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practic[ing] karate on inmates and beat[ing] them with cables.”60 Far more “high 
profile” opposition figures like Islamist MP Laith Shubailat have been subjects of 
chronic and systemic abuse in a revolving door cycle of harassment and 
imprisonment for their criticism of government corruption and policies.61  
But this could be a function of the “surgical” strategy of the regime; 
preferring to use subtler intimidation methods first. Of course, the Information 
Minister, Mohammed Adwan, has a particular view of how the regime has been 
able to weather demonstrations: “I think the vast majority of public opinion in 
Jordan is with the government and the king.”62 But activists like Bustani have a 
shrewdly different view of the phenomenon: “We have tyranny dressed up in a 
suit cleanly shaven talking about democratic rights. …We have this repression 
that’s neat.”63 
Here one female activist’s example returns. A corollary of the new social 
bargain is a public sector as the nexus of employment and patrimonial control. In 
Jordan, while this bloated public sector is not economically tenable, especially 
given increased immigration rates from neighboring Syria and Iraq, it serves in 
the realm of repression as a further pressure point to neutralize dissenting 
challenges to the regime. In the activist’s example, a family member’s prominent 
position in a government ministry was not a ticket to increased insulation from the 
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repression of the regime. Instead, she received a phone call from the security 
services, gently reminding her that her behavior does not only affect her, but 
endangers the employment of her family member – lucky already to have a job in 
an economy stretched dangerously thin. Similar scenarios were reported by 
blogger and freelance researcher Mariam, scholar Fatimah, and others. 
Respondents frequently recounted stories of themselves or friends being called in 
to the police station, being made to wait all day before being sent home. 
Presumably this subtle tactic is used to intimidate by suggesting that the regime 
can compel even the most asinine behavior. The punishment itself is decidedly 
non-violent, and even inane. But the message is clear. 
What King Abdullah’s regime lacks in charisma, it supplements in 
nationalist campaigns. The 2002 “Jordan First” campaign – “designed to mold 
citizens in ‘a unified social fiber that promotes their sense of loyalty to their 
homeland’” and create a ‘common denominator between all Jordanians regardless 
of their origins, orientations, views, talents, faiths [or] races’” – is clearly 
designed to unite a seemingly fragmented Jordanian polity.64 Likewise, the 2006 
“We Are All Jordan” campaign was designed explicitly as a  
forum, an initiative of His Majesty King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein, 
created to give all Jordanians an unprecedented opportunity to speak out. 
The declaration is a list of urgent issues facing the country on various 
levels: strengthening internal capacity, political reforms, economic 
reforms, social security, and regional challenges.”65  
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Combined, these initiatives are intended to confer a nationalist legitimacy with a 
veneer of neoliberal economic and political reform.  
Finally, the 2004 “Amman Message” represents an official interpretation of Islam 
endorsed by the regime to marginalize more Salafist elements within the 
opposition.  
Uniquely, when asked about how the regime responds to protests and how 
it deals with or manages them, one activist and freelance researcher cites the 
theory of “political technology”, which she describes as originating in and 
perfected in contemporary Russian politics. Neoliberalism, she argues – and what 
other activists and journalists call the “new social contract” – may appear to be 
reforms, but they are in fact just one form of political technology. In this 
paradigm, outright repression and the stealing of ballot boxes – behavior that 
might characterize traditional authoritarianism – is replaced with a complex 
gaslighting process by the regime to create a virtual politics whereby elites 
manage and manipulate democracy.66 By this process, even the public perception 
of the regime itself or societal dynamics can be manipulated. If this is true, it may 
explain why the Jordanian regime can afford to be less repressive (at least in the 
initial stages); because it can neuter protests and large-scale dissent through this 
subtle strategy.  
Strategies of Control 
The first point of transition from prevention to control looks, at first 
glance, to be the same. Indeed, the actions are frequently indistinguishable with 
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the exception of the temporal criteria. For example, the government rounded-up 
and arrested twenty pro-reform activists as part of a crackdown on dissent in the 
Arab Spring wave. Rounded up between mid-July and early October of 2012 
either during or following peaceful protests in Tafileh, Karak, and Amman,  
[c]harges against them include 'carrying out acts that undermine the 
political system in the Kingdom', participating in an 'illegitimate 
gathering', 'insulting the King', spreading news that aims at 'weakening 
national sentiment or inciting sectarian and racial strife', and 'attempting to 
change the state's constitution' - a charge which is punishable by death.  
In a useful parallel of control, to the previous example of Toujan al-Faisal 
under prevention: Sa'oud al-'Ajarmeh, member of the tribal leaders’ reform 
coalition, the “Jordan 36 Current” (Tayyar al-Urduni 36) faces potential life 
imprisonment for what Amnesty International believes amounts to penalizing him 
for peaceful protest to criticize the government. Al-'Ajarmeh was arrested in 
Amman in July 2002, "reportedly for publicly criticizing the King and other 
officials during a protest against the new elections law". He, like many others, is 
"being tried on charges of 'carrying out acts that undermine the political system in 
the Kingdom' and 'inciting others to carry out illegitimate acts'." Amnesty 
International connects these events with a wider crackdown on protests and 
legitimate criticism of the regime. In another example of control, in March 2002, 
six men reportedly belonging to or protesting with the Free Tafileh Movement are 
detained without trial for several weeks for their alleged involvement in a 
previous protest by Tafileh residents that turned violent. There is no evidence that 
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the men were involved in the violence or the organization of the protest. Among 
others, the accusations made against the men, included 'insulting' the King.67 
In contrast to the prevention tactics and counter-framing prior to protests, 
a notable event in June 13, 2011 in Tafileh saw the regime scrambling to use the 
same tactics for control. While on a tour ostensibly inspecting construction 
projects in the city of Tafileh, the royal convoy was purportedly attacked by 
protesters throwing stones and bottles. Protests in Tafileh had occurred since June 
10, 2011 with demands highlighting anger at the regime’s failure to initiate 
reform and combat corruption as well as the failure of the regime to remove the 
prime minister and cabinet. In terms of control, security forces briefly clashed 
with the crowds and those protesters attacking the convoy, with reports of at least 
25 injured by security forces.68 But we also see counterframing as a measure of 
control. The regime quickly moved to frame the attack narrative as simply 
enthusiastic youth rushing forward toward the motorcade, attempting to greet the 
king. 
In a textbook example of control, an Amnesty International press release 
dated February 5, 2002 records that dozens of people were arrested in the wake of 
September 11th, frequently for no other reason than being connected to 
demonstrations against the killing of Palestinians during the Second Intifada and 
against the U.S. bombing campaign against Afghanistan.69  
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The Palestinian cause is embedded in the Jordanian national 
consciousness, and protests such as these should normally be “safe” protests and 
thus generally allowable.70 In other words, we should expect not to see prevention 
or control of these collective actions by the regime both because the actions aren’t 
directed usually at the regime itself and because the regime loses more than it 
would gain by repressing the protests, even symbolically. If even these “normal,” 
“safe,” protests were repressed after September 11, that would suggest that 
something changed in the logic of the regime. What was normally allowable is no 
longer allowable.71  
By 2002, the regime was openly intensifying its prevention strategy. Most 
obvious during the pre-Arab Spring period, was the decision to implement over 
100 "temporary laws" (temporary because they are effectively royal-decrees while 
the parliament was then dissolved). Most of these laws have been explicitly 
intended to prevent (and as necessary) control mobilization.72 
In a highly significant event, protests in the city of Ma’an in November 
2002 featured heavy surveillance bordering on house-arrest of prominent tribal 
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and religious leaders such as Sheikh Subji Mughribi. During this same period, 
Shadid notes that the regime had increasingly clamped down on outspoken unions 
and opposition parties and journalists.73 Frequently in the case of journalists, this 
began to result in self-censorship – the ultimate form of prevention. While this 
could be argued to straddle my conceptualization of “prevention” versus 
“control”, it is clear that effective control breeds future prevention.  
Six people were killed in Ma’an in clashes with authorities during protests. 
According to both protesters and residents, protests and violent unrest were both 
caused or bolstered by “poverty, neglect, anger over U.S. policy in Israel and Iraq, 
and the heavy hand of a worried government”.74 The last part is important to note 
here because worry is associated with a heavy hand, whereas elsewhere during 
my interviews, for example, worry is associated with hesitation on the part of the 
authorities, rather than a doubling down on repression. Here, Shadid reports that 
King Abdullah responded to unrest in Ma’an with an iron fist, sending “tanks and 
thousands of police officers and soldiers.” Shadid’s sources within the 
government said that such a heavy-handed response was “part crackdown, part 
message of what was in store in the event of wartime unrest.”75 Again, the line 
between an action being preventive or controlling is blurry here. Control measures 
(especially coercive ones) are always serving two purposes: they stop 
mobilization that has already happened, and serve as a signal against future 
mobilization. They are controlling but may inspire prevention through self-
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censorship or self-policing. For the purposes of analysis, I am still using the 
temporal criteria.  
Seasoned Dhiban activist “Abu Shuji’a” has experienced the gamut of the 
slightly more aggressive but not outright repressive strategies of the regime. Abu 
Shuji’a has been imprisoned many times, the most recent in Dhiban in June 2016. 
One year before he had been imprisoned in Zahran for six months for insulting the 
king. While in prison, he refused to engage in the daily practice of prisoners being 
required to publicly wish good will on the king. When asked why he refused, he 
argued that he could not say “long live the king” when the king causes such 
suffering.76 A year was consequently added to his sentence.  
Before and between his periods of incarceration for protesting and 
criticizing the government, corrupt practices and laws, Abu Shuji’a has felt the 
subtle pressures of the regime’s surgical strategy. He was fired three years ago for 
his association with Dhiban workers’ social movements and protest activities. 
Since then he can scarcely travel, can’t spend the holidays with family because of 
time spent in the legal system. He was refused a loan from the government and 
when he confronted the director of laws – who happens to be a close relative – 
police arrested him for insulting the king and his own relative. He stressed that the 
government refused his request for a loan even while they were simultaneously 
preventing him from working. Once released, the court refused to give him some 
particularly crucial form of documentation and consequently he lost 
approximately 300 dinars from his already thin paycheck. For Abu Shuji’a, who 
remains indefatigably optimistic, his driving motivation is to “speak truth to 
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power”. And he asserts that the reason behind his “long tongue” (tawiil al-lisaan) 
is because of the government’s “long hands” (tawiil ayyed). For Abu Shuji’a “the 
king believes that he is bigger than God”. This is evidenced for him in practical 
experience: if you insult God, you receive two days in prison. Insulting the king 
will earn you a year.77  
More aggressively, the Dhiban protests in particular also serve as an 
example of the strategy of the regime in approaching the protests in Jordan’s 
wave. Over time, according to Abu Shuji’a, protesters in Dhiban strikes began to 
call for the fall of the regime.78 This, unsurprisingly, served as a red line for the 
regime as the police not only arrested peaceful protesters but began to escalate 
with greater violence. Abu Shuji’a was himself arrested as the Darak forces used 
tear gas on protesters who reacted in kind with stones. In one instance, he relates 
that the Darak forces demolished a tent where people were gathered seeking 
employment, beating and arresting those in the tent despite the generally peaceful 
tenor of the surrounding protests. In fact, interviewees reported, Dhiban suffered 
thirteen days and nights of tear gas from security forces in addition to general 
harassment of the populace including arbitrary alcohol arrests.79 Dhiban featured 
more tense exchanges between youth protesters and the Darak security forces. At 
one point, youth activists were cursing the security forces, but the media only 
picked up the story at this point. As a result, the media didn’t capture the initial 
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violence of the Darak and the thirteen days of tear gas.80  
From the sample of interviews, we can glean a number of tactics: The 
regime was more than willing to arrest protesters and activists. But apart from 
notable Darak activities against activists in Dhiban (6-7 January 2011) and 
baltajiyya attacks at diwar dakhiliyyeh protests (24 March 2011), the former of 
which was widely considered a drastic overstep, the regime appears to have 
avoided the type of violent crackdowns that characterized the Tunisian and 
Bahraini uprisings. As mentioned previously, several respondents noted that the 
regime arrested many people at each protest. But in a particularly crucial moment, 
soon after regimes collapsed in Tunisia and Egypt, the regime pulled back, 
leaving protesters free to demonstrate at the 4th circle in from of the prime 
minister’s office and the “diwar dakhilliyyeh” (interior ministry circle) protests – 
particularly on 24 March 2011. One activist argued that the regime lost its nerve 
and feared the backlash of popular sentiment if it responded too harshly, echoing 
Tahrir.81 Another activist and civil society manager argues that for a time after 
Tunisia and Egypt the security forces did not arrest anyone at first. In his view, 
this is because the regime feared the result of too aggressively repressing 
protesters, leaving them free to demonstrate for fear of sparking violence.82 
Finally, there is the episode held out by some as the monarchy-reaction sine qua 
non: the 24 January 2011 march of thousands from the Grand Husseini Mosque in 
Wasat al-Balad (downtown) to the Greater Amman Municipality building saw not 
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widespread crackdowns but police handing out water and juice.83  
Once again, we must ask ourselves what this data means as interpreted 
through the lens of the pertinent research questions. By the attestation of 
numerous interviewees, the regime either backed off or help off on outright 
repressive actions for fear of either tribal backlash (thus costing the regime 
potentially valuable political support) or of sparking a “Jordanian Tahrir.” Yet we 
can also deduce that this level of care and nuance is not a function of the Arab 
Spring protest cycle. Instead, the Hashemite regime appears to have a deeply-
embedded and well-practiced strategy.  
How Far “Above the Fray”? 
As I mentioned before, there is an important difference in any regime 
between protests against policies, protests against policymakers, and protests 
against the regime.  
There was some notable back-and-forth between the myself and 
interviewees regarding the reform movement’s and much of Jordanian society’s 
condemnation of the parliament and MPs but the reform movement’s general lack 
of willingness to push harder against the institution of the palace. Several 
interviewees have criticized the monarchy in the past and have paid the price for 
doing so. The most common response was that the parliament is the most outward 
manifestation of corruption and other ills of the regime. The logic is weak, 
considering that the parliament – or at least one half of it – issues directly from 
the king and the king holds broad veto power over both chambers, but 
understandable considering the considerable punishment for criticism of the king.  
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Two interviewees were willing to criticize King Abdullah: The first, a 
prominent lawyer whose father was a highly placed intelligence official, calls the 
regime the “fourth kingdom of Abdullah” and asserts that “the country has 
developed negatively since the very beginning of his rule.”84 He argues, not 
surprisingly, that the king has long proposed empty reforms and failed to deliver 
on promises. The same applied to proposed reforms as a result of the Arab Spring 
uprisings. The lawyer has some greater wiggle room for criticism given his 
father’s former position. 
The other interviewee, Abu Shuji’a, has been arrested numerous times for 
his involvement in demonstrations, his criticism of King Abdullah, Queen Rania 
and the government. The regime has squeezed him in numerous ways, depriving 
him of his job and ensuring the denial of a loan to support a farm, but he is 
remarkably fearless in his willingness to speak out against not only the corruption 
of the parliament but of the palace as well.85 In comparison to other interviewees 
who tended to demur when pressed on why the parliament should be criticized but 
not the monarchy, both the lawyer and Abu Shuji’a did not. In a nod to the very 
nature of both my project and theirs, they see King Abdullah’s desire to not only 
reign but rule as a distinct stumbling block on the path to reform. This is the case 
despite the fact that the lawyer falls into the camp of those who believe the hirak 
failed because it was not prepared to cope with the governing reality after a 
regime change, whereas Abu Shuji’a is a committed activist who insists on the 
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viability of the reform project and the need for more than simple cosmetic 
reforms. 
Another example occurs in protests and regime response from July 15 
2011 to July 20, 2011. Protesters and journalists surrounding the July 15, 2011 
protests were reportedly attacked by the police. The Jordanian Public Security 
Department admitted responsibility although it defaulted to a narrative that 
blamed the protesters and the Muslim Brotherhood for provoking the police.86 
Protests carrying the original message of economic and political reform 
grievances also became protests against police attacks on protesters and 
journalists and occurred on the following Saturday and Wednesday (July 16 and 
July 20) without incident, suggesting the regime made the decision to back off 
and allow the protesters some breathing room to release pressure. This would not 
be the first time that the regime appears to have acted aggressively and then 
withdraw, ostensibly to give protesters room to breathe and to hopefully prevent 
the kind of mass uprising that both sides were seeing in Tahrir Square in Cairo. 
Similarly, protests in the southern city of Karak were not attacked or disrupted by 
the regime. As Jillian Schwedler notes, however, this could be not an innovation, 
but rather a manifestation of practiced strategy: if protests occur in hinterland 
cities and can be kept confined and not spread to larger cities like Irbid, Salt, or 
the capital, the regime will allow the protesters to burn off their frustration 
unperturbed.87 
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Ultimately, however, if this was pursued as an actual strategy to dampen 
protests or decrease tension, it failed, as August and October of 2011 saw protests 
in Karak and Sakeb (Jerash province) that were met with resistance either from 
pro-government counter-protest forces or by Baltajiyyeh thugs that were widely 
seen as de facto enforcers and even agents provocateurs for the state.88  
From this point onward, until at least late 2012, protests increase in 
frequency, size, and geographic distribution. Concomitantly, the protests became 
bolder in calling for actual regime change or placing the blame not on the 
shoulders of the prime minister and cabinet, as is the norm, but at the feet of the 
king himself. The turning point here appears to me to have been a July 22, 2011 
communique by the London-based expatriate Jordanian opposition coalition, the 
Jordanian Overseas National Assembly (JONA). For the first time since at least 
the beginning of the contemporaneous Arab Spring wave, calls for the overthrow 
of the king emerged, holding him responsible for corruption in Jordan. The JONA 
also refers to the royal family as “a gang of parasites” and accused them of 
“occupying the land.”89 This frame would be repeated by domestic activists 
(frequently Islamist in ideological orientation) such as Layth Shubaylat in October 
2011, and a cascade of marches in solidarity with Shubaylat after his rally was 
allegedly attacked by regime-coordinated baltajiyyat (thugs). Contentious actions 
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continue through at least March 2012 where the Jordan National Movement 
chairman, former MP and retired military veteran Dr. Ahmad ‘Oweidi al-‘Abbadi 
begins to overtly chastise the regime and call for the removal of the king/royal 
family and for the transformation of Jordan into a republic.90 
Former Information Minister Mohammad Adwan argued in 2003 that the 
regime had been able to “contain” demonstrations in 2001-2003 not by force or 
intimidation, but because the “vast majority of public opinion in Jordan is with the 
government and the king.” Such counterframing is not unexpected by any regime. 
In many ways it is effective without being bound by the need to be factual. Yet 
leftist activist and professional activist Hisham Bustani, twenty-nine, counters 
acerbically: “We have tyranny dressed up in a suit, cleanly shaven, talking about 
democratic rights. …We have this repression that’s neat.”91 Bustani encountered 
the reaction of the Hashemite regime first-hand when he was arrested and 
detained for six days over an article he wrote in a Lebanese literary magazine. 
Ironically, the article that had him first imprisoned was effectively a whistle-
blowing on the very coercive apparatus of the state and its prisons and describing 
the abuse Bustani had witnessed during that previous sentence, particularly overt 
physical violence by guards against inmates.92  
Jillian Schwedler has pursued a highly interesting thread of this research 
agenda in Jordan, ultimately arguing that “Jordan’s liberal constitutional order 
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employs both a rights discourse, e.g., legal codes such as the permit system, and a 
range of surveillance and policing practices to constraint the use and 
expansiveness of public space.”  
Analyzing the push and pull of reform and control in the Jordanian regime 
since the succession of King Abdullah, veteran reform oppositionist Marwan 
Muasher was more sanguine about the regime’s promises of reform than other 
oppositionists might prefer. But combining his insights with reports of activists 
and other analysts, one begins to observe an interesting dynamic. Muasher 
records, for example, the dynamic between legislation or royal proclamations that 
run counter to the public statements by King Abdullah. The Arab Summit in 
Tunisia in 2004 birthed the Tunis document. Self-reflection spurred by a desire 
for an alternative to what was seen as externally-imposed reform of “The Greater 
Middle East Initiative” being pushed by the Bush administration, the Tunis 
document diagnosed crucial areas of political reform in Arab states. These 
included “respecting human rights and freedom of expression; ensuring the 
independence of the judiciary; pursuing the advancement of women; 
acknowledging the role of civil society; modernizing the educational systems; and 
adhering to the values of tolerance and moderation.”93 
In one of his more sanguine moments, Muasher argues that King 
Abdullah’s attempts to reinvigorate Jordanian efforts at domestic political reform 
“fell on deaf ears yet again” and reform fizzled out by the end of 2004 at the feet 
of an intransigent parliament.94 The schizophrenic inclination of Jordanian reform 
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efforts emerged in March 2005 when, instead of wider reforms the Interior 
Ministry introduced a “government-approved” bill to parliament to further 
regulate activities of all professional associations. The bill "required associations 
to keep discussions apolitical and called for the creation of a disciplinary structure 
to penalize those who broke the law."95 When civil society spawned a series of 
collective action events to protest the reduction of political space by the bill, they 
were quickly repressed with crackdowns and arrests. This entire process, Muasher 
notes aptly, contradicted the public message from the palace in which King 
Abdullah “called for a ‘democracy based on dialogue and respect of others’ 
viewpoints’.”96 
Again, this schizophrenic dynamic itself is neither abnormal in Jordanian 
politics, nor would it feel out of place in many other regimes in the region. King 
Abdullah or the individual who happens to be lucky enough to be sitting in the 
Prime Minister’s chair that month, continually promise reform in one form or 
another. Those fluent in this language of reform know that reforms that do occur 
are more often symbolic and toothless at best or so heavily transmogrified so as to 
be indistinguishable as any attempt at real reforms. But what is truly interesting 
and documented in the Arab Spring wave, is that moderate protesters, and even 
the “traditional” opposition, often use exactly the same language and imagery of 
reform that the regime has used in the past. Respected blogger Nassem Tarawneh 
identified this phenomena during one of the most contentious episodes of the 
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Jordanian Arab Spring – the March 24-25, 2011 protests at Diwar Dakhiliyyeh 
(Interior Ministry/Gamal Abd al-Nasser circle). As Tarawneh observed,   
As the hours progressed the March 24 shabab [“youth”] began to make a 
few declarations of what they sought to achieve. I do not recall a single 
thing that they said, which the King himself has not either said in the past 
few weeks, let alone the past few years. At the top of their list was having 
an elected government under a constitutional monarchy where the King is 
the sovereign ruler. [Also] at the top of their list was cutting off the 
interference of the security apparatus (the mukhabarat) in the lives of the 
average Jordanian, or more specifically, the lives of Jordanian youth, 
especially on campuses. This last point likely emerged due to the King 
having had expressed the exact same sentiment not one week ago. …The 
feeling [among those I spoke to was] that if they presented themselves 
publicly, that this would some how [sic] offer political capital for the King 
to carry out reforms amidst an apparatus that has difficulty accepting 
change.97 
 
There is something ingeniously simple here that perhaps embodies the “above the 
fray” element of politics. The regime has managed to discursively differentiate the 
role of the king from the government. He is part of the debate, but his position is 
to be seen as not up for debate. In this case, the king can safely rest behind this 
artificial wall, built and maintained with “virtual politics”, and fire volleys of 
suggested reforms at an imagined point in the future.  
One might say that this represents monarchical advantage, but in 
hindsight, the regime quickly cracked down on the March 24-25, 2011 Diwar 
Dakhilliyeh protests, and the Jordanian protest wave continued unabated, even 
reinvigorated. So, the regime clearly doesn’t believe that the virtual politics of the 
trained discursive discipline and established ‘red lines’ are enough to preserve the 
regime. Even when the protesters are repeating demands for reform that the king 
has already, in theory, conceded to. Moreover, it is clear – referring to Figure 2 – 
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that the hirak do not believe the king’s empty promises. It may have been an 
effective method in the past, but the protesters clearly see the writing on the wall. 
After the initial salvo of 2010 protests in Dhiban, the contemporaneous 
Prime Minister Samir Rifa’i penned an editorial in the popular independent 
newspaper, al-Ghad. In this editorial, we see the initial framing response of the 
regime to protests. Rifa’i maligned the striking workers and teachers, asserting 
that the regime would not surrender to the “oppression” of the protesters. Instead 
of returning home and abandoning their campaign, this only emboldened the 
demonstrators and caused protests to begin to spread from the countryside to 
Amman. The regime’s response in this first salvo evinces a persuasive-control 
strategy through a transparent warning. But more importantly, it represents 
counter-framing, presenting the protesters as oppressive and illegitimate as 
compared to the legitimacy of the regime.  
The protesters called for Rifa’i’s firing or resignation. Meanwhile the 
teacher’s movement protesters present at the 2010 demonstration added the 
demand that the head of the ministry of education be fired or resign. Numerous 
interviewees noted that the police and special gendarmerie (Darak) made 
significant attempts to hamper the demonstrations in Dhiban. The deployment of 
the Darak could be interpreted as a sign of how seriously the regime takes the 
problem, rather than simply allowing regular police to handle domestic protests.98  
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Despite this initial reaction and attempt to hamper protests, on December 
23, the newly elected parliament proclaimed an unprecedented vote of confidence 
in the newly formed cabinet of Samir Rifa’i. Given tensions in the kingdom, this 
vote was seen by the public as a crass rejection of public demands for reform, and 
indicative of the government’s disregard of the public.99 Unbelievably, on 
December 31, 2010 the government decided to increase the price of gas for the 
fifth time without raising salaries – a decision guaranteed to instigate riots.100 Abu 
Shuji’a reports that in Dhiban, there was no immediate strike, perhaps to the 
satisfaction of the regime.  
More dangerously, the youth organization of Dhiban did decide to gather 
on 7 January 2011 in front of the mosque in Dhiban to protest.101 Some one 
thousand citizens participated in this 7 January Dhiban demonstration, chanting 
the slogan: “Down with the Government Price Increases.” According to activists 
and other participants, the government was surprised by the number of protesters 
gathering to wait for the march to begin. General anger with the government 
carried protesters to the end of the demonstration. At the end of the day, activists 
called for widespread mobilization, urging all major cities to gather together and 
demonstrate as well.  
We can say unequivocally that this is the moment at which the events 
transcended mere local economic grievance demonstrations. A repeat of the 7 
January protest was scheduled for a week later under a similar slogan: “Down 
with the High-Priced Government.” Protests spread from Dhiban to the capital, 
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Amman, as well as the traditionally loyalist city of Karak. By the third week, 
protests spread to other governorates. Most interestingly, Abu Shuji’a and a 
number of other interviewees noted with pride that the 2006, 2010, and 2011 
protests utilized bread as a symbolic frame – reportedly attaching bread directly to 
placards – prior to its famous appearance in Egypt’s revolution.102 Such a picture 
is featured in Amis’ chapter with the caption “  ؟يزيزع اي تنأ نيأ" (“Where are you, 
my dear?”).103 
It seems relatively clear that the activists in this case were able not only to spark 
and sustain protests, but also that the protests were innovative in their techniques. 
None of the frames differs significantly from those deployed in the parallel 
protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, or elsewhere in the region. As a result, the 
idea that the protesters did not mobilize with a coherent message seems dubious. 
It is clear and commonly accepted among the interviewees that the hirak 
splintered and was neutralized without accomplishing the characteristic Arab 
Spring goals of regime removal. There was likewise broad agreement on a few 
common reasons for this splintering. First, the regime strategy of divide-and-rule 
helped to prevent full-integration of the two ends of the protest movement – 
Transjordanian and Palestinian – into a cohesive unit comparable to that in Tahrir 
square.104 Second, while Tunisia and Egypt breathed fire into the Jordanian 
protests, Syria extinguished them. Every interviewee identified fear of either 
government reprisal because of government fear that things might escalate into a 
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“Syria situation” or fear themselves that the natural progression of pushing too far 
too fast with the regime would be civil war akin to Syria. The final element 
requires further investigation but is consistent enough: the internal division among 
the hirak as to the merits of pushing past simple socio-economic reform and into 
political demands only served to split the movement when tensions rose. That 
“Jordanians don’t know how to protest” may not be as chauvinistic as it first 
appears. It may reflect a feeling that the hirak couldn’t cohere enough to decide 
on and present a united front, realistic demands, or a plan for follow through if the 
demands were indeed met. Even this sentiment, however, is perhaps too ad hoc 
and swift a judgement, as we can see from the Dhiban protest mobilization and 
the anecdote of a Karak-born activist seemingly doing the networking work of the 
entire Egyptian April 6th youth movement.  
Conclusions 
 Did the Jordanian regime survive the Arab Spring uprising wave because 
of the hypothesized mechanisms of monarchical advantage? Let us summarize the 
evidence examined in this chapter.  
Was Jordan’s monarchy better able to forestall protests such that 
mobilization took place at much lower levels compared to MENA republics? 
Based on the evidence, the Jordanian protests were fewer and smaller in 
comparison to other Arab Spring uprising cases. This would lend credence to the 
existence of the monarchical advantage and support for the first hypothesis. On 
the other hand, we have to acknowledge that these protests were sustained. Of 
course, when we make the crucial comparisons to Tunisia, Tunisia’s uprising was 
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necessarily shorter than Jordan’s (and Bahrain’s) because the Tunisian uprising 
had a natural endpoint in the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime.  
 But the duration of protests is, analytically, a double-edged sword. It 
means that the regime is not particularly adept at forestalling protests. Activists 
are clearly capable of carrying out protests. This lends credence to the idea of 
discursive and networking space as well as physical space to protest. It also 
indicates that the regime’s concessions were either not trusted or the protesters 
took the opportunity to press for further demands. In the case of Jordan, both are 
true. Protesters clearly did not vacate the streets, even after numerous economic 
and political concessions. On the other hand, it could be an indicator of the 
monarchical advantage as an indicator of the strength of the regime. In other 
words, if protests persist it may be because the regime is weak or because it is 
strong enough to withstand them. Further, it is related to the dimensions on 
geographical intensity, size intensity, but perhaps most of all the dimension on 
intensity and targets of claims. In other words, a regime can withstand a protest if 
it is isolated to the periphery or small parts of the capital, if the protests are 
comparably small, or the protesters were not calling for the fall of the regime, 
beyond which the regime must either brutally repress them or reconsider the 
continuing nature of the regime as authoritarian.  
Interviewees and other sources indicated clearly that this mobilization in 
Jordan in 2010-2012 was both qualitatively and quantitatively different than 
previous waves. This indicates an inability of the regime to prevent protests in 
several time periods, damaging assertions of hypothesis 1. Regarding the 
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geographic dispersion of the Jordanian Spring, protests began in the periphery but 
the regime’s intransigence gave them swift purchase in Amman. Beyond 
geographical dispersion, protesters in Jordan represented a cross-section of 
society as never before. Both these dimensions of dispersion (geographical and 
demographic) were sustained over time. Both of these evince a weakness in 
hypothesis 1, but also in hypothesis 2 to the extent that the indicators overlap. So 
we are left, with, at best, a mixed record in the case of Jordan. We see in the 
single case of this Jordanian monarchy, we see different levels of each of the 
hypothesis indicators. Though, admittedly, it is powerful evidence of monarchical 
advantage that the protests were smaller in quantity, even if they persisted.  
On the final dimension – intensity of aims/goals of protesters – the record 
is likewise mixed. We can definitively say that the legitimacy of the monarchy 
does not stand as a persistent bulwark against protests. On several occasions and 
persistently in 2012, protesters frequently and undeniably made the monarchy the 
target of their ire. But this means that nearly a year passed before these calls for 
regime change appeared. Unfortunately, the full examination of this final measure 
cannot be presented in this chapter alone, but must wait for comparison to Tunisia 
and Bahrain. 
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Chapter 5  
Tunisia – Early Riser 
Tunisia’s ostensibly successful transition after its inspiring revolution has 
been the silver lining of the Arab Uprisings and remains the hopeful spring in 
what some began to call the “Arab Winter” as Libya imploded and Syria 
exploded. But perhaps the most tragic story of the Arab Spring is its smoldering 
embers in Bahrain. 
The previous chapter provided crucial insights on the dynamics of 
collective action in Jordan. But it leaves questions unanswered. What is notably 
missing from these findings is any comparative indication that variables crucial to 
explaining the survival of the Jordanian regime rest on its status as a monarchy 
rather than a republic. Jordan on its own does not tell us enough and provides too 
little in the way of external validity. Remember that the purpose of the 
comparison of the primary case of Jordan to Tunisia and Bahrain is intended to 
show the potential monarchical advantage in relief. Tunisia was chosen as a 
republic of comparable size and an “early riser” in the Arab Spring wave. A 
comparison between Jordan and Tunisia alone might be sufficient to tease out the 
existence of the monarchical advantage. However, Bahrain was chosen as a third 
case to help compare conclusions about Jordan to another monarchy, but also to 
juxtapose a dynastic monarchy against the Jordanian monarchy.1 Comparisons to 
Tunisia and Bahrain are designed to draw out and scrutinize what I think I know 
                                                 
1 For more on the distinction between linchpin and dynastic monarchies per Michael Herb, please 
refer to Chapter 2.  
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from Jordan and possibly highlight those things that are still missing and to widen 
the circle beyond Jordan.  
Before comparing Tunisia and Bahrain to Jordan, it is important to review 
the questions and hypotheses driving those comparisons. Protests in Tunisia led 
quickly to regime change. But Jordan and Bahrain experienced protests but 
remained standing. Recall that the examinations of the hypotheses laid out in the 
previous chapter were modeled on the assertions of Michele Angrist, examining 
why the Tunisian uprising resulted in regime change. Hypothesis 1 (H1) holds 
that monarchies are better than non-monarchies at preventing protests. The second 
hypothesis (H2) holds that monarchies are better at withstanding protests than 
non-monarchies. Finally, Hypothesis 2a asserts that monarchies are better at 
withstanding protests (H2) because they more effectively control protests that do 
emerge.  
As I have re-worked and operationalized Angrist’s original argument, the 
Tunisian uprising resulted in revolution and regime change because it ultimately 
failed to control protests, resulting in protests that were larger, of longer duration, 
and geographically diffused over most of the country. Protests in Tunisia will be 
more aggressive in calling for changes to policies and policy-makers, including 
the executive, Ben Ali. As in the previous chapter, after establishing the timeline 
of the Tunisian uprising, I will begin by examining the intensity of protests in 
terms of scale (number, size, and geographic dispersion across Tunisia). Next, I 
examine the character and composition of the protest coalition in Tunisia, looking 
for a diversity of actors across identity and demographic cleavages. This will be 
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followed by an examination of the character of the grievances expressed and used 
to mobilize protests in the Tunisian uprising and the intensity of protests in their 
demands. Finally, I will review the findings regarding the regime’s capacity for 
prevention of (H1) and control of (H2a) protests.   
Before comparing Tunisia and Bahrain to Jordan, it is worth pausing to 
review my tentative conclusions from Jordan. A couple of things are clear from 
the analysis of collective action and regime response in Jordan. First, and easiest 
to determine, is that Jordanian activism, even in the Arab Spring wave, had been 
long-simmering. Jordanian activists and protesters were well-practiced in the act 
of mobilization for political grievances. Moreover, they have a rich cultural 
reservoir from which to pull both tactics and frames. Second, it appears that the 
Hashemite regime does not have any particularly special capacity to either 
prevent or control protests. However, the regime does appear to have a talent for 
resiliency based on a careful but not especially convoluted mixture of 
concessions, framing, and selectively targeted or surgical use of repression. It 
should be no surprise that the Jordanian regime seems quick to learn from 
mistakes not only of other regimes but of its own in the past. Third, activists in 
Jordan note that the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt did buoy support for 
mobilization toward reform and made it possible for them to mobilize people 
around effective frames, move into the street, and visibly and vocally challenge 
the regime. The commonality of grievance frames as well as the cultural reservoir 
of past uprisings in Jordan were key in making it possible to mobilize people 
across different identity and ideology cleavages. But the regime still deployed its 
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usual “divide-and-rule” strategy vis-a-vis ethnicity and identity among 
Jordanians. In this instance, unlike others in the past, however, the regime perhaps 
only cynically played its divide-and-rule hand to separate East Bank Jordanians 
from West Bank Jordanians. The hirak movement was composed of cross-
cleavage youth that was more difficult to divide on identity lines. Since the Arab 
Spring fervor has subsided and the tide has receded, activists report that people 
remain politically aware and engaged but it is more difficult to get them off the 
balconies and into the street. Lastly, the Jordanian hirak movement appears to 
have dissolved under what interviewees report as a lack of cohesion in its 
message on the streets, lack of a practicable plan for reform if a potential 
revolution had succeeded. Externally, worries among the protesters and activists 
that any collective action sufficient to topple the Jordanian monarchy would invite 
the same destabilizing chaos that was happening in Syria or might weaken Jordan 
to the point that spillover from Syria would become increasingly likely.  
Characteristics of the Tunisian Uprising 
Unlike any other case in the Arab Spring wave, the Tunisian revolution 
consisted primarily of only one month of protests before the fall of the Ben Ali 
regime.2 Ben Ali, ruled Tunisia with a draconian grip for 23 years before 
departing with his wife, Leila Trabelsi, and their children for Saudi Arabia on 
January 14, 2011, marking the end of the Tunisian uprising and the beginning of 
                                                 
2 Though widely reported in the international press, it appears that the name “Jasmine Revolution” 
was a moniker used only outside Tunisia and never by Tunisians themselves to refer to the 2010-
11 uprising. I will use only the less colorful but contextually accurate “Tunisian revolution” in my 
analysis. Cf, Issandr El-Amrani, “Why You Shouldn’t Call It the ‘Jasmine Revolution,’” The 
Arabist, January 17, 2011, https://arabist.net/blog/2011/1/17/why-you-shouldnt-call-it-the-
jasmine-revolution.html. 
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the Arab Spring. The Tunisian regime under Ben Ali was widely known for its 
repression. Though, like many of his contemporaries among Arab leaders, he 
began as a promising reformer, expanding press and electoral freedoms, 
repression and the closure of freedoms crept steadily back into Tunisian life and 
politics. As in Egypt, the police and security forces were long feared, and brutally 
effective in controlling regime opponents.  
Tunisian mobilization prior to the Arab Spring 
“Graduate’s self-immolation sparked 10 days of violent protest that left at 
least two dead in nation where dissent is rare.”3 This Guardian article’s subtitle 
pithily tells the story of Tunisia that belies a much more active backstory. In what 
has become a common theme, the uprisings in Tunisia that became the Arab 
Spring did not emerge from a vacuum, nor did they emerge solely based on 
WikiLeaks cables that already confirmed what Tunisians and others already knew 
about repression and malfeasance.  
Laryssa Chomiak catalogues in detail the collective action events in the 
decade that preceded the December 2010 uprising. The juxtaposition of two 
similar protests shows an interesting (and representative) if altogether 
unsurprising dynamic in pre-revolution Tunisia. On April 3, 2002, a pro-
Palestinian protest organized by the ruling party and featuring state-created or 
otherwise co-opted women’s organizations, labor and professional unions, and 
student and youth groups. Naturally, there was no regime repression of this 
                                                 
3 Julian Borger, “Tunisian President Vows to Punish Rioters after Worst Unrest in a Decade,” The 
Guardian, December 29, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/29/tunisian-
president-vows-punish-rioters. 
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action. It was not only regime-sanctioned, but in support of a “safe” subject area, 
and thus ostensibly far enough from regime redlines.  
Three days later, leftist students, some associated with the Progressive 
Democratic Party (PDP) and the outlawed Tunisian Communist Party (PCOT), 
staged a copycat protest. Despite the same subject of the rally, the leftists were 
unable to obtain a permit for the protest. Hundreds of protesters nevertheless 
showed up to the illegal rally. Probably strategically, but to the eventual detriment 
of the protests, the protesters converged on Avenue 9 Avril in downtown Tunis – 
near the crucially symbolic area of the Kasbah, which housed the Tunisian 
parliament and a major university campus, among other sites.4  
Unlike the previous demonstration, the police swarmed this protest within 
minutes. This quickly devolved into clashes between police and protesters. Once 
these clashes began, Chomiak reports that the protesters began chanting slogans 
against the police forces, the most visible embodiment of the regime’s repression 
and illegitimacy.5 It is doubtful that the protesters would have been surprised by 
the security forces’ reaction. And to organize what amounts to essentially a 
redundant or copycat protest could be a deliberate attempt to push the regime or to 
force it to define the physical and rhetorical red lines. A secondary benefit could 
have been that activists wanted to shine the spotlight on the abuses of the Ben Ali 
regime and expose the hypocrisy of the West’s support of the regime as a paragon 
of human rights in the region.  
                                                 
4 Laryssa Chomiak, “Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia,” in Taking to the Streets: The 
Transformation of Arab Activism (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014), 26. 
5 Laryssa Chomiak, “Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia,” in Taking to the Streets: The 
Transformation of Arab Activism (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014), 26. 
169 
Regardless, Chomiak highlights the importance of these two juxtaposed events in 
retrospect. The April 6, 2002 protest marked the first time that a protest organized 
around one of the “safe” topics with the support of a major political party, 
professional associations, and student activists would immediately switch to 
deploy a domestic grievance frame once the security forces turned to repression.6 
This entire process would recur a year later in Tunis and the Gafsa mining region, 
with the PCOT and student activist networks protesting the American invasion of 
Iraq. This time protesters deployed another human rights-specific grievance 
frame, criticizing police for restricting their freedoms of assembly and 
expression.7 It recurs yet again in approximately August and October 2006. This 
time, however, protesters from the PCOT and the newly organized illegal Union 
of Unemployed Graduates – an alternative to the corrupt and co-opted Tunisian 
General Labor Union (UGTT) – began to make a serious tactic of the piggy-
backing protest.  
Activists mobilized in August and October 2006 again in the towns of 
Gafsa and Redeyef around the frames against corruption and illegitimacy of the 
regime. Frames specifically focused on these grievances as manifested in the 
regime’s lackluster efforts to fight unemployment in the hinterlands, corruption 
and co-optation of the large UGTT union, in the unfair hiring practices of the 
Gafsa Phosphate Company, and the nepotism of a small coterie of regime-linked 
families. These regional protests continued in January and February of 2008, 
manifesting as demonstrations as well as sit-ins and hunger strikes in Redeyef. In 
                                                 
6 Laryssa Chomiak, “Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia,” in Taking to the Streets: The 
Transformation of Arab Activism (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014), 26. 
7 Chomiak, 27. 
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March of 2008, local activists networked with a larger protest movement 
supported by left-wing student activists across the country. These urban activists, 
including members of the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET) and 
members of the Communist Party (PCOT) and Parti Socialiste de Gauche (PSG), 
used this political opportunity space of the Gafsa-Redeyef protest wave to add 
their broader grievance frames to the existing unemployed workers’ claims.8 
Large protests began to break out in Redeyef in response to the failure of previous 
protests and the arrest of activists. Wives and mothers of jailed husbands and sons 
began planning “women’s protests” hoping that the regime would be less 
repressive against protests by women. By March 2008, this tactic spread to the 
wives of unemployed miners, school teachers, and local union members.9 These 
protests increasingly resulted in police clashes with protesters and the regime 
sending greater numbers of police to quell protests, ultimately arresting and 
jailing hundreds over the course of three months and shooting and killing at least 
two protesters. In April 2008, leftist activists organize a national day of solidarity, 
attempting to spread support throughout the country. At the same time, activists 
across the country begin using the networking powers of Facebook and Twitter to 
spread information about grievances and regime repression. This proves to be 
crucial in both this period and the 2010-2011 period as the regime maintained a 
stranglehold on media, including foreign media. France 24 was the first outside 
news source to cobble together a documentary on the activities within Tunisia 
based on material shared by activists online. In response to this, Ben Ali did not 
                                                 
8 Chomiak, 31-32. 
9 Chomiak, 31-32. 
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back down, but instead sent an additional 12,000 police forces to the restive areas 
to help quell the protests.10  
After April 2008, protests lost momentum, however. Ben Ali responded 
with minor concessions, authorizing the release of some political prisoners if they 
would sign a pledge never to engage in organized collective action against the 
state again. Paired with his concessions, however, Ben Ali still reserved the 
ability to brutally crush dissent that emerged. Accordingly, regime repression 
escalated dramatically in response to the next protest a month later. Police 
swarmed a sit-in outside the offices of the Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company 
(STEG), which had assembled to protest rampant electricity and gas outages in 
the Redeyef area. After arresting everyone involved, police electrocuted to death 
protester Hisham A‘Alemi after he refused to leave and held onto a power cable 
that had been turned off.11 
This dramatic overreach by the regime only fueled protests in response 
throughout May 2008. The regime deployed a counterframe, “labeling the 
nonviolent and peaceful protests as an organized coup attempt and terrorist 
strategy to destabilize Tunisia.”12 Unemployed workers in Redeyef continue to 
take to the streets on June 6, 2008, despite increased repression. By July-August 
2008, the regime has effectively suppressed the uprising in the Gafsa-Redeyef 
mining region, having shot two more protesters during the June 6 protest. During 
this period, while street-protests were suppressed, left-wing activists continued 
networking, particularly on university campuses and on Facebook and Twitter. 
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Police deployment may have receded, but activists found themselves under 
increased surveillance, continuous random arrests, harassment, and censorship. 
By August-September 2008, Ben Ali ordered Facebook blocked for a month in 
response to activists evading regime censors by using proxy servers among other 
methods.  
Until 2005, Chomiak observes, activism against the Ben Ali regime was 
geographically disconnected. Techniques ranged from an increasingly contentious 
cyberspace willing to critique the regime, to those street protests than began as 
normal, non-anti-regime or anti-police protests and occasionally morphed after 
meeting with police repression. After 2005, mobilization became more focused, 
particularly around issues of internet censorship and freedoms of expression. 
Perhaps more importantly, as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way would likely 
affirm, was the bolstering of Tunisian activist networks through interconnection 
with parallel international activist NGOs.13   
Previous analysts viewed the pre-2010 collective action, however 
widespread and increasingly dense in networking, as effectively mobilizing only 
those directly affected by the specific grievance frames. In this case, the grievance 
frame and mobilization was specific to the anti-corruption/unfair practices 
protests in the mining hinterlands of Gafsa and Redeyef. While notable as 
evidence of mobilization and networking ability of the activists and protesters, 
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Regimes After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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previous analysis argued that this crucially left out the urban, coastal middle 
class.14  
Yet, Chomiak also argues, this ignores one of the most significant 
mobilizations in the lead up to the Tunisian revolution. May 22, 2010 was the first 
substantive protest event since the regime effectively repressed the Gafsa 
Phosphate workers’ strike of June 2008 and Ben Ali had blocked Facebook from 
August to September 2008. Six internet activists – all of whom had been involved 
in the leftist efforts to mobilize national solidarity around the Gafsa/Redeyef 
protests and whose activity online after that protest wave caused the regime to 
block Facebook – organized a protest on Facebook known as “Tunisie en Blanc” 
(“Tunisia in White”). The mobilization called for Tunisians affected by internet 
censorship (virtually everyone) to simply dress in white and have a coffee on any 
one of the many cafes in Tunis’ main thoroughfare, Avenue Habib Bourguiba. 
They planned to pair this innovative flash mob protest with calls for traditional 
protests in front of the Ministry of Communication and Technology.15  
The intelligence services quickly shut down the “Tunisia in White” 
Facebook page. Police quickly dispersed the potential flash mob protest and 
arrested those involved in organizing both it and the physical protests. Regardless 
of the ostensible failure of this incident, Chomiak asserts that this represents a 
crucial convergence of Tunisian activist networks. By this point, “activists, 
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bloggers, and oppositional journalists were supporting and covering any attempt 
to transgress and contest the Ben Ali regime.”16 
Despite increased security forces surveillance of activists, after passing 
through the period from 2002 to 2008, regime counterframing and violent 
repression, activists and protesters had all been learning in that crucible and 
refining their methods. Thus, the “Tunisia in White” campaign does represent a 
failure of a protest, though it was aborted less violently than in the past and the 
future. But more importantly, it was an innovation in tactics. That innovation 
crucially drew together a newly mobilized middle class, and youth, students, and 
others growing disgruntled with the regime’s overreach and blasé corruption 
around effective past collective action frames and networks. By May 2010, 
despite repression and surveillance, activist networks were able to marry any 
small-scale grievance such as a hinterland miners’ strike to a larger master frame 
of regime corruption and excesses as crimes against the public writ large. Seven 
months later, Mohamed Bouazizi would prove just how fecund the grievance 
networks and cultural reservoir were.  
On December 20, 2010, days after Bouazizi’s self-immolation in the 
southern hinterland town of Sidi Bouzaid, the government dispatched 
development minister Mohamed al-Nouri al-Juwayni to the impoverished 
southern epicenter. There he dangled a new $10 million development program 
concession to appease protesters and halt the further diffusion of protests. But, in 
the ensuing days, 22-year-old Houcine Falhi electrocuted himself to death in Sidi 
Bouzaid at a demonstration against unemployment. His reported last words were 
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“No to misery; no to unemployment!”17 December 24 saw protests spread 
throughout the southern hinterlands. Numerous protesters, after reportedly setting 
police cars and buildings on fire in the central Tunisian town of Menzel 
Bouzaiene, were met with police opening fire on the crowds, killing two. 18 The 
interior ministry argued this was justified in self-defense after protesters failed to 
disperse when police fired shots into the air.  
Nevertheless, this sets off a pattern of violence over the ensuing days, punctuated 
by the regime’s attempt to alternatively counterframe and concede to the demands 
of the protesters. A December 25 rally attended by hundreds in the central towns 
of al-Ragab and Miknassi featured clashes with security forces when security 
forces staged an overnight crackdown campaign. Protests continued to diffuse to 
Kairouan, Sfax (the capital of the southern governorate and the second largest 
city), Gassa, and Ben Guerdane, while clashes erupted in Souk Jedid. During this 
time, protests take on a decidedly political turn, with chants (including some of 
the first in Tunis) beginning to appear, calling for Ben Ali not to stand for re-
election in 2014.19 On December 26, 2010, amid these clashes and protests in 
which unemployment was highlighted as a grievance frame, and a day before 
protests reach Tunis, beleaguered development minister al-Juwayni announced 
that the Tunisian government conceded the legality of the protesters’ employment 
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demands. Just as in Jordan, however, the government, through al-Juwayni, 
underlined that its concessions were tied to demands “only through dialogue. 
…’what is unacceptable is for those parties to resort to violence, which is not in 
anyone’s interest.”20 A member of the then-outlawed opposition Ennahda 
movement deployed a vehement counterframe, arguing that the problem was 
more widespread than unemployment and salient beyond Sidi Bouzaid. Regarding 
the inexcusability of violence, he argued that “these disturbances have never been 
violent – it is the government that incites violence. [The government is] highly 
corrupted and there is a denial from them about how they treat people.”21 
Likewise, Lina ben Mhenni maintained that the government’s use of money to 
prevent potential protests was too little, too late: “They [the government] are 
trying to solve the problem by making promises. They did the same thing in 2008, 
but these are not real solutions.”22 
Journalist Yasmine Ryan points to the massacre by paramilitary forces as a 
turning point in the Tunisian Uprising. A local high school teacher characterized 
the flow of events, saying, “Mohamed Bouazizi broke the wall of fear. But the 
real centre of this revolution is Kasserine, and the neighborhood of Ezzouhour [in 
particular].”23 Though protests in the Kasserine region had already increased to a 
steady tenor after a copy-cat self-immolation by a man in the town of Kasserine. 
The tipping point within Kasserine came when the local police were replaced by 
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the security services. Specifically, Ryan notes that large numbers of riot police 
units known as the Brigades de l’Ordre Public (BOP) were mobilized from other 
towns. While protests were largely peaceful in the beginning, physical violence 
by the BOP agents – including beating and the use of teargas and rubber bullets – 
resulted in youth throwing stones and allegedly Molotov cocktails at police and 
security forces.24  
At some point, Ryan discloses, “then came a number of unidentified 
agents wearing different, slicker uniforms from either the BOP or the local police. 
They used live bullets for the first time on January 8.”25 After shooting several 
protesters at the Monguela roundabout in the neighborhood of Ezzouhour, things 
escalated dramatically the next day, January 9, 2011. Per Ryan’s account, on 
January 9, four agents of the unidentified paramilitary force stormed the women’s 
bathhouse near the same Monguela roundabout. The agents shot teargas into the 
bathhouse, trapping women and children inside for several minutes before 
allowing them to flee and giving chase. When young men approached to help the 
women, they were shot by the paramilitaries. Some eyewitnesses argued that this 
was a deliberate tactic to draw protester-age young men into the open to 
neutralize them.26 
Security officials escalated brazenly by opening fire on the funeral 
procession of Mohamed Mbarki on January 9. The procession for his friend Walid 
Massoudi – one of those fatalities – on the following day, was attended by more 
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than 200 people, despite being forbidden by security officials. BOP riot police 
blocked the funeral cortège and attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas. 
Youth protesters responded with rocks. This continued apace until the afternoon 
when eyewitnesses said at least five snipers started firing on the procession from 
rooftops. Eyewitnesses noted that this was an escalation from previous encounters 
with security forces and police, when even live rounds were announced and used 
to incapacitate by shooting at non-vital locations like the arms or legs. 
Eyewitnesses and the head of forensics at the local hospital noted that these were 
clearly shots intended to kill. Eyewitnesses, meanwhile, noted that the snipers 
appeared to “target the youths who were leading the protests, those who were the 
most courageous, those who had a camera or a cellphone.”27 
Notably, this occurred on the weekend of January 8-12, 2011, nearly one 
month after Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. Emphasizing this point, this 
means that, as Yasmine Ryan notes, (though less critically) it took nearly a month 
for the critical mass of the middle classes to join the protests and push the 
uprising nationally and onto Avenue Habib Bourguiba in Tunis.  
Intensity of Scale of Protests 
 Michele Angrist’s criteria for “sustain[ing] physical protests across most 
of a state’s territory for a significant period of time” uses the very narrow period 
of one month (December 2010 – January 2011) as a benchmark. Because the 
Tunisian revolution only persisted for a month and ended not in devolution to 
civil war as in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, but in regime change, we might assume 
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that there is a relationship with intensity of scale. Conversely, in Jordan, because 
the protests persisted for over a year and did not result in regime change, we 
might assume the protests were small and sporadic. Yet either of these 
assumptions could easily be incorrect.  
In Tunisia, protests regularly ranged from hundreds to several thousand people 
during the various sit-ins, strikes, and protests across the country. By the time 
protests reached Tunis in early January 2011, participants numbering in the tens 
of thousands were marching down Avenue Habib Bourguiba toward major 
government offices. On February 26, 2011, 100,000 people - the largest crowds 
since Ben Ali's ouster - turned out to demand the resignation of interim prime 
minister (and former Ben Ali regime insider) Mohammed Ghannouchi and the 
prohibition of any other former ruling party or Ben Ali regime insiders from any 
future government.28 
We know that the 2010-11 protests began in interior towns and villages and 
spread to Tunis only in the last few weeks of the uprising. Protests in the month-
long uprising occurred in Gafsa; Redeyef; Sidi Bouzaid; Menzel Bouzaine; al-
Ragab; Miknassi; Kairouan; Sfax (the capital of the Southern governorate and the 
second largest city in the country); Benn Guerdane; Souk Jedid; Kasserine; 
Jendouba; and of course, Tunis. In Tunisia, protests were reported in 11 of 24 
governorates, a geographic dispersion of approximately fifty percent. Laryssa 
Chomiak illustrates the geographic spread of protests in Tunisia after protests first 
erupted in Sidi Bouzaid. In those very hinterland towns that had remained 
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seemingly cowed since the violent crackdown in 2008, the protests began to 
spread systematically: “the first towns to engage in ongoing protests were Thala, 
Kasserine, Gafsa, Redeyef, and Metlaoui, before heading north long the Algerian 
border, through Jendouba, and finally reaching Tunis in early January.”29  
Composition of the Protest Coalition 
The composition of the protest coalition in the Tunisian uprising can be examined 
from two related but distinct angles. As in Jordan, parties to the protest ranged 
from decentralized grassroots youth movements to NGOs, professional 
associations, and labor unions. The 2002, featured an amalgamation of students, 
and members of the Progressive Democratic Party and outlawed Tunisian 
Communist Party. As discussed previously, during the 2008 Gafsa protests 
against the UGTT union and the Gafsa Phosphate Company, local activists in 
Gafsa started networking with larger left-wing student activists throughout the 
country, combining their respective grievances. 2008 also witnessed an effluence 
of specialized protests and groups – the wives and mothers of jailed husbands and 
sons, wives of unemployed miners, school teachers, and local union members. Of 
course, the “Tunisia in White” flash mob protest was unique in that it mobilized 
ordinary Tunisians, particularly middle-class Tunisians in the larger coastal cities 
who had been affected by the regime’s increasingly clampdown on the internet. 
They merely had to wear white and purchase a coffee at a pre-coordinated date 
and time. As Chomiak reveals, the foundation for 2010 was laid in 2008 when the 
General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET), the Tunisian Communist Party 
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among others “used the waves of [previously disorganized and weak] protests as a 
political opportunity to mobilize others with broader political goals.”30 It appears, 
overall, that left-wing student activists provided a network throughout the country 
to expand and spread protests that began in the interior. 
It is true that the urban middle-class and intelligentsia were among the last to 
move into the streets in Tunis to demand the ouster of Ben Ali. But, as Chomiak 
illustrates, the cascade of constituencies that went into the streets or that defected 
from the regime was unprecedented and spelled the end of the regime. Within the 
first two weeks of January, opposition parties, lawyers, and professional 
organizations had joined the protests in ever greater numbers and with increasing 
frequency. Most damaging to the regime, perhaps, was the defection of the 
UGTT, the largest union in the country, which then called on thousands of 
protesters to join them in the streets of Sfax on January 11 and in Tunis on 
January 13, 2011.31 Within 24 hours, Ben Ali had fled to Saudi Arabia.  
A second crucial aspect of the protest coalition in Tunisia, as discussed 
previously, underscores the presence of activism across (real or potential) societal 
cleavages.32 The heterogeneity of Tunisia’s mass collective action was bolstered 
and fostered by Tunisia’s secular opposition actors reasoning that the regime 
under Ben Ali was more of a threat to their interests than the possibility of sharing 
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power with the Islamist opposition. In short, from the 2000s to the revolution, 
bridge-building across the secularist-Islamist divide had been steadily cultivated.  
Finally, by the time the UGTT joined the angry streets and protests had reached 
Tunis, Angrist observes the “refusal of civilians to stand with and for the status 
quo by not demonstrating, or by counterdemonstrating in support of the 
regime.”33 
Intensity of Demands and Aims 
 In large part, Tunisian activists were not deploying grievance frames any 
different from their counterparts in Jordan, either in the period immediately 
preceding the Arab Spring uprisings, or the revolutionary uprising itself. 
Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation unfortunately served as a stark emphasis of 
the grievances in Tunisia. As Angrist demonstrates, though economic grievances 
were central to the Tunisian uprising,  
many Middle Eastern societies faced greater economic hardship than 
Tunisia. Despite its economic challenges…Tunisia could boast a relative 
low poverty rate, high literacy rates, impressive school enrollment rates 
for both sexes, high life expectancy, decent health care provision, and a 
large middle class for the region.34  
Angrist reconciles these indicators with the apparent quotidian reality for most 
Tunisians through relative deprivation. This was most marked in the rural interior, 
where past uprisings as well as the 2010 revolution began. Michael J. Willis 
captures the view from the ground, particularly in these hinterlands, saying  
Progressive neglect of the region during the rule of Ben Ali, who 
channeled resources and especially jobs disproportionately to the capital 
and the coastal towns and cities, stoked resentment. …Official rhetoric 
about Tunisia’s “economic miracle” failed to chime with local 
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experiences, and the marked growth of clientelism and nepotism, 
particularly during the latter part of Ben Ali’s presidency, led to 
widespread local feeling of being excluded and cheated out of the fruits of 
Tunisia’s supposed economic success.35 
As in Jordan, economic grievances were quickly and easily packaged together 
with corruption grievances. This is not the only substantive parallel between 
Jordan and Tunisia. Just as the Jordanian teachers’ and workers’ movements that 
predated the Jordanian Spring in Dhiban in 2006-7, and 2009 so the 2008 Gafsa 
uprising predated the 2010-11 Tunisian uprising. Another quite interesting 
parallel can be drawn between the socio-economic and geographical similarities 
between the hinterlands of the two states. Perhaps a more apt comparison to Gafsa 
in Tunisia is the Jordanian town of Ma’an. 
Chomiak summarizes the grievance framework and its implications:  
In following the flow of protests in 2010 and 2011, one can see that 
grievances developed from basic economic demands in Sidi Bouzaid, 
Thala, Kasserine, and the mining region in the South, along the Algerian 
border toward the north of the country and also to Jendouba in the north-
west, to over demands for increased civil liberties. … By the time the 
popular protests reached Tunis on January 8, 2011 …regional variation in 
grievances mattered less…when Tunisians felt united in their collective 
grievance towards the Ben Ali regime.36 
 
Again, in protests in the interior in 2008, activists were focused not necessarily on 
the removal of Ben Ali but on alleviating economic pressures. This goal easily 
shaded into an anti-corruption frame and at times took on an anti-policy or anti-
personnel goal. Early protests, for example, frequently criticized the police as the 
most visible manifestation of the Ben Ali regime’s repressive capacity.37 As time 
progressed, even anti-police or anti-repression slogans became more specific, as 
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in a 2003 protest in which protesters deployed a specifically human rights-
oriented frame, criticizing the police for restricting their freedoms of assembly 
and expression.38 Overall, the picture in the lead up to the 2010/11 uprising was of 
grievance frames highlighting economic injustice, a lack of dignity, and unfair 
practices by clientelist unions and companies in the hinterlands, and protest goals 
of righting those unfair practices and reforming job allocation processes and 
perhaps dismantling particular companies or breaking union monopolies. 
After December 25, 2010 protests for the first time take on a decidedly 
anti-policymaker goal, as protesters began to call for Ben Ali not to stand for re-
election in 2014/15.39 By January, Willis notes, once the UGTT had thrown its lot 
in with the protesters, and middle-class activists and networks – especially 
including large numbers of lawyers and professional associations – joined the 
existing youth and leftist grassroots activism, calls for Ben Ali’s removal became 
increasingly common. It is important to note here that, unlike what one might 
assume, given the outcome, the calls for the ouster of Ben Ali were not present 
from the beginning, just as in Jordan, calls for the institution of a constitutional 
monarchy or the removal of the king/monarchy, were neither immediate nor 
ubiquitous. Nevertheless, as both Willis and Chomiak note, unprecedented 
solidarity, paired with a singular goal of ousting the regime, especially after the 
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January 2011 Kasserine Massacre, may have been the deciding factor in the fall of 
the Ben Ali regime.  
Regime Responses 
What should be obvious is that Tunisian activists have not only been 
active but quick to learn and innovate during the period from 2002-2011. But 
what should have been just as obvious to activists involved anywhere during that 
period (2002-2011) that the regime would not tolerate this level of dissent and 
active, public rejectionism. The Ben Ali regime was quick to snuff out any serious 
or sustained challenges to its rule and was swift to deploy counter-narratives to try 
to prevent mobilization of bystanders or warn off protesters. The latter includes 
the willingness to move co-opted professional associations or extensions of the 
ruling party into the streets to delineate space for acceptable collective action.  
But none of this appears to have worked. The Ben Ali regime is no better 
than the Jordanian regime at the prevention of protests. In fact, especially in the 
case of the 2002-2005 protests activists were active in experimenting with new 
tactics, welding together grievances, and testing the red-lines of acceptable 
behavior for the regime. By 2006-2008, activists are learning from the crucible 
outside of those red-lines and showing a willingness and ability to mobilize 
protests in both the hinterlands and the coastal urban centers.  
In terms of regime strategies, there is a noticeable pattern of a foundation 
of persistent surveillance. As with Egypt, the military in Tunisia was not the 
primary agent of regime repression, and ultimately, the military, when deployed, 
would refuse orders to fire on protesters. Likewise, the regime was more than 
186 
willing to deploy police to disperse protests, arrest activists and participants, or 
even attack and kill protesters. Overall, however, the regime appears willing to 
vary its strategies for prevention and control. In all cases, police were quick to 
descend on protests that materialize. The use of tear gas and live ammunition was 
commonplace.  
During the precedent-setting 2008 protest cycle, protests increasingly 
resulted in clashes with the police. Police would arrest hundreds over the course 
of March and April 2008 and two would be killed in clashes while the regime 
simply continued to pour more police into restive areas in an attempt to quell 
them.  
The Ben Ali regime was not averse to more subtle methods of prevention 
and control, however. After it had effectively controlled protests in April 2008, 
Ben Ali responded with minor concessions, promising to release some political 
prisoners on the condition that they sign a pledge never to engage in organized 
collective action against the state again. Nevertheless, the regime response to 
protests a month later was swift and brutal. Police swarmed the sit-in protest at 
the Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company, arresting all participants, and publicly 
and extrajudicially executing Hisham A’alemi by returning power to a power 
cable that he refused to abandon.  
As discussed previously, the public backlash to this dramatic overreach 
resulted in a counterframing effort by Ben Ali, “labeling the nonviolent and 
peaceful protests as an organized coup attempt and terrorist strategy to destabilize 
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Tunisia.”40 During this same time, the regime continued to use police to repress 
protests, but it also sought to prevent and control simultaneously by shutting 
down Facebook. At the same time, the regime increased mukhabarat surveillance 
and harassment of activists. Surveillance of this type undoubtedly allowed the 
regime to quash the “Tunisia in White” attempted protest as soon as it started.  
The regime was not without the wherewithal to purchase appeasement. 
Ben Ali dispatch development minister Mohamed al-Nouri al-Juwayni to the 
restive southern epicenter with an offer of a $10 million development program 
designed explicitly to halt the protests and prevent future outbreaks. When this 
fell flat, however, the police were more than willing to repress protesters with live 
ammunition on December 24.  Two days later, al-Juwayni delivered a statement 
featuring a mild concession to the legality and legitimacy of the protesters’ 
employment grievances. But this was to come with a caveat as al-Juwayni 
underlined that the concessions were tied to demands “only through dialogue. 
…’what is unacceptable is for those parties to resort to violence, which is not in 
anyone’s interest.’”41 Ben Ali would emerge only three days later, on December 
29, 2010, appearing on television with a promise to both create jobs and punish 
protesters, whom he labeled terrorists. He simultaneously deployed the military to 
stifle protests.42  
By the first week of January, the regime effectively switched to a 
repression-only strategy and increased the level of violence to a new high. The 
events of January 8-9 in Gafsa and Kasserine, with paramilitaries from the BOP in 
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sanitized uniforms opening fire on protesters and a funeral cortège from snipers’ 
nests and specifically targeting those recording events with cell phones, would 
later become known as the Kasserine Massacre and represents the most brutal 
episode in the Tunisian uprising.  
  The 2010/11 Revolution, what had been clashes between protesters and 
police earlier in the decade turned to pitched battles between protesters and the 
police or security services, featuring burning tires, Molotov cocktails, tear gas and 
live ammunition. Finally, what is notably different from the Jordanian but similar 
to the Bahraini uprising is the remarkable and routine violence used by the Ben 
Ali regime. 
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Chapter 6  
Bahrain – Smoldering Embers 
If the prevailing view of the Tunisian revolution was of swift victory and a 
promising transition, and the Jordanian uprising was of protracted but ultimately 
ineffective mobilization, the view of the Bahraini uprising may be of its 
protracted violence. We could challenge the monarchical advantage and compare 
Jordan and Bahrain simply on one dimension, represented by the following 
question: why did similar realities faced by the Jordanian and Bahraini regimes 
result in a careful and mixed strategy in the former and a brutal crackdown in the 
latter?  
Apart from those places that have descended into civil war, like Syria, 
Libya, and Yemen, Bahrain has seen some of the most sustained protest activity 
of the region since 2010. Protest in Bahrain has been markedly sustained and yet 
the Al-Khalifa regime remains standing. Recall that Bahrain represents a dynastic 
monarchy and a regime that relies at least in part on hydro-carbon rents and 
international and regional patronage (two of the other proposed mechanisms of 
the broader monarchial advantage).1 This allows us to explore potential variance 
between the two monarchies. Bahrain also presents us with the ability to 
generalize a bit more beyond Jordan, as Bahrain has comparable issues of ethnic 
cleavages. Finally, Bahrain also allows us to examine Herb’s and Lucas’ 
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contentions that dynastic monarchies are substantially and structurally different. 
The selection of these dynamic cases allows for plenty of ground on which to 
make claims and draw at least mid-level generalizations. 
Finally, recall once more that Bahrain will be subjected to the same 
hypothesis tests as Tunisia and Jordan have been. If Hypothesis 1 (H1) is 
supported, the Bahraini regime will have successfully acted to confine protests to 
relatively fewer and smaller incidents. Those incidents will be less geographically 
dispersed. The opposition will be less ideologically diverse, and their goals and 
tone will be less extreme and less likely to call for regime change and more likely 
to call for changes in policy or in policy makers. These elements would indicate 
support for Hypothesis 1 in that the Al-Khalifa regime was better able to prevent 
protests on a scale, intensity, and tone that threatened to topple the regime.  
As a monarchy, the Bahraini regime obviously survived the uprisings that 
swept the region. In a way, this satisfies Hypothesis 2 (monarchies are better at 
withstanding protest than non-monarchies), but, again, H2 is tested through its 
sub-hypotheses – most notably for this chapter being H2a – that monarchies are 
better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling 
protests. In other words, it will have focused on controlling the protests that 
appeared, resulting in shorter protests that are less geographically dispersed. 
Those protests will focus more on the goals of change in policies or policy makers 
below the King, and those that directly challenge the existence of the monarchy or 
otherwise cross regime red-lines will be quickly disrupted. If Hypotheses 2a is 
upheld, we should see a Bahraini regime that quickly disrupts protests, but that 
191 
may move to concede as quickly as it represses, so long as challenges to the 
regime are controlled. 
As I will demonstrate, the Bahraini case evinced a mixture of preventative 
and controlling measures through both intimidation and violence. Both collective 
action and violent reactions by the regime continued apace. Violence comparable 
with that exercised by the mysterious unidentified security services in Tunisia 
occurred regularly in Bahrain. Yet the Al-Khalifa regime remained standing.  
Narrative of the Bahraini Uprising 
Like the Tunisian revolution, the initial uprising in Bahrain – from the 
“Day of Rage” on February 14, 2011 to the arrival of Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) forces to help put down the uprising on March 14, 2011 – lasted only 
about a month. But as I have asserted before, the Bahraini uprising began as 
smoldering embers and continued as such for much longer.  
The dynamics of the Arab Spring uprising in Bahrain must be understood 
in the context of the previous “Uprising of Dignity” (ةماركلا ةضافتنلاا) from 1994-
1999. Nevertheless, my coverage of this period will remain largely confined to a 
discussion of generally observable patterns and their relation to collective action 
in later time periods. Though the Arab Spring wave of Bahraini collective action 
continues until at least 2017, as in Jordan and Tunisia I am focused here on a 
decade-long window of approximately 2000-2012.  
The axis around which Bahraini activism has orbited since at least the 
1994-99 “Uprising of Dignity” has been the consecutive issues of the abrogated 
1971-3 Constitution and Parliament and the 2001 promulgation by King Hamad 
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Al-Khalifa. The latter, embodied in the “National Action Charter” “promised to 
end twenty-five years of national emergency and to reinstate the country’s 
constitution and elected parliament.” The Charter, “when put to a 
referendum…gained the approval of 98.4 percent of voting citizens and an 
outpouring of support for the king.”2 
This support would be short-lived, as the result was instead an imposition 
of a new Constitution, drafted secretly and differed significantly from the 1973 
Constitution that the referendum had people believe their vote was supporting. 
Interestingly, the 2002 Constitution created an institutional arrangement not 
unlike Jordan’s: 
…replacing the country’s unicameral parliament with a bicameral 
legislature in which an upper chamber, appointed by the king, shared 
equal law-making powers with a lower, popularly elected chamber. 
Oversight of government spending was delegated to the Royal Court, a 
body under the direct authority of the king. New electoral districts were 
also drawn up along sectarian lines, providing voters in Sunni-majority 
areas with relatively greater representation than their counterparts in 
larger, Shi’a-dominated districts. Media restrictions were loosened. A 
sweeping amnesty law provided immunity for government officials 
implicated in abuses and for opposition figures in exile and detention, who 
had been accused by the government of security-related crimes.3 
Elham Fakhro points out that political parties remained banned (despite a new 
parliament in which they were supposed to take part) but political societies, many 
of whom sprung up along sectarian lines, and many of whom would feature 
prominently in the coming 2011 uprising, appeared after the 2001-2 National 
Charter period.4 
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 An April 2004 petition submitted to the king and reportedly signed by up 
to 75,000 people, objected to the 2002 Constitution and called for “exclusive 
legislative power for the elected parliament” rather than for the appointed upper 
chamber. The regime responded that petitions – a long-used tool of Bahraini 
citizens and opposition groups to seek redress from the government – were no 
longer legitimate per the creation of the popularly-elected 2002 parliament. Then 
the regime turned to arresting numerous activists from the Shi’a political society 
al-Wefaq.5 
A 2005 International Crisis Group report noted with some concern from 
residents that events in 2004 and 2005 – regularly featuring protests of thousands 
and frequent occasions of stone throwing and Molotov cocktails by the more 
radical elements of the protesters, returned by volleys of tear gas and rubber 
bullets by the security forces – had begun to resemble the ramping up period that 
had preceded the 1994-99 uprising.6 By March 2005 the regime instituted a ban 
against demonstrations. Despite this, crowds reportedly as large as “tens of 
thousands” turned out to protests organized by al-Wefaq in Sitra and Manama 
demanding democratic reforms – specifically the demand that the elected lower 
house be given greater powers. At these protests Bahraini flags began to appear 
emblazoned with “Constitutional Reform First”.7 
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In 2005, the regime also began detaining prominent activists and political 
society leaders as they departed from or attempted to re-enter Bahrain from trips 
abroad. Al-Haqq society activists were particular targets of this tactic. Abdul Jalil 
Singace – whose blogging to catalogue human rights abuses in the kingdom and 
his frequent trips abroad to lobby American and British governments against 
further support for the repressive Al-Khalifa regime – was detained at the airport 
after traveling to Washington, D.C. in March 2005. The detention of Haq society 
leader Sheikh Muhammad Sanad in December 2005, also returning from abroad, 
sparked a series of sit-ins and demonstrations throughout December. In one 
incident, protesters swarmed the main shopping mall and Formula One racetrack.8 
By December 2008, the Interior Minister asked Parliament to enact legislation 
“making street protests subject to harsher penalties.”9 Al-Singace was arrested 
again for blogging and having “incited hatred against the regime” in January of 
2009 and his blog, al-Faseelah, was blocked by the authorities a month later.10 He 
was arrested again in August of 2010 By December of 2009, Abdulhadi al-
Khawaja had begun calling explicitly for the downfall of the regime during an 
Ashura holiday speech entitled “Let’s Bring Down the Ruling Gang”. He was 
consequently arrested on charges of “giving sectarian legitimacy to the potentially 
violent overthrow of the government.”11 
By August of 2010, the government began a campaign of rounding-up 
prominent activists and opposition leaders. The initial arrests were of members of 
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the Haq movement – a rejectionist splinter from the mainstream Shi’a opposition 
party, al-Wefaq. Frederic Wehrey argues that Haq was formed with intentionally 
provocative civil disobedience at its core strategy. These tactics ranged from 
protests, marches, boycotts and barricades, to the escalatory destruction of 
property, and particularly at key junctures later in the uprising, the use of Molotov 
cocktails and firebombs – all intended to elicit repression by the security forces. 
In Wehrey’s estimation, these tactics are designed to draw public outrage 
and mobilize more of the public, particularly their compatriot Shi’a. It is also 
likely that the group engages in these actions to subvert the capitulatory efforts of 
its progenitor, al-Wefaq, and to increase pressure on the regime. Yet, Wehrey also 
notes, Haq is also leading the charge alongside the ubiquitous Bahrain Centre for 
Human Rights (BCHR) in directing Western attention to the systemic plight of the 
Shi’a.12 In this way, the group may have been risking a great deal in provoking 
the regime, but it was also attracting the kind of attention to the uprising that 
could pressure the regime into concessions. 
In any case, this may have been the rationale of the regime in going 
aggressively after leaders and members of Haq. But it is worth nothing that the 
dragnets between August and September 2010 were less discriminatory in their 
targeting. Arrested alongside Haq leaders and activists and twenty-three other 
individuals were Abduljalil Singace, Sheikh Mohammad Sa’eed al-Miqdad, 
director of al-Zahra’a Association for the Care of Orphans, Sheikh Sa’eed al-
Nouri, religious leader and member of the al-Wafa movement; Dentist 
Mohammad Sa’eed al-Sahlawi; Ali Hassan Abdullah Abdelimam, a thirty-year-
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old blogger and owner of opposition website bahrainonline.org.13 Nabeel Rajab, 
president of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, likewise fell victim to the 
dragnet. Between September and December 2010, he was repeatedly harassed, 
including having his computer confiscated at the airport. He was finally accused 
of “being part of a ‘terrorist network’ and passing ‘false information’ to 
international organizations for the purpose of ‘harming Bahrain’s reputation’.”14  
Despite the extended activity in the years leading up to the 2011 uprising, 
the Arab Spring wave of the Bahraini Uprising began starkly with Bahraini 
activists’ call for a commensurate “Bahraini Day of Rage” on February 14, 2011. 
The chosen date (and name of eponymous grassroots movement) were not 
accidental. February 14 holds symbolism for the opposition as it represents the 
2001 referendum of the National Action Charter and its calls for devolution 
toward a constitutional monarchy. It also represents the rescinding of that charter 
by royal promulgation of a new, less reformist constitution only a year later in 
2002.  
As in previous uprisings, the reaction of the regime was immediate. 
Numerous protesters were injured as protesters clashed with police and security 
forces in Nuwaidrat, Sitra, and the capital, Manama.15 Within twenty-four hours, 
the revolution would claim its first martyr in twenty-one-year-old ‘Ali Mushaima. 
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Mushaima was shot in the back with a shotgun at close range by riot police at a 
protest on the outskirts of the capital, Manama. He died en route to the hospital.16  
More than ten-thousand people attended ‘Ali Mushaima’s funeral the 
following day, February 15. After police opened fire on the funeral cortège – 
which the regime had approved as a legal gathering – the procession marched 
toward Pearl Roundabout in Manama. Shortly after, a second man, Fadhel al-
Matrook, (31) was killed in a similar fashion, being shot in the back and chest 
with riot shotguns at close range. Twenty-five others were reportedly injured.17  
Presumably, seeing the outpouring of support and anger from protesters 
gathered at Pearl Roundabout – whose number had by now reportedly swelled to 
ten-thousand – King Hamad publicly expressed sorrow at the deaths of Mushaima 
and al-Matrook and pledged to investigate their deaths for wrongdoing. 
Interestingly, former defense force officer Mohammed al-Buflasa addressed 
protesters gathered at the Pearl Roundabout, calling for unity across sectarian 
lines. He was detained by security forces immediately after this speech and 
effectively disappeared. The government finally reported that he had been in their 
custody nearly a month later, on March 4, 2011.18  
On February 17, 2011, the 1,500 protesters camped out at Pearl 
Roundabout were ambushed in the early hours of the morning by five hundred 
police officers. Three were killed, two hundred injured, and thirty-one reportedly 
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missing by morning. In response, nearly four-thousand protesters gathered outside 
Salmaniya Hospital to protest against the violent raid on the encamped protesters 
and the deaths of ‘Ali Mushaima and Fadhel al-Matrook.19 This ambush on 
encamped protesters in the Pearl Roundabout is a pivotal point in the uprising. 
During the February 17, 2011 protest outside Salmaniya hospital, a doctor is 
alleged to have addressed the crowd in anguish: “People of Bahrain, you will win 
your rights and your dignity. What they have done to you will be avenged.” The 
crowds reportedly responded with chants of “Down with the king; down with the 
government!”20 
Intensity of Scale of Protests 
 Compared to both Tunisia and Jordan, the sheer size of protests in Bahrain 
was significantly larger. It must be noted, however, that Bahrain is also 
significantly smaller than both Tunisia and Jordan in terms of both total 
population and in total land. Tunisia has a total land area of 155,360 square 
kilometers, and a population of 11.4 million.21 Jordan comprises a total land area 
of 88,802 square kilometers, with a population of 10.2 million.22 Bahrain, by 
contrast, comprises only 760 square kilometers, and a population of 1.4 million.23 
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These stark differences would impact the scale of protests in terms of both size of 
protests and geographic dispersion of protest activity. 
Protests in Bahrain, like Jordan, ranged from hundreds of protesters to tens 
of thousands. According to figures presented by Fakhro, the median size of 
protests could be safely placed in the tens of thousands.24 Of the three cases, 
protest activity in Bahrain most closely resembled the occupation-style protest 
tactics used in Tahrir square in Egypt. The encampments of the Pearl Roundabout 
initially featured several thousand protesters. Fakhro reports that tens of 
thousands visited the Pearl Roundabout encampment over the initial two-days of 
the sit-in. Even the comparatively small crowd that gathered at the Salmaniyya 
Medical Complex after the February 17, 2011 ambush of the Pearl Roundabout 
was not insignificant at 2,500-4,000 people.25 
  During the February 20 cascade of strikes by professional associations, 
labor unions, and students, “according to official records, an estimated 80 per cent 
of the total workforce stayed away from work.” Fakhro claims that this number 
was also no doubt influenced by the geographic dispersion of the protests on the 
tiny island nation – protesters forced the “closure of key roads and 
highways…which prevented others from accessing their workplaces.”26 
Even the so-called counter-demonstration by the Sunni loyalist National 
Unity Gathering (NUG) – which “called on the government to implement many of 
the same demands made by the political opposition, including the removal of all 
forms of ethnic and sectarian discrimination and an end to the misappropriation of 
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wealth” – was attended by an estimated 50,000 to 300,000. The week after the 
NUG demonstration, a Martyr’s March to protest the killing of six protesters 
recently killed by security forces featured crowds of 100,000 to 150,000.27  
In Tunisia and Jordan, protests spread throughout the country, from 
hinterlands to major cities and the capitals. By comparison, protests in Bahrain 
were less geographically dispersed. For the most part, the Bahraini uprising 
centered around the capital Manama, the predominantly Shi’a cities of Sitra and 
Nuwaidrat, and Hamad Town, and Riffa. But, again, we must keep in mind the 
relative size of the island and the distances from relative “hinterland” cities to the 
capital of Manama. By comparison, the distance from Sidi Bouzaid or Gafsa to 
Tunis (273.2 km and 364 km respectively) or Ma’an or Madaba to Amman (216.6 
km and 36.6 km respectively) is compared to Sitra or Nuwaidrat to Manama (11.8 
km and 15.1 km respectively). We must also keep in mind that the population 
centers of Bahrain are concentrated in the north-northwest of the island. Tunisia is 
comparable in that the major population centers are on the coast. But population 
in Jordan is significantly more dispersed, even though it is concentrated in major 
population centers like Amman, Irbid, Karak, or Salt.  
Character and Composition of the Protest Coalition in Bahrain 
As a case, Bahrain also interesting splits the difference between the highly 
decentralized hirak of the Jordanian uprising and the mixed grassroots-labor 
union/professional association coalition of the Tunisian revolution. Like many 
other sites of Arab Spring wave protests, Bahrain was saw a sharp increase in 
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decentralized grassroots youth mobilization led by the February 14 Coalition. 
Recognizing the realities of organizing in the Bahraini context, Louër notes that 
the “loose network of activists…insisted on its goal to set aside sectarian 
identities and create a ‘democratic current’.”28 Just as in Tunisia – when the 
formal labor unions and professional associations (as well as the middle classes) 
were pressured to join the protests as the revolution wore on and the regime’s 
repression became more bold – organized “political societies” in Bahrain were 
pressed into the streets by the overwhelmingly violent character of the security 
forces’ reaction to the grassroots protests.29  
It remains quite difficult to gather data on the sectarian composition of 
protesters in the Bahraini uprising. But we can piece together a likely picture 
based on existing sources. First, we know from work by the International Crisis 
Group field researchers during the 1994-99 “Uprising of Dignity” that the goal of 
greater democracy and a return to the abrogated 1973 constitution and dissolved 
parliament was one shared by both Sunni and Shi’a activists. In other words, in 
terms of Angrist’s guidelines, we know that the willingness of tens of thousands 
to sign pro-reform petitions signals the ability of activists to bridge substantial 
regime-created sectarian divisions by using the grievance frame against the 
abolished parliament and constitution.  
As in Jordan, where many tribal coalitions remained steadfastly pro-
regime, while others either founded the hirak or joined later, likewise, Louër 
observes that when Shi’a parties such as al-Wefaq focus on the issue of 
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establishing genuine democracy, Sunnis were willing to join the campaign.30  
Justin Gengler reports that at the peak of protests at the Pearl Roundabout, “a 
number of Sunni personalities…appealed to their co-religionists to join the protest 
movement.”31 Gengler observes 
These Sunnis insisted the movement was in the interest of all citizens and 
not simply Shi‘a. Protesters donned stickers and badges bearing the 
slogan, “No Sunni, No Shi‘i, Just Bahraini.” While these attempts to 
bridge the sectarian-cum-political divide never gained traction, and few 
Sunnis were likely to be persuaded in any case, even the outside chance of 
crosssectarian coordination was enough to elicit a furious government 
effort to brand the uprising an Iranian conspiracy and to ostracize and 
punish any Sunni who dared to join it.32 
 
As part of the strategy to alienate Sunnis from the protest movement, 
Gengler notes that those people caught wearing the aforementioned “Just 
Bahraini” paraphernalia found themselves “singled out for harassment at 
checkpoints.”33 One former Sunni army officer Mohammed al-Buflasa addressed 
protesters gathered at the Pearl Roundabout, calling for unity across sectarian 
lines. He was detained by security forces immediately after this speech and 
effectively disappeared. The government finally reported that he had been in their 
custody nearly a month later, on March 4, 2011. A few months later, he was 
trotted out on state-owned television where he issued an apology and retraction of 
his earlier statement.34 
 Ultimately, Louër argues, that  
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the presence of at least one Salafi among the protesters gathered on the 
Pearl Roundabout showed that some Sunni activists are tempted to 
advance an agenda that does not fully support that of the regime. In other 
words, there was probably no consensus on a strategy of unquestioned 
support of the regime.35 
 
Intensity of Demands and Aims 
Like Jordan and Tunisia, Bahrain experienced collective action that 
presaged the Arab Spring uprising. But Bahrain’s experience of the Arab Spring 
wave was least spontaneously connected to the overarching grievance frame of 
the Arab Spring. Bahrainis did mobilize for freedom and social justice and against 
corruption, just as Jordanians and Tunisians. But Bahraini activism has long been 
centered on the issue of the reinstitution of the National Assembly and the 
abrogated 1973 Constitution. For Bahraini Shi’a, this fundamental issue is 
paralleled with further issues of sectarian discrimination.                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Laurence Louër summarizes the history and character of activism in Bahraini 
along roughly four points. First, Bahrainis are no strangers to mobilizing 
collective action. Prominent activist Maryam al-Khawaja argues that Bahrain has 
hosted a protest movement every decade since the 1920s.36 Second, the collective 
memory of Bahrainis is populated with this history of activism. Though Louër 
does not make note of this, what this also means for my purposes is that the 
Bahraini cultural reservoir is deeply populated with activism and the tactical and 
collective action framing repertoires available to activists is likewise quite rich.  
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This is particularly the case with Shi’a activism. Third, the longest cycle 
of mobilization and protest in Bahrain (prior to the Arab Spring wave) lasted four 
years (from 1994 to 1999). This not only evinces a “staying power” or persistent 
undercurrent for Bahraini activism – comparable to Jordan – but as Louër points 
out, this helped to set the context for the Arab Spring uprising in 2011. Despite 
this, Louër asserts that the 2011 uprising was still “a shock to the Bahraini 
political system, fundamentally altering the relationship between the opposition 
and the regime.”37  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is significant overlap in the Bahraini case 
between grievances, regime reactions to dissent and collective action, and the 
composition of the protest coalition. But what mobilized so many for five years 
(1994-1999) during the “Uprising of Dignity” (ةماركلا ةضافتنا) – aptly named 
comparable to the later 2010-11 Tunisian uprising – that they would withstand 
inevitable regime repression? Again, the circumstances of this earlier uprising are 
not dissimilar to those grievances raised in 2011: demands for the reinstitution of 
the Constitution and elected parliament, grievances aimed at the blatantly 
sectarian and discriminatory policies of the Al-Khalifa regime, and, finally, the 
process of repression itself – in 1994-99 personified by the ruthless British 
security advisor Ian Henderson.  
At independence in 1971, Bahrain appeared to be on a path to at least 
modest liberalization. The ruling Al-Khalifa dynasty allowed the first 
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parliamentary elections in 1973. But when that parliament failed to ratify the State 
Security Law, the Amir, Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa, moved quickly to dissolve the 
parliament. It is not hard to see how the newly-elected parliament decided to 
reject the proposed law, also known as “the precautionary law”. The law was 
drafted by the notoriously ruthless British advisor Ian Henderson, who had been 
retained by the regime to streamline and modernize the Bahraini security services, 
beginning in 1966.38 As Adam Curtis describes it, the law “said that any Bahraini 
could be held for three years without charge or trial on just the suspicion that they 
might be a threat to the state.” Understandably, he continues, “it caused an 
outrage – because it meant that anyone could be imprisoned just on the 
imaginative suspicions of Colonel Henderson and his State Security acolytes.”39  
The rejection of the bill by the nascent parliament sparked a standoff 
between the parliament, the ruling family, and Henderson himself. It ended in the 
simplest and most autocratic way possible – the Amir simply suspended 
Constitutional articles guaranteeing freedom to Bahrainis and then suspended the 
parliament entirely.40 
Exacerbating the situation, the regime arrested one of the most prominent 
Shi’a clerics in the kingdom. Protests quickly erupted. But the regime was far 
from caught off-guard. Instead, the machinery of Henderson’s feared “General 
Directorate for State Security Investigations” (ةلودلا نمأ ثحابمل ةماعلا ةرادلإا) kicked 
into high gear. Henderson and the security services began filling Bahrain’s jails 
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with activists and dissidents – including, Curtis notes, members of the erstwhile 
parliament. Curtis cites opposition activists and human rights groups, whose 
allegations against Henderson and company included “widespread torture, the 
rolling imprisonment without trial of thousands of people, deaths and 
assassinations.”41  
Of all the cases, Bahrain demonstrates the most blatant and 
institutionalized preventative measures against widespread collective action. 
Henderson was the spear point of a ruthless, sectarian policy designed explicitly 
to keep the Al-Khalifa in power and safe from mass protests. The opposition 
explicitly accused Henderson and the regime of deliberately using divide-and-rule 
policies that purposely resulted in “fomenting sectarian hatreds”.42 From this 
crucible, the Constitutional Movement which would emerge in force in 1994 was 
birthed. Remarkably, despite the regime’s efforts, the Constitutional Movement 
united activists across sectarian lines – secular left and Islamists – around a 
devastatingly simple grievance frame that would become the clarion call of the 
“Uprising of Dignity”: The constitution and the parliament should be restored.  
Added to this was the targeted demand that Henderson himself be removed. 
Curtis quotes the opposition at length: 
Security and special branch chief General Henderson, along with a bunch 
of British mercenaries who are in control of the security apparatus bear 
full responsibility for the deterioration of relations between people and 
regime and for the festering political crisis – by their policy of sectarian 
discrimination, by waging large scale arrests and killing campaigns, and 
by fabricating plots designed to alienate the masses from the movement.43  
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Frederic Wehrey is careful to note that “The calls for demonstrations were 
largely non-sectarian in outlook; most demanded peaceful reforms and refrained 
from directly criticizing King Hamad or calling for the overthrow of the Al 
Khalifa. A few Facebook pages did, however, call for ‘revolution’ and the ‘fall of 
the regime’.”44 Other sources directly contradict Wehrey’s estimations. Similar to 
Jordan and Tunisia, more specific calls for the removal of policy-makers or the 
fall of the regime occurred with greater frequency as time wore on. In the case of 
Bahrain however, the calls came faster and in direct proportion to the violence 
utilized by security services in putting down even the most mundane and peaceful 
of demonstrations. In contrast to both Tunisia and Jordan, calls by activists in 
Bahrain for the removal of policy makers and the fall of the regime appeared 
early. In September 2004, Human Rights activist Abdulhadi al-Khawaja 
denounced the prime minister as corrupt and abusive, resulting in al-Khawaja’s 
arrest and detention for “‘inciting hatred’ and accusing a member of the royal 
family of corruption.” The regime also shuttered the Bahrain Centre for Human 
Rights and the ‘Uruba Club where al-Khawaja had delivered the speech 
denouncing the prime minister. This set off weeks of protests demanding the 
release of al-Khawaja, with participants regularly numbering in the range of 
3,000-4,000.45 
The regime turned its sights on online activists in February 2005, arresting 
three bloggers who criticized the regime and the monarch on the infamous 
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opposition site, bahrainonline.org. The bloggers were detained for “insulting the 
royal family”, “defaming the monarch, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, spreading false 
rumours and spreading hatred of the regime” on the internet.46 The bloggers were 
released a month later after a tense standoff with several hundred protesters and 
riot police. Organizers themselves called off the protests “after the event 
threatened to escalate into a more violent showdown.”47 As previously discussed, 
activists and leaders of political societies are frequently subjected to arrest and 
arbitrary detention, often incommunicado. In one additional case, al-Singace and 
Abdul Ghani al-Kanjar were amongst several prominent human rights activists 
targeted in a media defamation campaign after the release of a Human Rights 
Watch report on the use of torture in the country in February 2010.48  
Regime Responses 
 Unlike many other countries in the region, wherein the modus operandi 
seemed to be to allow protests around “safe” topics so long as they did not 
implicate or threaten the government directly, the Al-Khalifa regime bucks this 
trend. But the very bucking of this trend in one instance may belie how close the 
sectarian red line is in the minds of the Bahraini regime. A May 2004 protest by 
approximately 4,000 Shiite demonstrators in Manama against the US military 
siege of the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala was met with tear gas and rubber 
bullets and resulted in several being seriously wounded, including a leader of al-
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Wefaq and member of one of Bahrain’s Municipal Councils, Jawad Fayruz. In the 
interest of transparency, the protesters were alleged to have “turned over a public 
security vehicle and set it ablaze while chanting anti-American slogans.”49 But 
note that this protest could be considered decidedly unsafe by the government: 
Shi’ite protesters, angered at American military actions against two important 
Shi’i cities in Iraq, Najaf and Karbala, were chanting anti-American slogans in 
Bahrain, home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. This incident is also notable because it is 
one of the only times King Hamad has struck a mildly conciliatory tone, 
“denounc[ing] the heavy-handed use of force by the police and respond[ing] by 
sacking the minister of interior, Sheikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Khalifa.”50 
This even though police routinely utilized these levels of force in 1994-99 and 
continued to do so in 2011. 
As discussed previously, the Bahraini regime utilized a calculated strategy 
of intimidation and physical violence to confront dissent. But, as Laurence Louër 
reports, “the situation appeared to be heading in the direction of major 
concessions to the opposition when some 2,500 troops from the Peninsula Shield, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) joint military force, arrived in Bahrain” 
attacked and razed the Pearl Roundabout, and signaled a definitive end to the 
willingness to engage in dialogue.51 
With few exceptions, unlike the Jordanian uprising, the Bahraini regime 
did not seem to make any attempt to bargain with protesters or parlay with the 
opposition. Cortni Kerr and Toby Jones note that prior to the February 14, 2011 
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“Day of Rage” protests, King Hamad attempted to use the ostensibly-successful 
Saudi tactic of purchasing quiescence. Ahead of the planned protests, “and 
cognizant of the fates of autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt, Hamad announced that 
every Bahraini family would receive a lump-sum payment of 1,000 Bahraini 
dinars (approximately $2,650).”52 When this failed to mollify protesters, the 
regime effectively pivoted back to a strategy of staggering repression.  
Also notable was the attempted intercession of Prince Hamad to forestall the 
deterioration of the uprising. These prescient maneuvers of the Crown Prince 
toward reform or at least partial concessions were paralleled by seemingly 
oblivious maneuvers of the King and the rest of the regime. This culminated in 
the intercession of Gulf Cooperation Council troops led by Saudi Arabia on 
March 14, 2011, exactly one month after the beginning of the uprising. 
As support was coalescing around the youth-activist calls for a February 
14, 2011 “Day of Rage”, the regime and the al-Wefaq leadership – especially 
leader ‘Ali Salman – began secret negotiations. The regime requested that Salman 
call off the planned protests, which of course he had no control over. Salman 
responded by suggesting that the King announce key reforms. Central was the 
suggested stipulation that the prime minister would be elected from outside the 
royal family and that the sitting prime minister be dismissed. Crucially, Wehrey 
notes that the regime, “deploying a longstanding argument…stated that the GCC 
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states – Saudi Arabia in particular – would not countenance the removal of the 
prime minister.”53 
In August 2010, the regime began the campaign to round up Shi’a 
oppositionists, mainly from the Haq movement. At the same time, the regime was 
growing more threatened by cross-sectarian cooperation in the parliament. This 
became particularly intolerable when al-Wefaq won all eighteen of the seats it 
contested in the October 2010 elections. In response, the regime shut down the 
political society’s media outlets and several popular blogs. It then shut down a 
Facebook page for a popular leader of the 1994-99 uprising, and the security 
services directly shut down Blackberry messenger service – used extensively by 
al-Wefaq for constituent communication.54 
Because of this assault on al-Wefaq’s operational and communications 
infrastructure, social media and technology space were evacuated of traditional or 
institutionalized Shi’a opposition. Youth activists filled the vacuum. It is unclear 
whether this was an intentional strategy of the regime. It would make sense to 
divide the opposition not based on any known cleavage if unavailable, but simply 
by giving existing doubts among the grassroots of the viability of al-Wefaq’s 
parliamentary experiment a little nudge. With a little cross-pressure on al-Wefaq 
and harassment of Haq, the regime could have been trying to ensure that the 
moderates would vacate the Shi’a field. This would in turn populate the uprising 
with potentially unexperienced and hot-headed grassroots youth activists. Because 
the previous periods of uprising quickly devolved into escalating violence by the 
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regime and protesters, this conclusion is hardly out of the question. This is of 
course post hoc reasoning, but the behavior of the regime vis-à-vis al-Wefaq and 
the youth protesters as well as the previous patterns lends at least some credence 
to the conclusions that this was a possible strategy.  
Anyone having followed observed the uprising of 1994-1999 should not 
have been surprised at the uprising that began in 2011. Unfortunately, activists 
and protesters should not have been surprised at the reaction of the regime either 
because it likewise used the 1994-1999 uprising to create a template. 
Joe Stork, advocacy director at Human Rights Watch-Middle East chronicled 
first-hand the 1994 uprising and shed useful light on the comparative nature of 
both the 1994 and 2011 uprisings. Writing in mid-1996, Stork describes the 
government having summoned the international press corps (of which he was a 
part) to the capital for what promised to be a significant announcement. The 
“Uprising of Dignity” had persisted for two years. Some in the opposition 
believed that the announcement would finally be some liberalizing reforms, 
though likely falling short of the demanded reinstitution of the National Assembly 
and 1973 Constitution. In the week before, opposition groups, namely the Bahrain 
Freedom Movement, the Popular Front, and the National Liberation Front, issued 
a joint statement preemptively condemning and rejecting any “cosmetic 
concessions” at the planned press conference and reiterating the uprising’s 
collective chorus of “restoration of constitutional law to Bahrain.”55 
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 Far from announcing liberalizing reforms, the regime instead announced 
that the security forces had extracted confessions from dozens of detainees, 
arrested and no-doubt tortured during the foregoing protests. They allegedly also 
confessed to establishing the terror group “Hizb-Allah Bahrain – Military Wing”. 
Moreover, the regime asserted, this organization and its conspirators were 
mobilized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – the greatest bête noire in the 
small gulf kingdom.56 As Stork notes, no group in Bahrain used this moniker. 
What was real was a campaign of Shi’a activism against the regime’s actions. 
Field interviews by International Crisis Group members indicated that though 
“Shi’ites formed the bulk of protesters, … Sunnis embraced the goal of returning 
to the 1973 constitution and holding national assembly elections, and helped 
organize pro-reform petitions signed by tens of thousands.”57 The regime now had 
an insurrection on its hands that it felt justified in quelling. But more importantly, 
the regime could counter-frame and counter-mobilize fearful and hesitant Sunnis 
by pointing to this evidence as proof for its claim that insurrection was inspired, 
coordinated, or aided and abetted by the Islamic Republic. Stork describes the 
effects plainly, saying “the past two years of political unrest and agitation on 
behalf of the abrogated constitution was again dismissed as part of a ‘scheme of 
sabotage and terrorism’.”58 Every Arab leader under siege by mass protests, 
especially Bashar al-Assad and Ben Ali, deployed the same attempted counter-
frame of foreign insurgent interference. It appears to have worked in Bahrain to 
the extent that it eventually caused many Sunnis to vacate the streets.     
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Stork’s examination of the 1994-1999 uprising illustrates a more nuanced 
approach of the al-Khalifa regime security services to protests. Protests since 
1994 had been pressuring the regime through the simultaneous tactics of public 
petitions and large-scale protest mobilization. In terms of tactics in the 
contentious repertoire of Bahrainis, Stork notes that the petitions and 
demonstrations “have been alternately requesting and demanding” attention and 
concessions from the regime.59 
Again, the regime’s reaction in 1994-1999 presages its reaction in 2011. 
Stork catalogues the response as “cracking down hard on all demonstrations, by 
indiscriminate arrests and arbitrary detention of several thousand persons, by 
abuse and torture of prisoners, by deporting alleged ringleaders, and by tightening 
restrictions on all forms of meetings and public expression.”60 He cites one 
instance in which security authorities detained several Bahrainis for having helped 
a BBC reporter arrange meetings and translate the proceedings.61  
The al-Khalifa regime is also fond of using deportation and long-term 
imprisonment to prevent and control dissent, particularly among Shi’a clerics and 
other activists and movement leaders. “In 2001,” Abdurrahman al-Nu’eimi notes, 
“the number of deportees was in the thousands.” This does not include Bahrain’s 
prisons which “are full of tens of thousands of political prisoners” subject to 
brutal torture or even killing at the hands of the police.62 
                                                 
59 Stork, 44. 
60 Stork, 44. 
61 Stork, 44. 
62 Abdurrahman Al-Nu’eimi, “Arab Initiatives for Reform: Achievements and Failures in the GCC 
Countries - Bahrain as a Case Study,” in Reform and Change in the Arab World: Conference 
Proceedings (Amman: Al Manhal, 2005), 70. 
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Where the strategies of the two monarchies perhaps converge is in the 
subtle, non-violent methods of coercion and persuasion. Here Stork’s insight is 
again helpful. The regime's response to the riots hardly stopped with these public 
confessions. Masterfully, the regime mustered the voices of the country's two 
newspapers, al-Ayyam and Akhbar al-Khalij, as well as advertisements by private 
companies and sports clubs, to publish pieces lauding the vigilance of the security 
services under the mast of the Interior Ministry.  
In addition to this, Stork reveals that the regime extended an "invitation" 
to upper-level civil servants, heads of civic organizations, and religious leaders, to 
come to the palace to discuss the most recent developments in the unfolding 
crisis. What might appear to be a measure of transparency or inclusivity carries a 
not so subtle message that declining the invitation could result in dismissal if a 
civil servant and a de facto blacklisting. Perhaps more illustrative, Stork reports 
that "for a Shi'i cleric, a no-show would likely produce a rude wee-hours 
summons to Interior Ministry headquarters on the grounds of the old prison fort in 
central Manama."63 In a 1995 move to cow Shi'i villages that had been the 
frequent headwaters of the uprising, the regime went so far as to demand that each 
club in the General Organization for Youth and Sports sign a pledge of loyalty to 
the Amir.64 
These might seem like insignificant or even puerile actions by the regime. 
But meditating on these seemingly arbitrary actions, one notes the truly sinister 
character of such seemingly small gestures. It could be argued, in fact, that the 
                                                 
63 Stork, “Bahrain Regime Stages Confessions, Rejects Compromise,” 44. 
64 Stork, 44. 
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“Uprising of Dignity” ended in 1999 not because of any real actionable reforms 
vis-à-vis the constitution or parliament, but because the incoming Amir finally 
dismissed Henderson and abolished the State Security Law.65 I said earlier that no 
one in Bahrain who experienced the 1994-99 uprising should have been surprised 
by the reaction of the regime in 2011. Unfortunately, this is because not only was 
there little to no reform, but because Henderson departed but the ruthless system 
he helped to engineer remained.  
Wehrey notes that the casualties of February and March of 2011 included 
not only those killed in the attack on Pearl Roundabout and Mushaima and 
Matrook. Also included were eighteen other civilians killed by torture and 
excessive use of force. Simultaneously, the regime reportedly engaged in 
“arbitrary imprisonment, denial of medical care, and the prosecution of medical 
professionals for providing care to protesters.”66 Salmaniya medical center was at 
one point occupied by the military and used as an informal detention center. Not 
only were medical professionals intimidated and occasionally beaten to dissuade 
them from caring for protesters, protesters who dared seek medical attention 
found that they had delivered themselves into the hands of the security services 
and were frequently interrogated within the hospital itself – now a makeshift 
interrogation center as well.67 
An extended account by an anonymous Bahraini source published in April 
16, 2011 demonstrates the coercive strategy of the regime, particularly after the 
                                                 
65 Curtis, “BBC - Adam Curtis Blog.” 
66 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf, 77.  
67 ’Mahmoud’, “A Chilling Account of the Brutal Clampdown Sweeping Bahrain,” The Guardian, 
April 16, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/16/bahrain-eyewitness-riot-police. 
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arrival of Saudi troops with the GCC – dispelling any pretense that might have 
existed about the use of mercenary troops before. “Mahmoud’s” account bears 
striking similarities to narratives from the Tunisian uprising.  
“Mahmoud”, who lives in a Shi’a village near the capital of Manama 
describes nightly rituals of groups of “armed and masked thugs [who] were not in 
security forces uniforms… some [of whom] had Saudi accents; they are very 
different from Bahraini and easy to tell” detaining people at the point of shotguns, 
and chasing those who fled through streets and houses, breaking into and 
vandalizing cars along the way. Around eight in the evening every night, people 
would shout the takbir (“Allahu Akbar”) from their rooftops, safe from the streets 
littered with tear gas grenades and rubber bullets and the armed thugs who would 
shoot at the air and the rooftops. He describes systematic hunting and beating of 
demonstrators, even in small and easily dispersed gatherings, often to the point of 
death. 
Shi’a Bahrainis are systematically hunted using checkpoints, usually 
strategically-placed at the entrances to Shi’a villages and manned by masked and 
heavily armed men with Saudi accents. Because Bahraini identity cards include 
the individual’s birth town and name, security forces and other groups of 
enforcers could single out Shi’a for taunts and further questioning. The security 
elements were particularly interested in whether the detainees were “at Lulu 
Square”, the name for Pearl Roundabout. The authorities reportedly had lists 
containing names and pictures of protesters and activists known to be present at 
the roundabout, and would check IDs against the lists at checkpoints. The same 
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lists with names and pictures were reportedly posted to Facebook “with notices 
saying: ‘Bring these people to justice, they are guilty people’.” 
Intimidation tactics ran the gamut from relatively indirect to grossly personal. 
Indirectly, people experienced daily flights of F-16s low over Shi’a villages 
amidst the constant police helicopters and routine searches by troops looking for 
weapons. These were dismissed by “Mahmoud” as “obviously put there by them - 
they are government-issue weapons.” Under the pretense of the searches, the 
authorities also demolished several Shi’a mosques. 
More personally, “Mahmoud” reports that three of his cousins - two 
women and one man - all of whom are teachers, have been arrested in their 
classrooms “for joining the strike and signing a petition to remove the education 
minister. Tanks were surrounding the school and riot police entered and arrested 
them.” “Mahmoud’s” 15-year-old brother was returning from school when the 
school bus was stopped at a checkpoint. Riot police attempted to single-out Shi’a 
students on the bus and questioned why a photo of King Hamad was not featured 
on the bus.  
In one instance, masked Saudi troops manning a checkpoint near the 
military hospital in Hamad Town turned “Mahmoud” and his ailing mother away 
despite her appointment at the military hospital, evicting them with sectarian 
insults. “Mahmoud” was unable to divert to the Salmaniya medical complex 
because it “has been under military occupation for three weeks”, with doctors 
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detained and Shi’a employees harassed and beaten after being accused of racism 
for not giving appointments to Sunnis.68 
Conclusions                                                            
 Rather than falling in the same category or pattern of collective action and 
regime reactions as Jordan – and thus affirming some pattern inherent to 
monarchy as a regime type, Bahrain differs significantly. In terms of size of 
protests, Bahrain is exponentially larger. But perhaps more notable is the category 
of regime reactions. The al-Khalifa regime made a few attempts to mollify 
protesters early in the process. But, as it had in the 1994-99 uprising, the regime 
defaulted to violent repression. The February 17, 2011 Pearl Roundabout ambush 
is unprecedented in the sample of cases, but is most comparable to the Kasserine 
massacre in Tunisia.  
 More interestingly, the Bahraini regime did not use subtle tactics like the 
Jordanian regime. Instead, harassment, arrest, and deportation of activists, direct 
attacks on protesters using lethal and less-than-lethal force, and the use of state-
run media to defame the opposition was unique in Bahrain. Finally, though 
perhaps least surprising, is the centrality of institutionalized sectarian divide-and-
rule policies played a distinct role in fracturing the opposition and preventing a 
successful uprising even while Sunni and Shi’a Bahrainis were appalled by the 
increasingly violent nature of the regime’s treatment of dissent.  
 
                                                 
68 ’Mahmoud’. 
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Chapter 7  
Monarchical Advantage and Regime Responses 
Moving beyond the data provided in the previous process tracing 
narratives, in this chapter I will to marshal both existing quantitative data and an 
original dataset of protest event counts and regime reactions to systematically test 
the hypotheses about the theory of monarchical advantage. We know from 
narrative data presented in the previous chapters that the cases represented in the 
three cases illustrate different responses to the mass mobilizations of the Arab 
Spring uprisings. Was Bahrain truly more violently repressive than Tunisia? Was 
Jordan an outlier in terms of its more variegated and measured strategy in 
responding to protests compared to the overt violence punctuated occasionally by 
crass attempts at concession or negotiation exhibited in Tunisia and Bahrain? Do 
the monarchies in our sample show similar patterns of repression or use the same 
strategies of control? What can quantitative data tell us about these cases and the 
monarchical advantage that we didn’t already know? Does the monarchical 
advantage exist in terms of prevention or control of protests but in a way that is 
missed by the narrative data presented in previous chapters?  
Recall that the second subhypothesis of hypothesis H2, H2b, builds on the 
assumption that monarchical advantage in the form of withstanding protests (H2) 
is a function not only of greater control of protests (H2a), but of monarchies 
displaying a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of protests as 
compared to republics (H2b).  
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Recall also the indicators for hypothesis H2b: Regimes respond to protests 
in some ways preventatively, before protests have gotten underway, and in other 
cases in a controlling manner, once protests are already happening. Regimes also 
use greater and lesser degrees of persuasion and coercion to prevent and control 
protests. If H2b is true, monarchies should respond to protests by emphasizing 
preventive, controlling, persuasive and coercive actions at levels distinct from 
those seen in non-monarchies. Likewise, if H2b is true, the severity of 
government repression should be different for monarchies in comparison to non-
monarchies. 
I will begin by presenting data based on counts of collective action events 
in the cases in the pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring periods. Next, I will 
introduce the Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion Matrix. This matrix will 
allow us to examine regime reactions to protest in finer detail by operationalizing 
the principal hypotheses of prevention of mobilization (H1) or control of protests 
(H2a). More importantly, the matrix and this chapter will examine Hypothesis 
H2b: If it is shown that monarchies are more effective at controlling protests 
(H2a), is it because monarchies, compared to republics, display a distinct and 
discernable pattern in their response to protests (H2b)? 
Collective Action Events, 2000-2012 
As previously discussed in the individual narrative chapters, the Arab 
Spring wave was a more contentious and contemporaneous manifestation of a 
much longer process but it was also quantitatively and qualitatively quite 
different. Qualitatively, it put into question the survival of regimes in a way that 
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had not happened before. This is borne out in Figure 7.1, which presents the 
number of collective action events from 2000-2012.1  In Figure 7.1, we can see 
three small but distinct peaks in the period leading up to the Arab Spring, in 
Jordan in 2002, Bahrain in 2004-5, and Tunisia in 2008. Occurrences of collective 
action events increase sharply in each case, beginning from baseline in 2009 in 
Tunisia, and reaching nearly 25 in 2010 and more than double that in 2011, 
followed by a sharp drop in 2011 to 2012. In Bahrain, we see a gradual increase 
beginning in 2008 before events spike exponentially from 2010 to 2011, only to 
fall just as fast from nearly 100 events by 2012. Finally, in Jordan, the sharp 
increase is present but more shallow, beginning in 2010 from nearly zero and 
arriving at nearly thirty events in 2011 before beginning a much more gradual 
decline from 2011 to 2012.  
Already, the data present some important findings. No country could avoid 
collective action altogether, either in the pre-Arab Spring phase or during the 
Arab Spring itself. This would seem to discount the hypothesis (H1) that 
monarchies are better able to prevent protests than non-monarchies. In fact, 
glancing at the data in Figure 7.1, before 2008, a more convincing argument could 
be made that Tunisia – the republic in the sample – was better at preventing 
collective action than either of the two monarchies. Looking at the period 2000-
2009, the pattern in collective action events in Tunisia resembles Jordan more 
than either one resembles Bahrain. In short, leading up to the Arab Spring, we 
have significant variation across regime types. By the time we arrive at the Arab 
Spring, in each case there is a predictably aggressive spike in collective action 
                                                 
1 Recall that I am limiting myself to a data range of roughly 2000-2012. 
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events. But interestingly, the country with the highest collective action event 
count, Bahrain is a monarchy, and the country with the lowest collective action 
event count is Jordan – the second monarchy. There is still not a clear breakdown 
with republics on one side and monarchies on the other.  
Collective Action Events in the Pre-Arab Spring Period 
Examining the pre-Arab Spring period should provide a view of wider 
patterns of collective action and the difference in how the three regimes interact 
with collective action challenges outside the diffusion action of the Arab Spring 
wave.2 But most importantly, including this period will take us that much further 
toward uncovering whether monarchies are better able to prevent or control 
mobilization and whether they use persuasive or coercive techniques.  
In Figure 7.2, we see collective action events by year specifically during 
the Pre-Arab Spring phase. A few interesting dynamics within the data are 
evident. Jordan saw the greatest number of events in the earlier part of the time 
period – corresponding with uprisings in Ma’an and Tafileh that presaged the 
Arab Spring uprisings. Activity in Jordan drops precipitously in the space of a 
year (2002-2003) and with the exception of a small increase in 2005, remains low 
to non-existent for the remainder of the decade, only ticking upward slightly 
between 2008 and 2009. 
An almost opposite effect is evident in Tunisia with more collective action 
events occurring at the end of the decade in 2008. This too drops precipitously in 
                                                 
2 In addition to “pre-Arab Spring period” we could refer to this period as the “reignition period” 
because it represents the reemergence of collective action that occurred in many countries in the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and served as an incubation period for the ideas and tactics utilized in 
the Arab Spring, for both activists, citizens, and regimes. 
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the space of a year (2008-2009). This corresponds to both the uprising in the 
Gafsa mining district and the time period that Laryssa Chomiak  argues the Ben 
‘Ali regime had effectively neutered collective action in putting down the Gafsa 
revolt with severe repression.3 However, the comparison of dynamics of events to 
Jordan are not exact, as Tunisia’s collective action events show a wavelike pattern 
of increased activity roughly every three to four years until the exponential rise 
from 2007-2008. There is also the matter that Jordan’s early “spike” is actually 
slightly longer than Tunisia’s. The pre-Arab Spring Jordanian collective action 
spike ultimately peaks at fifteen collective action events in 2002, comparable to 
but slightly higher than Tunisia’s single-year-spike in 2009. But a slightly closer 
look reveals that Tunisia begins 2007 at zero events, spikes exponentially to 
fourteen events in 2008, only to drop just as fast to baseline in 2009. Jordan, 
meanwhile, saw six collective action events in 2001, followed by a sharp increase 
to fifteen in 2002, and a slightly more shallow but nearly identical expoential drop 
to Tunisia from 2008-2009.4  
Returning to Figure 7.2, collective action events in Bahrain during this 
period  do not increase and decrease as significantly as they do in Jordan and 
Tunisia.  Nor do they reach the fever pitch that events during those spikes in 
activity do in Jordan and Tunisia. Instead, Bahrain exhibits a slowly sloping 
increase dynamic between 2003 and 2006. This highlights a subtle but important 
                                                 
3 Chomiak, “Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia,” 33. 
4 It is especially interesting that Jordan and Tunisia should  generally mirror each other during this 
pre-Arab Spring period because the two  largest exponential increases (2002 in Jordan  and 2008 
in Tunisia) correspond to the Ma’an revolt and Gafsa revolt, respectively. Gafsa and Ma’an are 
strikingly similar in their positions as formerly major economic hubs outside the capitals, now 
economically “forgotten” hinterlands, suffering similar socioeconomic distresses as a result of 
personalism and neoliberal economic policies. 
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fact, however. True, Bahrain does not exhibit a sharp and concentrated rise in the 
space of a year, as Jordan and Tunisia do in 2002 and 2008 respectively. But, 
what the Bahrain data show is instead a steady rise in collective action over a 
period of two years in 2004 and 2005. If we superimposed event count labels on 
Figure 7.2, the spikes in Jordan in 2002 and Tunisia in 2008 featured 15 and 14 
events, respectively. In Bahrain, 2004 witnessed seven events and 2005 witnessed 
eight. Taken together, therefore, Bahrain’s total collective action is also directly 
comparable to Tunisia and Jordan, with an overall event count during 2004-2005 
of fifteen events. In other words, if we compressed a steady but lower incident 
period of two years into one year, as in Jordan and Tunisia, the data would feature 
a nearly identitical spike for Bahrain as we witness in Jordan and Tunisia. 
Ulimately, Bahrain ends 2009 with a slight uptick similar to that seen in Jordan 
during the same time. Bahrain’s event count during the period of uptick was 
slightly higher than Jordan’s but in the same direction and both trend upward at 
the same rate. 
Collective action in Bahrain was likely relatively flat before 2003 because 
it was coming on the heels of the 1994- 1999 Uprising of Dignity. We could make 
the same observation about the precipitous drop of Tunisia’s 2008 spike. After a 
short period of intense collective action in the hinterlands, and the 
correspondingly intense repression of the state, Tunisian collective action seems 
to go abruptly dormant. We could perhaps attribute this to natural cycles or waves 
of contention, or – and, not mutually exclusively, – to weariness on the part of the 
grassroots opposition after the intensity of the regime’s reaction to that previous 
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uprising. Interestingly, while events in Tunisia go dormant, dropping off 
precipitously in 2009, – in this particular snapshot of data at least – collective 
action in both of the monarchies, Jordan and Bahrain, are on an uptick heading 
out of the decade and toward the Arab Spring. Referring back to Figure 7.1, 
however, we can see that this uptick in Bahrain in 2009 will continue into 2010 
before catapaulting into 2011. 
So, for the pre-Arab Spring era, there are no discernable patterns that 
would point to the monarchical advantage with respect to collective action events. 
Clearly the hypothesis about monarchies being better able to prevent mobilization 
is unsupported. In both of the monarchies we see spikes, albeit at different times, 
but which nevertheless illustrate not only a failure to prevent mobilization, but an 
inability to control it as well. Both Jordan and Bahrain exhibit spikes of collective 
action that last for multiple years. Tunisia also presents a spike in events, but it 
manages to more quickly bring it under control.  
Interestingly, in Bahrain during 2004-5, as it illustrates a collective action 
campaign with a modest degree of staying power. Again, the Bahrain “spike” 
appears to be smaller, but it also represents the same number of collective action 
events as in the Jordan and Tunisia “spikes”, only spread across two years. Even 
without this data, however, we know from the narrative that, out of the sample, 
Bahrain appears to have been the most systematically and brutally repressive in its 
response to collective action. I will return to this in the coming discussion of 
severity.  
227 
Collective Action Events in the Arab Spring Period 
 How does this dynamic change with the arrival of the Arab Spring?  
Figure 7.3 presents data from 2010 – 2012, quarterly. Entering 2010, all cases 
remain relatively inactive with the exception of a small increase in Bahrain in 
mid-2010. By the last quarter of 2010, however, we see that  Tunisia becomes the 
"early riser". It then continues to rise for another quarter, and then falls quickly as 
the Ben Ali regime is toppled in just under a month. Among the two monarchies, 
Bahrain is "infected" before Jordan, rising even faster than Tunisia albeit behind 
by a quarter. Jordan's collective action begins at roughly that same time as 
Bahrain - January - February 2011. But Jordan's event count is dramatically 
smaller than both Tunisia and Bahrain, although Jordan was experiencing an 
uptick at the end of this period, unlike Bahrain and Tunisia. 
In all three cases, there is a strong effect in the first quarter of 2011, 
particularly from mid-to-late January 2011 until mid-to-late February 2011. But 
are the patterns different enough to dissuade any conclusions about the 
monarchical advantage as a positively correlated causal factor? 
Figures 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 disaggregate the individual cases during the Arab 
Spring period and change the scope of the data from quarterly to approximately 
monthly event counts.  The same patterns are present as in Figures 7.1 and 7.3, 
but disaggregating them by case allows us to view the data in greater detail.  With 
the exception of the lead-in to the time period, note that Tunisia and Bahrain 
exhibit similar peaks and valleys in mobilization during the Arab Spring period. 
This is in contrast to Jordan. Jordan has a similarly placid period leading up to 
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December 2010-January 2011. There is an exponential rise in events at the end of 
2012, but what makes Jordan stand out in comparison to Tunisia and Bahrain is 
the fact that lower levels of collective action were sustained in Jordan, compared 
to more dynamic swings in Bahrain and Tunisia. In this case, the Arab Spring 
wave data for Jordan is not unlike Bahrain in pre-Arab Spring period.  
As the data demonstrate, Bahrain and Tunisia are most similar in their 
patterns, compared to Jordan, undermining the argument for a monarchical 
advantage. Like the narrative chapters, these data suggest that hypothesis (H1) 
(monarchies are better able to prevent protests compared to non-monarchies) is 
not supported. Hypothesis 2a (monarchies are better able to control protests 
compared to non-monarchies) appears to be in doubt as well. 
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Patterns of Regime Responses 
To assess the second subhypothesis of H2, which I am calling H2b, it is 
necessary to examine not protests and protesters actions in a vacuum, but to 
systematically examine the responses of the regimes. To reiterate, Hypothesis 
H2b states that monarchies will evince a different pattern in their responses to 
protests than non-monarchies.  The previous figures illustrate when collective 
action occurred in both the pre-Arab Spring “re-ignition” and the Arab Spring 
waves. But none of the data presented illustrate when regimes select coercion, 
persuasion, or to take no action. Regarding the latter first, all three cases have 
instances of no regime response to a variety of collective actions, and there does 
not appear to be any consistent pattern to types of actions that warrant no reaction 
234 
by the regime.1 Interestingly, all three cases evince essentially similar patterns of 
regime non-response, as the Table 7.1 illustrates. 
 
Despite number of collective action events, each case did not respond (or no 
response was reported) at virtually the same rate – about 1/3 of the time. Besides 
being curious in general, this points again to a lack of variance across regime type 
when confronted with protests. But regime non-response is hardly the only data 
on which we should hinge our examination. When regimes did take action, what 
patterns do we observe? For this I will turn to the Prevention-Control/Persuasion-
Coercion Matrix. 
Prevention/Control-Persuasion/Coercion Matrix 
I am interested in categorizing regime actions and reactions on two basic 
dimensions: prevention or control of protests, and whether the action taken is 
persuasive or coercive. Again, this is designed to address one of the central 
                                                 
1 In the case of Jordan, for example, we should expect that burning pictures of the king, when even 
defaming him in public is illegal, would illicit a strong crackdown from the regime. This event 
occurred at least twice in the Arab Spring phase with quite different reactions by the regime. In 
Madaba on January 11, 2012, a single activist caught torching the portrait was sentence to two 
years imprisonment for “harming the king’s dignity”, but he was pardoned by King Abdullah only 
a month later.1 Conversely, on November 13, 2012 in Dhiban, protesters burned pictures of the 
king and protesters en masse were confronted with tear gas.1 The latter scenario was in the context 
of a much wider uprising and more aggressive actions by protesters, frustrated with price increases 
and some calling for ending King Abdallah’s rule. 
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elements of the overall argument: whether monarchies are better at withstanding 
collective actions or preventing their occurrence.  
 
 
How do we know whether to classify an action as prevention or control? 
In my formulation, control is only meaningful in the face of protests; prevention is 
about undermining the causes thereof. The Prevention-Control differentiation is 
meant to mark time. The distinction I am making is whether something occurs as 
a reaction to something (control) or in anticipation of something (prevention). 
Actions that occur after a protest is underway or has already taken place will be 
considered “control”. Actions that take place before will be considered 
prevention.  
The second dimension that I will examine is the difference between 
persuasion and coercion. I also include the criteria of “Persuasion” and 
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“Coercion”. Coercion is punitive action or actions designed as negative 
inducements. Any inducement in which the threat of pain and suffering plays an 
important role – even if there's a positive inducement alternative – I will classify 
as coercion. In any incident, persuasion and coercion may be combined, but if 
there's a significant element of coercion involved, I will classify it as coercive. 
Persuasion and coercion concern the use of ideas versus the use of force, 
respectively. 
Persuasion itself encompasses a quite wide range of activities. All the 
activities are about changing perception and ideas as a tool to either prevent or 
control collective action. But persuasion, interestingly, can have a wide range of 
target audiences as well. It can be targeted at activists or protesters to persuade 
them either that they should not protest because the regime is watching them or 
increasing security forces in advance of a protest or can persuade them by 
offering concessions. It can also be targeted more widely toward society to either 
convince potential bystanders that could be mobilized that the regime is willing to 
negotiate or conversely that it would be in citizens’ best interest not to support or 
show up to a protest because it may be willing to show force. In the case of 
counterframing, the regime can whitewash its own actions, clear the discursive 
field of competing narratives about events, and/or defame the actions or intentions 
of activists to disrupt mobilization networks.  
With this additional dimension of Persuasion-Coercion, we can more 
clearly illustrate patterns of regime actions and reactions. So now regime actions 
that might fall on a blurrier line such as arresting or intimidating citizens, 
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activists, or even NGOs or the press can be categorized as either prevention or 
control based on time and, further, as either persuasive prevention/coercive 
prevention or persuasive control/coercive control depending on the combination 
of the quality of the action and its timing.2 
As much as possible – while acknowledging the interrelation and 
interconnection of protest events and regime strategies to deal with them – I am 
considering each event as relatively distinct or at most dyadic (action-reaction and 
vice versa). This event-count method, while not perfect, will help to demonstrate 
two different patterns. First, I will show overall patterns of regime action vis-à-vis 
patterns of mobilization resulting in collective action. In other words, by coding 
each discrete event or event-pair/event group by its placement on the Prevention-
Control Matrix as illustrated in Table 7.2, a pattern will emerge in the form of a 
table that shows the prevailing patterns (i.e., predominant regime action) for each 
regime. Each data point would represent one event or event dyad. For example, a 
predominance of events in the left two quadrants of the table would illustrate a 
regime relying largely on prevention rather than control. Conversely, a cluster of 
events in the bottom right quadrant would illustrate a regime relying largely on 
coercive forms of control rather than subtler, more persuasive measures. 
                                                 
2 I recognize that there is some recursive action between the two conceptual categories. Repression 
as control in one instance could serve soon after as a teaching tool in relation to future collective 
action and thus shift into the category of coercive prevention or prophylaxis. Similarly, the 
feedback effect of internal security surveillance, for example, shades easily back and forth 
between prevention and control. In short, as protests are typically best viewed as campaigns or 
waves, constantly fluid between planning and deploying, so are regimes’ actions realistically both 
preventing and controlling in the same action. 
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The example events from ta represent more specific actions or reactions and 
their corresponding quadrant on the Prevention-Control Matrix.3 Again, 
whether a particularly coercive event like arrests of activists, a raid on a café, 
or closure of physical or virtual space is preventative or controlling depends 
entirely on the timing of the event vis-à-vis collective action. Let us take, for 
example, the upper two quadrants. Note that both feature regime actions of 
“Explicit surveillance to dissuade”, “Co-optation”, and actions to 
“delegitimize opposition by kompromat or propaganda”. These actions can 
cross the line between prevention and control depending not on the quality of 
                                                 
3 Regarding the timing criteria for Coercive Prevention or Coercive Control for example, if a 
protest begins at noon, and the regime immediately deploys a curfew/emergency law/martial law 
for that specific day, this would qualify as control. The same criteria should apply to censorship, 
and the arresting of journalists, shutting down social media and the restricting of access to 
physical sites. 
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the reaction, per se, but on the timing of the reaction relative to protests. 
Conversely, we could not put “explicit surveillance to dissuade” under 
coercive prevention or coercive control, because the point of explicit 
surveillance, as I am using it here, is that security forces want to intimidate by 
not taking care to hide their surveillance efforts. This is a matter of persuasion 
by intimidation, but stops short of the use of coercion. 
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Comparison of the Cases on the Prevention-Control Matrix 
Figures 7.7(a-c) represent the coded data for each case for the entire time 
period 2000-2012. Comparing across the matrices, two things are immediately 
apparent. First, there does appear to be a pattern of greater reliance on Coercive 
Control than any other strategy. As a reminder, this means that all the regimes 
choose to repress protest during or soon after it occurs. By extension, this means 
that regimes are failing to prevent mobilization from happening (hypothesis H1) 
or are explicitly choosing to crush protests once they have materialized rather than 
attempting to persuasively or coercively prevent them.  
Second, the overall pattern I just described holds across regime types. The 
intra-matrix boxes in the lower right corner of each quadrant show the frequency 
distribution of each category in the matrices in Figures 7.7(a-c). Again, all the 
events coded fall into the category of Coercive Control more than any other 
category – Tunisia deployed Coercive Control 57 percent of the time, Bahrain 41 
percent of the time, and Jordan 52 percent of the time. But beyond this, 
commonalities diverge. In the case of Bahrain, Coercive Control is followed 
closely behind by Coercive Prevention at 36 percent. In Jordan and Tunisia, 
however, Coercive Control is followed instead by Persuasive Control. Compared 
to Bahrain, if we hold constant the most frequent strategy of Coercive Control, the 
frequency of all other categories is quite close.  
The Bahraini regime is almost as likely to choose Coercive Prevention (36 
percent) as Coercive Control (41 percent). This is partly borne out in the cells to 
the bottom and right of the main matrix table, which illustrates the frequency 
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distribution by category (Prevention, Control, Persuasion, and Coercion). Here, 
Bahrain deploys control strategies 55 percent of the time and Prevention strategies 
45 percent of the time. Compare this to Jordan and Tunisia, which are 
impressively close vis-à-vis Prevention vs. Control. Jordan used Prevention 
strategies 27 percent of the time but overwhelmingly used Control 73 percent of 
the time. Likewise, Tunisia used 26 percent of the time and Control 74 percent of 
the time.  
 The commonalities in these cells at the borders of each matrix are in the 
categories of coercion and control. Tunisia used coercion 70 percent of the time. 
Jordan is slightly lower at 66 percent and Bahrain is the highest at 77 percent. 
Overwhelmingly and across regime type, coercion is the most commonly used 
strategy. Likewise, control is preferred by Tunisia at 74 percent, Bahrain at 55 
percent, and Jordan at 73 percent. This is a significant difference for Bahrain. 
Overall, comparing the percentages within the matrix and the percentages on the 
borders of the matrix, it is clear that Jordan and Tunisia are more like each other 
than Bahrain is to either of them. In all cases, coercion is preferred over 
persuasion and control over prevention. Diverging from the pattern, though not 
entirely, Bahrain only used control over prevention by 55 percent and 45 percent 
respectively. In sum, Bahrain is the most likely of the three cases to use coercion, 
but the least likely (though still likely relative to prevention) to use control. 
Looking at the percentages in the matrix figures 7.7(a-c), we can see that there is 
a fairly even split between prevention (45 percent) and control (55 percent) in 
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Bahrain, whereas in Tunisia and Jordan the gap is much wider – roughly 75 
percent control and 25 percent prevention.  
 Bahrain’s affinity for the use of coercion is apparent from the narrative in 
Chapter 6. But recall that the Tunisian regime was quite coercive and repressive 
as well, with paramilitary and possibly mercenary forces freely using lethal force, 
sniping protesters and flushing women and children from bathhouses with tear 
gas. The data in the matrices bear this data out quantitatively. But the data also 
provide important nuances that are not clear in the narratives.  
Per the matrices, the Tunisian regime is almost as likely to choose 
Persuasive Prevention (13 percent) as Persuasive Control (17%). If the regime 
selects on prevention, it is just as likely to favor persuasion as coercion (13 
percent). 
Lastly, the sheer event counts between the cases are roughly similar in 
proportion even though the Tunisian revolution proper lasted just over a month, 
while Jordan and Bahrain continued to simmer long after Ben ‘Ali fled. As of 
2017, Bahrain was still experiencing routine running battles between youth 
protesters and security forces on a nightly or semi-nightly basis.1 
The predominant pattern observable in the Bahrain data was 
overwhelmingly in the coercive quadrant. The overall pattern of heavier reliance 
on coercive control holds across regime types and across the pre-Arab Spring 
period of the early-to-mid 2000s and through the Arab Spring period. In Jordan, 
however, the contrast is stark regarding the strategy of the regime. Far and away, 
                                                 
1 “Bahrain: An Inconvenient Uprising,” VICE News, November 10, 2014, 
https://news.vice.com/video/bahrain-an-inconvenient-uprising. 
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the Jordanian regime employs coercive control measures to deal with collective 
action. Though it is the least likely to use Coercion in comparison to the other 
cases, its propensity for Control is nearly identical to Tunisia’s rather than 
Bahrain’s. 
The foregoing analysis should cast doubt upon the last of the three 
hypotheses (H2b) which holds that monarchies are not only more effective at 
controlling protests (H2a), they Jordan and Bahrain would display a distinct and 
discernable pattern in their control of protests.  
Severity of Repression 
 The Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion matrix and the 
corresponding frequency tables in Figures 7.7(a-c) already provide greater nuance 
to the narratives presented in previous chapters. But the matrix and frequency 
tables do not tell us anything about the severity of repression. To begin to address 
this gap, I will rely on the Political Terror Scale (PTS). 
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) aims to measure the level of state 
violence (therefore excluding non-state actor violence) and terror in each country. 
Based on a 5-point scale, each country receives a score from each of two different 
sources: Amnesty International Country Reports, and U.S. State Department 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Table 7.4 illustrates the meaning of 
each score in the 1-5 scale. 
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Figure 7.8 features a plot of the Political Terror Scale scores for Tunisia, 
Bahrain, and Jordan from 2000-2011 (the furthest extent of the data). As a 
reminder, the Political Terror Scale ranges from 1 (least use of political terror 
tactics) to 5 (thoroughly repressive totalitarian state). The PTS uses US State 
Department Human Rights Reports and Amnesty International Scores, and thus 
presents a pair of scores per year. For the purposes of simplicity, I have used the 
average scores for each year.  
All three regimes begin the decade in roughly the middle of the scale, 
indicating extensive use of political imprisonment, execution or other political 
murders and brutality. Tunisia begins with the worst score of the sample and 
Bahrain and Jordan both begin slightly below Tunisia, at 2.5. From here, Bahrain 
makes a surprising improvement, moving from 2.5 to 1, returning to 2 in 2002 
and back to 1 in 2003-4. After this, Bahrain begins a gradual ascent into 
worsening levels of political repression until it ends the decade tied with Jordan 
for the worst score of the sample. This roughly corresponds with the data I 
presented showing the event count that spiked in 2004-5, and increasing gradually 
during the Arab Spring. This might suggest a period of initial crackdown in 2004-
5 followed not by a return to baseline (a retreat of security services) but instead a 
regime that is gradually asserting greater control of the population. Looking back 
at Figure 7.2, Bahrain is exiting 2009 with an uptick in collective action events 
from 2008-2009. Comparing this with PTS scores in Figure 7.8, we see a slight 
decrease in the repressive environment, from 2 to 1.5. From 2009 onward as the 
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Arab Spring takes root in 2010/2011, the environment becomes more repressive 
overall.  
Tunisia maintains a far less dynamic pattern from 2000-2011. Apart from 
slight improvements in 2002 and 2005, Tunisia remains in the middle-range even 
throughout the Arab Spring until making a sharp dive from 2010 to 2011. This is 
perhaps to be expected given the removal of Ben Ali. This would seem to match 
with the overall narrative of the Ben Ali regime as one of the most draconian in 
the region. We might interpret this data as not less dynamic, per se, but as 
depicting a regime that maintains a constant press on the citizenry. Comparing 
this data with Figure 7.2, again, this may explain the overall lower levels of 
collective action in Tunisia until 2010-11. Yet, even the constant pressure of the 
Ben Ali regime as depicted by the PTS data in Figure 7.8 does not explain the 
wave-like pattern of collective action in the pre-Arab Spring phase (Figure 7.2).  
Jordan was the more repressive of the two monarchies in the sample and 
hovered around the same middle-range that Tunisia did until 2010-11. Two things 
stand out about Jordan in this data. First, Jordan is on average the most repressive 
regime of the sample, rising in 2008 and 2010 to 3.5. Second, and more 
interesting because it does not track with the rest of the data presented thus far, 
though they do so at opposite ends of the score spectrum, Jordan and Bahrain 
essentially track each other in overall direction up and down the scale, until the 
scores converge at 3 in 2011. For Bahrain, this is an increase from 2.5 to 3 - a 
worsening of repression/political terror. For Jordan, the same period saw a 
decrease of 3.5 to 3 - a modest improvement of repression/political terror. So, 
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both monarchies essentially track each other across the PTS data at different 
levels, yet they are only one point apart on the scale. Nevertheless, from the other 
data I have presented, Bahrain and Tunisia differ from Jordan in their use of 
coercion and repression in response to collective action. 
It should come as no surprise that these regimes would display high levels 
of repression on most scales. Especially given the matrix scores and frequency 
distributions and the narratives presented previously, which seemed to paint a 
picture of highly repressive regimes.  While there is no apparent commonality 
among the monarchies that might be called an advantage, there is certainly a 
distinct difference in each regime’s approach toward collective action over the 
years.  
A Matrix of Advantage? 
 This chapter aimed to examine the hypotheses regarding monarchies’ 
greater ability to prevent mobilization (H1), to control protests that occurred 
(H2a) and to finally explore whether the ability to prevention or control protests 
could be illustrated as a distinct and discernable pattern of behavior (H2b). Again, 
previous chapters analyzing the first two hypotheses through process tracing 
allowed us to travel some distance in answering these questions. But the data 
presented in this chapter paint a definitive picture that discounts the monarchical 
advantage, in terms of these hypotheses, among these cases.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Implications  
Are 21st century monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa better 
than non-monarchies in forestalling protests? Are they better than non-monarchies 
in withstanding protests that do occur? If monarchies can withstand protests that 
do occur, is it because they exhibit patterns of response in controlling protests that 
differ from non-monarchies? The research questions driving this analysis were 
composed of two elements: prevention of potential protests and control of 
occurring protests. If the evidence has demonstrated that monarchies have an 
exceptional ability to forestall protests or to control and therefore withstand 
protests that do occur, this should constitute evidence of a monarchical advantage. 
To answer these questions, I examined three hypotheses.1 In general, if the 
monarchical advantage was to hold, one or both of two hypotheses must have 
been true. Hypothesis (H1) states that MENA monarchies are better than MENA 
non-monarchies at preventing protests. Hypothesis (H2) states that monarchies are 
better at withstanding protests than non-monarchies. The premise of the 
monarchical advantage argument in the Arab Spring is the fact that all of the Arab 
monarchs survived while four of the Arab presidents did not. If we find no 
evidence for Hypothesis H1 – if monarchies were not significantly better than 
non-monarchies at forestalling protests – then it would seem that Hypothesis H2 
must be true – monarchies must be better than non-monarchies at withstanding 
protests. 
                                                 
1 These hypotheses and indicators are also presented collectively in Chapter 1 as “Table 1.1. 
Hypotheses and Associated Indicators”. 
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As a matter of course, this dissertation did not directly examine 
Hypothesis H2. The facts underlying Hypothesis H2 served as the logical starting 
point for investigating the monarchical advantage – monarchies survived the Arab 
Spring, so they must have withstood protests. I concluded, as a logical matter, that 
if H1 was false (monarchies are not better than non-monarchies at preventing 
protests), then H2 must be true (that monarchies are better than non-monarchies 
at withstanding protests). By the end of this concluding chapter, I will have 
demonstrated that, once we accept that monarchies saw high levels of 
mobilization – indicating that they are not better at preventing protests (H1) – that 
it becomes logically inescapable that they must be better at withstanding protests 
(H2). 
Again, we are accepting that Hypothesis H2 is supported, given the 
outcomes we have observed. This is why, over the course of the preceding 
chapters, I did not examine Hypothesis H2 directly. But I will still examine how 
and why monarchies’ ability to withstand protests operates and enquire whether 
this, though true, is not perhaps spurious. To this end, this dissertation examined 
two subhypotheses related to Hypothesis H2. First, are monarchies better able to 
withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests 
(Hypothesis H2a)? Second, do monarchies display a distinct and discernable 
pattern in their control of protests, compared to republics (Hypothesis H2b)? 
What would be indicators of the monarchical advantage regarding the 
prevention of protests, if it exists? The maximalist version would posit that 
monarchies can so effectively forestall mobilization that protest is comparatively 
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rare and no public demonstrations occur. This is demonstrably false. A more 
nuanced version of Hypothesis 1 posits that monarchies are better able to forestall 
mobilization such that protests take place at much lower levels of intensity 
compared to MENA republics. By “lower levels” I mean 1) fewer protests; 2) 
smaller protests; 3) less geographic dispersion of protests; 4) less demographic 
and ideological diversity of the protest coalition, and finally 5) protests whose 
goals were less likely to include regime change and more likely to be a change in 
policy or in policy-makers. 
What would be indicators that monarchies compared to republics, more 
effectively controlled protests?  More specifically, what would be indicators that 
monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at 
controlling protests (Hypothesis H2a)? If H2a is true, we should see 1) fewer 
protests, 2) shorter protests; 3) less geographic dispersion of protests; or 4) 
protests whose goals were less extreme and less likely to be regime change and 
more likely to be a change in policy or in policymakers. 
Hypothesis H1 and hypothesis H2a may appear to be similar, and there are 
overlapping indicators for the two hypotheses, but as I discussed in Chapter 1, 
there are important differences. The basic difference is one of timing: Where 
Hypothesis H1 applies to the prevention of protests that have not yet occurred, 
Hypothesis H2a applies to protests that have occurred or are underway.2  
Fewer protests, for example, is an indicator for both H1 (prevention) and H2a 
(control). It is an indicator for H1 because if a regime is able to successfully 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 1 “Testable Hypotheses” subsection for a discussion of my argument regarding the 
conceptual and methodological separation of Hypotheses H1 and H2(a). 
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interrupt the process of mobilization before collective action can take place, we 
should logically see fewer incidents.  Yet, fewer protests are also part of control, 
because controlling protests that are occurring could logically result in fewer 
protests in the future. Again, however similar the indicators are, it is important to 
recognize the temporal distinction I am drawing, because control (Hypothesis 
H2a) only takes place after protests have already occurred or are underway. 
Protests less extreme in intensity of demands are likewise an indicator of 
both H1 (prevention) and H2a (control). A proactive regime, backed by a robust 
surveillance and security apparatus will likely work diligently to prevent the most 
serious forms of dissent among activist networks. So long as this occurs in the 
form of increased surveillance of civil society, arresting activists and breaking up 
networks prior to protests, this is a matter of prevention and an indicator of 
hypothesis H1. At the same time, regimes can fail (or neglect) to prevent such 
intensely critical actions until they become placards and chants at demonstrations. 
Because these demands are occurring after mobilization is complete and 
collective action has occurred, it becomes a matter of control and can thus 
likewise be an indicator of hypothesis H2a3. 
There is a reflexive effect as well. Prevention and control are temporally 
distinct processes that are constantly weaving into and out of one another as 
regimes confront protests.  Preventing mobilization will tend to stifle the spread 
                                                 
3 Prevention and control are temporally distinct processes that are constantly weaving into and out 
of one another as regimes confront protests. Preventing protests will tend to stifle the spread of 
dissent and should theoretically therefore be illustrated by the appearance of fewer protests. There 
is of course a reflexive effect as well. Control of protest in an initial site could likewise control the 
dispersion of protests and prevent future mobilizations. We don’t know if control will prevent 
dispersion and future mobilizations. At this point it becomes an almost impossible measurement 
problem. 
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of dissent and should theoretically therefore be illustrated by the appearance of 
fewer protests. Control of protest in an initial site could likewise control the 
dispersion of protests and prevent future mobilizations. 
Entirely different indicators were presented for the second subhypothesis 
that monarchies display a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of 
protests (Hypothesis H2b). Regimes respond to protests in some ways 
preventatively, before protests have gotten underway, and in other cases in a 
controlling manner, once protests are already happening. Regimes also use greater 
and lesser degrees of persuasion and coercion to prevent and control protests. If 
H2b is true, monarchies should respond to protests by emphasizing preventive, 
controlling, persuasive and coercive actions at levels distinct from those seen in 
non-monarchies. Likewise, if H2b is true, the severity of government repression – 
measured in terms of the Political Terror Scale, which measures the level of state 
violence in each country based on a five-point scale – should be different for 
monarchies in comparison to non-monarchies.4 
Principal Findings 
The previous five chapters examined in detail and from several 
methodological angles the potential for monarchical advantage by examining the 
three hypotheses. In the sections that follow, I will review the findings across 
those chapters based on the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis H1 – Prevention  
                                                 
4 Mark Gibney et al., “Political Terror Scale 1976-2016,” 2017, 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. For more detail on the substantive meaning of each of the five 
levels, see Chapter 7, this volume, or Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, 
Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisano. “Political Terror Scale Levels.” Political Terror Scale 1976-
2016, 2017. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html#PTS-Levels. 
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Chapters 3-6 examined the individual narratives of each of the three cases’ 
uprisings and systematically tested hypothesis (H1) (that MENA monarchies are 
better than MENA non-monarchies at preventing mobilization). Here I review the 
findings with regard to hypothesis H1 by indicator (fewer protests, smaller 
protests, less geographic dispersion of protests, less demographic and ideological 
diversity of the protest coalition, and less extreme goals of protests). 
H1 – Number of Protests 
Event count analysis from Chapter 7 clearly demonstrates the inability of 
any of the regimes to forestall protests, either in the pre-Arab Spring or Arab 
Spring phases. This is most clearly demonstrated in the Pre-Arab Spring phase by 
Figure 7.2, showing the total event count for each of the three cases from 2000-
2009. It is immediately apparent that no relationship between monarchy and the 
number of protests exists during this period, so there is no evidence here of 
monarchical advantage. Looking at event counts on a year-by-year basis, 
Tunisia’s republic and Jordan’s monarchy are more similar to each other than 
either is to Bahrain’s monarchy. If we take the totals for each case across two-
year periods, Jordan becomes the outlier with 21 events. While Bahrain and 
Tunisia have 15 and 14 events, respectively. The republican case, Tunisia, is 
always more similar to one of the two monarchies than the two monarchies are to 
each other. This is a particularly robust finding that the monarchical advantage is 
unsupported for these countries, at least during the pre-Arab Spring period. 
Figures 7.4-7.6 in Chapter 7 demonstrate that the lack of monarchical 
advantage and relationship to regime type also holds during the Arab Spring 
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period as well. Both Tunisia and Bahrain saw large spikes of protests, followed by 
a sharp drop from peak levels. In both of those cases, this sharp drop is followed 
by ongoing mobilization and recurring protests, but post-peak numbers of events 
never approach the numbers evident in the peak periods. Jordan, by comparison, 
is not characterized by a sharp peak. In the Arab Spring period, the event count 
data for Jordan show a wavelike pattern of consistently recurring protests, 
beginning in January 2011.  
In total, we can say two things about the cases in the Arab Spring period 
based on the event count data. First, of all the regimes, Jordan is the one that has 
the fewest protests, but Bahrain is the case that has the most protests, providing 
little support for hypothesis H1. Second, Figures 7.4 and 7.5 – showing event 
counts for Tunisian and Bahrain, respectively – appear more similar to each other 
than either does to Jordan. Post-peak, all three regimes look more similar to each 
other than different. So, during the peak periods, one monarchy and the republic 
resemble each other closely, and post-peak, the regimes are more similar than 
different. Based on fewer protests as an indicator, there is little support for the 
ability of monarchies to prevent protests (Hypothesis H1). 
H1 – Size of Protests 
A dataset of events as of May 2011 developed by Andy Kirk and 
Christopher Wilson demonstrates the high levels of mobilization and contentious 
activity in Bahrain, with 17.6 percent of the population involved, which far 
outpaced Egypt (2.4%), Tunisia (0.9%), and Jordan (0.1%).5 But these stark 
                                                 
5 Andy Kirk and Christopher Wilson, “New Visualization Design Project: Protests and the 
Media,” Visualizing Data (blog), May 25, 2011, 
257 
numbers belie a more complex picture on the ground, as the preceding chapters 
aptly illustrated.  
In Tunisia, protests regularly ranged from hundreds to several thousand 
people during the various sit-ins, strikes, and protests across the country. By the 
time protests reached Tunis in early January 2011, participants numbering in the 
tens of thousands were marching down Avenue Habib Bourguiba toward major 
government offices. On February 26, 2011, 100,000 people - the largest crowds 
since Ben Ali's ouster - turned out to demand the resignation of interim prime 
minister (and former Ben Ali regime insider) Mohammed Ghannouchi and the 
prohibition of any other former ruling party or Ben Ali regime insiders from any 
future government.6 In Jordan, the size of protests ranged from 200-500 
participants, to 2,000-6,000, to the largest reported protest during the samples, in 
September and October 2012, attended by 10,000-15,000.7 Most frequently, 
protest attendance was reported in the low thousands. Finally, in Bahrain, the first 
day of rage protests were attended by at least 6,000 people across the country, 
with individual demonstrations ranging in size “from tens of persons to over 
1,000 persons.”8 More than 10,000 were reported to have attended ‘Ali 
Mushaima’s funeral and subsequent march to Pearl Roundabout in Manama.9 The 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.visualisingdata.com/index.php/2011/05/new-visualisation-project-protests-and-the-
media/. The raw data is available as a Google Documents Spreadsheet at http://bit.ly/2pmb7XI 
6 Lewis, “Middle East Protests: Major Rally in Tunisia Capital - BBC News.” 
7 Al-Khalidi, “In Biggest Protest, Jordan Islamists Demand Change”; “Muslim Brotherhood Vows 
to ‘flood’ Jordan’s Streets to Press Reform Demands”; Sherlock, “Thousands Rally to Demand 
Reform in Jordan.” 
8 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni et al., “Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry” 
(Manama, Bahrain: Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, November 23, 2011), 68. 
9 Ian Black, “Bahrain Police Open Fire on Funeral Procession Leaving One Dead,” The Guardian, 
February 15, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/15/bahrain-police-funeral-
procession; “Protests Boil Over In Bahrain After Bloody Clashes With Police,” NPR.org, 
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subsequent occupation of Pearl Roundabout before its destruction on February 17, 
2011, featured as many as 12,000 protesters.10 And 100,000-150,000 gathered in 
Manama in the Martyr’s March against repeated government repression.11  
Data from Kirk and Wilson as well as that presented in preceding chapters 
illustrates that there is no relationship between regime type and size of protests. 
Bahrain and Tunisia are more similar to each other than either is to Jordan with 
respect to the size of protests. Based on the size of protests, there is little support 
for the ability of monarchies to prevent protests (Hypothesis H1).12  
H1 – Geographic Dispersion of Protests 
With respect to the geographic dispersion of protests, the narrative data 
says that there remains neither persuasive evidence for any regime’s ability to 
prevent the spread of protests, nor any support for the monarchical advantage on 
this measure. Both Tunisia and Jordan in the pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring 
periods feature protests that begin in the economically and politically neglected 
hinterlands and center almost predictably around a handful of particularly restive 
municipalities. Taking into consideration Bahrain’s comparatively much smaller 
size, in Bahrain, protests spread from particular municipalities to surrounding 
villages and the capital. And they did so with remarkable speed.   
                                                                                                                                     
February 15, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133775176/protests-boil-over-in-bahrain-after-
violence. 
10 Bassiouni et al., “Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” 72. 
11 Fakhro, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain,” 91–92; Louër, “Activism in Bahrain: 
Between Sectarian and Issue Politics”; Michael Slackman and Nadim Audi, “Bahrain Protesters’ 
Calls for Unity Belie Divisions,” The New York Times, February 22, 2011, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/middleeast/23bahrain.html. 
12 It is worth questioning what relative weight to assign to protests in Jordan that might be smaller 
than gatherings of hundreds of thousands as in Bahrain and Tunisia versus a gathering of 
approximately 1,000 heads of different tribes, coalitions, and protest movements at once at the 
"Second National Convention for Reform" rally that was held in al-Lubban (approximately 20 km 
south of Amman). See Varulkar, “Varulkar, ‘The Arab Spring in Jordan.’” 
259 
In Tunisia, protests were reported in 11 of 24 governorates, a geographic 
dispersion of approximately fifty percent. Laryssa Chomiak illustrates the 
geographic spread of protests in Tunisia after protests first erupted in Sidi 
Bouzaid. In those very hinterland towns that had remained seemingly cowed since 
the violent crackdown in 2008, the protests began to spread systematically: “the 
first towns to engage in ongoing protests were Thala, Kasserine, Gafsa, Redeyef, 
and Metlaoui, before heading north long the Algerian border, through Jendouba, 
and finally reaching Tunis in early January.”13  
In Jordan, protests were routinely reported in eight out of the twelve total 
governorates encompassing each of the three regions of the country, a geographic 
dispersion of approximately 67 percent. In Jordan, protests not only covered a 
comparably larger geographic dispersion (in terms of municipalities and 
governorates involved) than Tunisia and Bahrain. Jordanian protests were also 
frequently held in tandem across the country. Protests and strikes called for in 
Dhiban, for example, would be paralleled in Ma’an, Irbid, Salt, Karak, and 
Amman. The fact that my interview respondents frequently spoke of activist 
organizers traveling from outlying municipalities like Karak to Amman and 
elsewhere attests to a geographic dispersion every bit as effective as the social 
media mobilized protests in Tunisia and Bahrain.  
Finally, in Bahrain, protests were routinely reported in both Shi’a and 
Sunni municipalities but also in the capital, Manama, and in notable locations in 
close proximity to royal court buildings. Protests were routinely reported in Sitra, 
Manama, Nuwaidrat, Hamad Town, and Riffa, comprising 2 of 4 governorates, a 
                                                 
13 Chomiak, “Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia,” 40. 
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geographic dispersion of fifty percent. If the benchmark republic, Tunisia, 
featured 50 percent dispersion, one monarchy, Jordan, at 67 percent surpassed 
both Tunisia and the other monarchy, Bahrain, at 50 percent, I can find neither a 
relationship to monarchy, nor support for Hypothesis H1 with regard to 
geographic dispersion of protest.14  
H1 – Ideological and Demographic Diversity of Protests 
With regard to the ability of activists to construct protest coalitions 
crossing crucial demographic and ideological cleavages, there was no discernable 
monarchical advantage in the ability to prevent such mobilization. Activists in 
Bahrain and Jordan, like those in Tunisia, constructed protest coalitions that 
crossed important ideological and demographic cleavages. As the baseline, the 
Tunisian protest coalition ranged from previously-mobilized miners and rural 
unemployed to trade unions and professional associations – especially the 
majority of lawyers in the country – and the crucial middle class in Tunis and 
other coastal cities. Importantly, as Angrist reiterates, hatred of Ben Ali and the 
sycophantic circle of family and friends, fostered mobilization across secular and 
Islamist cleavages that the regime thought impossible.  
Jordan’s hirak was composed of a crucial cross-section of the March 24 
Youth Movement, various tribal coalitions, and the established Islamist and 
Leftist parties. But even the hirak represented a microcosm of the entire coalition 
                                                 
14 It must be said that Bahrain’s geographic size makes it a special case. The sheer size of Bahrain 
makes dispersion of the kind that Angrist arguably intended in the analysis of Tunisia more 
difficult. Moreover, the effective cantonization of major Shi’a areas in Bahrain disrupts our 
understanding of geographic dispersion by either a) falsely showing a beginning level of 
dispersion or b) falsely showing a limited dispersion even though a major protest that began on the 
island of Sitra can easily spread to the capital of Manama in the form of a march. By comparison, 
there were no marches from Dhiban to Amman or Sidi Bouzaid to Tunis. 
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– grassroots Palestinian and tribal youth, established tribes, labor movements and 
teacher’s movements – e.g., the “electricity hirak” – and professional 
associations. That the hirak protests were paralleled by established opposition 
parties and other tribal coalitions was unprecedented in Jordanian collective 
action. But perhaps most important was, at least among the grassroots hirak 
groups, the minimizing of the East Bank-West Bank identity cleavage that was so 
often used by the regime to divide-and-rule in the past.  
In Bahrain, the February 14th Movement similarly drew from Bahraini 
youth activist networks, creating a grassroots coalition quite similar to the 
Jordanian hirak. The Bahraini uprising was, for the most part, dominated by Shi’a 
activists and movements. But the grievance frame demanding a return to the 
abrogated constitution united, at least briefly, both Shi’a and Sunni activists and 
movements, including the established “political associations”. Even groups like 
the National Unity Gathering – which inclined toward maintaining the regime 
more or less in power – shared many grievances with both the Shi’a professional 
associations like al-Wefaq and with the February 14 Youth Movement.  
Ultimately, a crucial difference between the uprising in Bahraini as 
compared to those in Jordan and Tunisia was that in the former the regime was 
still largely able to play the divide-and-rule card with the sectarian cleavage. This 
was exacerbated by the regime’s constant framing of the protests as the work of 
the kingdom’s bête noire, Iran. But the Bahraini uprising was beset by even intra-
sectarian divide-and-rule. As the uprising wore on, the aims, tactics, and 
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successes of the traditional opposition parties diverged sharply from those of the 
February 14th movement. As Kristian Ulrichsen observes,  
The result has been the empowerment of radical voices across the political 
spectrum and the marginalisation [sic] of Bahrain’s political middle 
ground. The emergence of radicalised [sic] splinter groups means that it is 
no longer possible to speak of a ‘regime-opposition’ dichotomy. Elements 
of the opposition are growing more violent, and calls have intensified from 
extremist groups urging the regime to crush the opposition once and for 
all.15 
In terms of preventing protests, by limiting the demographic and ideological 
diversity of the protest coalitions, none of the regimes was successful. As the 
Bahraini revolution wore on, we saw that divisions emerged and were subtly 
exploited by the regime. But in the cases of Jordan, Tunisia, and Bahrain there is 
no relationship between monarchy and the ideological and demographic diversity 
of protests.  
H1 – Demands and Aims of Protests 
In Tunisia, as Michele Angrist observed, the situation leading into 2010 
was balanced precariously on a powder keg of economic and political grievances 
that reflected the regime’s inability to keep up with citizens’ rising expectations.16 
This had been the case in Tunisia in the decade prior to December 2010. That this 
was the case throughout the region made the diffusion of protests possible in the 
first place. When examining the indicator of intensity of tone and goals of protests 
for Hypothesis H1 and Hypothesis H2a, the starting point was to compare 
grievance frames deployed by activists across the cases. Here I will reiterate that, 
                                                 
15 Kristian Ulrichsen, “After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?: Bahrain’s Aborted 
Revolution,” IDEAS Report (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012), 
30, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/Home.aspx. 
16 Angrist, “Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia.” 
263 
in terms of the demands and aims of the protests in each case, I find no 
relationship to monarchy. Moreover, despite the fact that monarchical advantage 
does exist in the form of H2 (ability to withstand protests), I find no support for 
the ability of either monarchies or republics to prevent the more extreme demands 
and aims of protesters. 
Because the Arab Spring wave of uprisings was defined at least partially 
by its remarkable diffusion and broad resonance of its collective action frames, it 
is hardly surprising that grievances across the three cases were nearly identical. In 
each case, grievances centered on rising costs of basic food and fuel subsidies 
with stagnant employment or dead-end opportunities for economic and social 
advancement. Added to these socio-economic grievances were political 
grievances. Among the latter were corruption grievances that ranged from general 
grievances to targeting specific policies and policymakers. Finally, grievances 
against the security apparatus in each state also ranged from outrage at specific 
instances of abuse and overreaction by security services (especially as each 
uprising progressed) to general resentment at the pervasive presence of the 
security apparatus and its involvement in politics. The latter was particularly an 
issue in the minds of Jordanian activists. 
Interview respondents who had participated in the early protests of the 
Arab Spring wave in Jordan were adamant that some of the popular frames that 
the public knows best from Egypt and Tunisia, were first deployed in Jordan. 
Moreover, in both Bahrain and Jordan, mobilization was spurred not only by the 
common themes of bread, freedom, and social justice, but by the specific feelings 
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of social, economic, and political disenfranchisement of particular constituencies 
– Shi’a Bahrainis and several tribal constituencies in Jordan. 
In Tunisia, protests began by calling on familiar grievance frames of 
corruption, unemployment, and unfair hiring practices, inter alia, inspired by the 
frames of the past mining region protests. Rather than a gradual escalation from 
policies, to policymakers, to the call for regime change, within a week after 
Bouazizi’s self-immolation protests in Tunisia had taken a decidedly political 
turn, with chants in Tunis calling for Ben Ali not to stand for re-election in 2014. 
As protests continued apace, demands for changes in policy and specific 
policymakers were scattered among the protesters’ demands. On January 14, 
2011, the thousands who stormed Avenue Habib Bourguiba explicitly expressed 
the now-central and non-negotiable demand of the revolution, calling explicitly 
for Ben Ali’s removal as a central goal of the protests. 
In Bahrain, calls for the dissolution of the monarchy came early and often. 
Because the majority-Shi’a protesters understood intimately the systematic 
discrimination alleged by Bahrain Shi’a at the hands of the Al-Khalifa regime, it 
is hardly surprising that the protest coalition’s demands quickly and effectively 
targeted not only policies and policymakers, but quickly targeted the monarchy as 
an institution. As early as December 27, 2009, noted activist Abdulhadi al-
Khawaja called for the downfall of the Al-Khalifa regime during an Ashura 
speech entitled “Let’s Bring Down the Ruling Gang.”17 Before the February 14, 
2011 Bahraini “Day of Rage” protests even arrived on the street, “The Youth of 
the February 14th Revolution” had issued its first statement. That statement 
                                                 
17 Fakhro, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain,” 100. 
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simultaneously called for policy reform –guarantees of the freedom of expression, 
press, internet and television and ending the role of the security agencies in the 
media; and an end to the political naturalization policy. It called for changes in 
policy makers – specifically the firing of the royally-affiliated Prime Minister, and 
a desire for a fully-elected parliament and prime minister. And it brazenly called 
for regime change - disbanding the National Assembly; redrafting of a 
Constitution, and most importantly, for members of the royal family to be barred 
from holding top positions in the three branches of government. They did not call 
for the removal of the Al-Khalifa monarchy and its replacement with a republic. 
They instead insisted that the family remain and become a true constitutional 
monarchy. The Al-Khalifa could reign, but they could no longer rule. They were 
to devolve power to an elected parliament and prime minister.18 The Bahraini 
uprising – at least in the grassroots movement incarnation – was explicit in its 
calls for regime change.  
The first protests calling for the downfall of the Bahraini regime came 
sooner than in either Jordan or Tunisia. By the day after the first organized 
protests of the “Day of Rage” we saw the first recorded calls for the downfall of 
the regime, with chants of "Down with the al-Khalifa". Protest organizers said this 
was not a planned chant, but one born from rage at the regime's actions in 
attacking the previous day's funeral cortège.19 This pattern would continue for 
more than a year. By February 17, 2011, after the seminally violent clearing of the 
Pearl Roundabout by police, the February 14th Youth Movement officially 
                                                 
18 Bassiouni et al., “Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” 66. 
19 Black, “Bahrain Police Open Fire on Funeral Procession Leaving One Dead”; “Protests Boil 
Over In Bahrain After Bloody Clashes With Police.” 
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followed suit. Its Facebook page “escalated its demands from the creation of a 
constitutional monarchy to the downfall of the regime.”20  
In Jordan, protests centered foremost on economic and political 
grievances, especially corruption. Importantly, Jordanian protesters clearly drew 
connections between policies, amorphous concepts like corruption and the 
absence of legitimacy, and specific policymakers. As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, 
criticism of King Abdullah or the monarchy as an institution were not initially 
frequent, though not uncommon. Frequent and sustained calls for the end of the 
monarchy and the end of Abdullah’s rule began much later in Jordan than in 
Tunisia or Bahrain, beginning in earnest in late 2011 (October) and early 2012. 
But once those protests turned to calls for regime change, they were vociferous. 
Finally, Chapters 4-6 compared the cases in terms of the aims of protests 
with interesting results. Table 8.1 combines the “Comparative Aims of Protests” 
tables from each of the case chapters.  
 
In each case, more of the protests were against policy rather than against 
policymakers or regime change.21 Again, Jordan and Tunisia, were more similar 
to each other than the two monarchies were to each other. In Bahrain, we see 
                                                 
20 Fakhro, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain,” 90–91. 
21 As mentioned in each chapter, it should be stated that in cases where the aims of protests were 
unclear, unreported, or ambiguous, such cases were coded as “Policy (General Reform)”. 
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more protests aimed at policies and regime change than in Jordan and Tunisia, 
and fewer instances of protests against policymakers.  
Finally, contrary to some views that see fewer protests against the regime 
in monarchies because of some preternatural legitimacy, Bahrain saw higher rates 
of protest calling for regime change than in Jordan and Tunisia. Moreover, though 
only slightly higher, Tunisia saw higher rates of protest calling for regime change 
than Jordan.22 It is hard to imagine a scenario in which this quantity and quality of 
vociferous protest demands could be construed as effectively prevented. This 
finding is applicable to all the cases, regardless of regime type. I can find no 
monarchical advantage with respect to preventing more extreme demands and 
aims of protests. 
Hypotheses H2 & H2a – Control 
Chapters 3-6 likewise examined the three cases to systematically test 
Hypothesis H2a (monarchies are more effective at controlling protests). The 
foregoing analysis of Hypothesis H1 already presented the results of the analysis 
of number of protests, geographic dispersion of protests, composition of the 
protest coalition and the level of demands. I have failed to find evidence of a 
monarchical advantage with regards to preventing mobilization on these 
indicators of Hypothesis H1. 
As I set out at the beginning of this dissertation, if it is not true that 
monarchies are better at forestalling protests than non-monarchies, the survival of 
                                                 
22 It should be noted that only two of the five recorded demands for regime change were against 
the Ben Ali regime. The remaining three instances were against the interim government after the 
fall of the Ben Ali regime. It is unclear to me why this is comparatively underreported in media 
sources as compared to the reporting in both Jordan and Bahrain. 
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monarchies (such as Bahrain and Jordan) at a time that some non-monarchies 
(such as Tunisia) were falling suggests that monarchies are better than republics at 
withstanding protests (Hypothesis H2). The Ben Ali regime fell within a month, 
but protests in Tunisia continued for months afterward against various policy- and 
policymaker-related grievances. The Jordanian and Bahraini monarchies 
withstood protests while the Tunisian republican regime fell, in line with 
Hypothesis H2. I distinguished two sub-hypotheses: H2a says that monarchies are 
better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling 
protests. H2b says that monarchies will display a distinct and discernable pattern 
in their control of protests as compared to republics. 
H2a – Duration of Protests 
The duration of protests was one of the central indicators of control in 
Hypothesis H2a. Duration can be understood in two ways: longitudinally 
(duration of the overall protest “wave”) and protests ad interim (length of protests 
within that wave). Longitudinally, a protest wave can last for months or years. 
Protests ad interim could last hours, days, or weeks.  
Event-count data from Chapter 7 demonstrated that, with respect to 
longitudinal duration, the three cases were roughly similar. In the pre-Arab Spring 
phase, there were spikes in collective action in all three cases, albeit at different 
times. In general, as the narrative data also support, each case experienced at least 
one pre-Arab Spring wave of collective action. We have seen from the foregoing 
analysis, that in all three cases during this phase, the event counts viewed on a 
two-year period demonstrate a roughly similar number of collective action events. 
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But, again, Tunisia’s republic is always more similar to one of the two 
monarchies than the two monarchies are to each other.  
During the Arab Spring phase, longitudinally, collective action events 
lasted throughout the sample period of one year (December 2010-December 
2011). As Figures 7.4-7.6 in Chapter 7 illustrate, in each case, mobilization and 
protest continued, though not at peak levels, in shorter spikes and a more wave-
like pattern until the end of the period.  
More specifically, we see in Tunisia and Bahrain, short, sharp spikes of 
events from December 2010-February 2011, and January 2011-July 2011, 
respectively. Again, both peaks decline precipitously compared to Jordan, in 
which repeated, though much smaller, peaks begin in December 2010 and 
continue through December 2011. As mentioned previously, and as Figure 7.6 in 
Chapter 7 illustrates, the pattern in Jordan is characterized by smaller wave-like 
actions rather than sharp spikes followed by sharp drops in Tunisia and Bahrain. 
In Tunisia, the peak period of collective action events last roughly two 
months, falling in the months after regime change. In Bahrain, by comparison, the 
principal spike of collective action events lasted roughly 2 months, followed by 
several months of alternating high and low activity. In Jordan, the overall 
undulating protest wave within the period lasted from December 2010 to April 
2012. After a period of apparent dormancy, protests in Jordan in December 2010 
spiked dramatically. Comparably to Bahrain in all but the number of events, this 
initial spike of collective action events in Jordan lasted roughly 2 months, 
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followed by several months of alternating high and low activity. There were 
important differences all the regimes, however.   
In comparison with Tunisia, whose uprising against the Ben Ali regime 
was effectively complete by February of 2011 (even though the data continue to 
show Tunisian mobilization and collective action until the end of the year), 
Bahrain and Jordan show much longer periods of mobilization and collective 
action and withstood them successfully. These data are consistent with 
Hypothesis H2: the Tunisian republic fell to protests while the two monarchies 
withstood protests. Pivoting to Hypothesis H2a, however, no regime managed to 
control protests to keep them down entirely.  
Two observations are in order, however. First, in Bahrain and Tunisia 
protests spiked but were brought back down to the status quo ante. After the peak 
spike, both Tunisia and Bahrain experienced returns to smaller spikes, but, again, 
post-peak numbers of events never approached the numbers evident in the peak 
periods. In post-peak Tunisia, we see a pattern of recurring events in smaller 
peaks of roughly two-month intervals. In post-peak Bahrain, by contrast we see 
fewer post-peak spikes, but the largest spike lasts three months (August 2011 – 
October 2011) rather than two months as in Tunisia. 
The large, multi-month peak evident in Tunisia and Bahrain is absent in 
Jordan, as noted above. Instead we see a recurring rise and fall of protests in 
roughly one or two-month intervals, similar to Tunisia. In other words, protests 
rise from December 2010 until dropping (though not to zero) by March 2011. 
They rise in April, only to drop to zero in May. They rise again beginning in June 
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2011 and last until August. A smaller spike appeared in October and returned to 
zero in November. Another, comparably-sized spike began in January 2012. 
Though this spike also declined, it did so more gradually, lasting through March 
2012. Protests appeared to die down from April through June 2012. As we enter 
July and August of 2012, events begin to increase again. The most dramatic spike 
in Jordan occurred in November 2012. This October-December 2012 spike in 
Jordan corresponds to inflammatory price increases. It also corresponds to the 
greatest consecutive number of protests calling for the downfall of the regime.  
In terms of overall longitudinal duration data, there is no support for the 
monarchical advantage. As in the foregoing analysis of prevention of mobilization 
(Hypothesis H1) illustrated, Tunisia is always more similar to one of the two 
monarchies than the two monarchies are to each other.  
With regard to protests ad interim, as part of the tactical repertoire of 
collective action in the Middle East, protests often occur sequentially on Fridays 
after congregational prayers. In Tunisia, during the pre-Arab Spring period, day-
long strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations, particularly by activists in the 
economically marginalized hinterlands, were frequent. In sporadic cases, protests 
and other collective action became multi-day, sequential protests. For example, in 
November 2005, seven Tunisian opposition activists engaged in a month-long 
hunger strike, calling for the release of political prisoners and a lift on restrictions 
on freedom of expression. Likewise, on April 16-17, 2008 two newspaper editors 
began a hunger strike against government harassment of opposition newspapers.23 
                                                 
23 “Tunisian Opposition Leader Comments on Government ‘Harassment’ of Paper,” BBC 
Monitoring - Middle East, April 27, 2008. 
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In February-March 2008, those weekly protests of miners and other laborers 
spread to a larger movement network of leftist students and the Tunisian 
Communist Party (PCOT). In the Arab Spring phase, protests continued every day 
from Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 17, 2010 until Ben Ali’s 
ouster on January 14, 2011.  
As Chapters 3-4 established, beginning with the initial protests as reported 
by interview respondents in 2010/11, protests in Jordan typically occurred every 
week until the end of the sample period in December 2012. In several cases, 
protests in response to security services overreaction resulted in multi-day 
protests. Examples include the March 24-25, 2011 diwar dakhilliyeh sit-in, the 
July 15-16, 2011 al-Nakheel Square protests in Amman in response to the 
crackdown on March 24-25, 2011 (which were themselves the subject of 
overreaching repression), the October 1, 2011 Islamist rally in Sakeb and 
imprisonment of Ahmad al-‘Abadi, and resulting protest cascade, and the killing 
of Qasi Omari in November 2012. 
H2a –Geographic Dispersion of Protests 
The results of the previous analysis of geographic dispersion apply equally 
to examining Hypothesis H2a (control of protests). There thus remains no 
evidence of monarchical advantage in terms of monarchies being able to more 
effectively control protests through control of geographic dispersion.  
H2a – Demands and Aims of Protests 
We have already seen that Tunisia, Jordan, and Bahrain all failed to 
prevent the most extreme demands and aims of protests and that there is no 
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support for hypothesis H1 on this indicator. Regarding demands and aims of 
protests as an indicator of hypothesis H2a (control), if H2a is supported, we 
should expect to see fewer protests that feature calls for regime change. If 
monarchical advantage is supported, especially in the sense that the king is 
“above the fray” of politics, we should expect to see greater calls for the removal 
of policymakers and fewer calls for the abdication of the monarch or the 
dissolution of the monarchy and regime change. There is a paradox inherent in 
examining this aspect of hypothesis H2a: Greater control – whether persuasive or 
coercive – could result in a lowering of the intensity of demands and a reduction 
in the maximalist positions of protests. Yet, control, particularly among the more 
pernicious forms of coercive control, could also have the opposite effect, 
increasing demands for the fall of the regime rather than the removal of lower-
level policymakers and changes in policy.  
Both the narrative and event count and matrix data demonstrate that there 
is little support for either monarchies or republics to control the most extreme 
demands of protests. In all of the cases, instances of overtly violent repression 
often resulted not in diminishing demands or even diminishing protests. Rather, 
such instances frequently exacerbated mobilization and offered greater 
opportunities for mobilization on even more grievance frames such as security 
services’ brutality.  
In the cases of Tunisia and Bahrain, this is illustrated in both punctuated 
instances – e.g., the Kasserine Massacre and the Pearl Roundabout raids, 
respectively – but also in cumulative events. Continuing attempts to put down 
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unrest in the outlying mining towns in Tunisia and repeated attacks by the 
Bahraini regime against the funeral cortèges of the previous day’s repression 
victims only fueled public anger and calls for the fall of the regimes. In Jordan, 
we see fewer instances of overwhelmingly violent repression. But we also see no 
relationship between that fact and fewer calls for the fall of the regime. In the case 
of Jordan, instances of the call for the removal of the Hashemite regime only 
increased with time.   
In general, the findings for this indicator in H2a (control) mirror those 
presented for H1 (prevention): With regard to the indicator of intensity of 
demands and aims of protests for hypothesis H2a, I can find no support for a 
monarchical advantage. 
Hypothesis H2b – Patterns of State Response 
Finally, principally in Chapter 7, I used event-count data on collective 
action and regime reaction to probe the assumptions of Hypothesis H2b, that 
monarchies, compared to republics, display a distinct and discernable pattern in 
their response to protests. If Hypothesis H2b is supported, evidence should show 
that monarchies use a distinct strategy in terms of either of two dimensions of the 
matrix: prevention and control, persuasion and coercion. 
With regard to ability to control protests the narrative data demonstrated 
that both the Tunisian and Bahraini uprisings featured remarkably brutal regime 
reactions. The Jordanian regime demonstrated a more mixed strategy, never 
cracking down on protests in nearly the same way that either its fellow monarchy 
275 
or the republic in Tunisia did. All three regimes attempted to utilize concessions 
at one time or another, but only Jordan pursued a truly mixed strategy.  
First, in terms of null responses, all three cases have instances of no 
regime response to a variety of collective actions, but there does not appear to be 
any consistent pattern to types of actions that warrant no reaction by the regime. 
Second, instead of monarchy having a pattern distinct from republics, the three 
cases have similar proportions of persuasion and coercion, ranging from 66 
percent (Jordan), to 77 percent (Bahrain), to 70 percent (Tunisia) in terms of 
preference for coercion over persuasion. Bahrain differs from both its fellow 
monarchy, Jordan, and from Tunisia, in terms of the balance of prevention (45 
percent) and control (55 percent). By comparison, Jordan and Tunisia are virtually 
identical (27 percent Prevention/73 percent control and 26 percent prevention/74 
percent control, respectively). Finally, the proportion of coercive preventive acts 
carried out by Bahrain is, again, greater than both Tunisia and Jordan. Looking 
again at the data, we might overly simplify them by saying that Bahrain is 
sometimes an outlier. When it is not an outlier, all three cases are virtually the 
same. In no case do the two monarchies differ systematically from the Tunisian 
republic as a group. 
There is an interesting element that does illustrate a potential monarchical 
advantage. In both Bahrain and Jordan, a potential reason for the survival of the 
regime was that the protest coalition fell apart. In Bahrain, the regime’s ability to 
divide the opposition along the sectarian cleavage and force the grassroots 
movements to diverge in goals from the established parties was central to the 
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survival of the regime. In Jordan, several of my interviewees affirmed that the 
Jordanian uprising of the Arab Spring failed not because of regime prevention or 
control, but because “Jordanians just don’t know how to protest.” This at first 
appeared to me to be chauvinism of one sort or another. It was only upon 
reflection, analysis, (and comparison to Bahrain) that I realized that it was 
actually not a critique of the ability of Jordanians to protest. It was, in fact, a 
criticism of the inability of the hirak to present a practicable agenda for the next 
step if the regime were to fall or be fundamentally changed. As interview 
respondents observed, even an uprising that crossed ideological and demographic 
cleavages and managed to avoid the regime’s divide-and-rule strategies was 
bound to fail if the participants did not have a plan to follow through. 
In all, despite variegated findings, while there is support for the hypothesis that 
monarchies are able to withstand protests (H2) there is no support for the 
subhypothesis (H2b) that monarchies, compared to republics, display a distinct 
and discernable pattern in their control of protests. 
Conclusions 
At the beginning of this project, I laid out a set of hypotheses that, if 
satisfied, would constitute evidence of a monarchical advantage with respect to 
protests in the Arab Spring. The evidence produced in this dissertation does not 
support Hypothesis H1 (monarchies are better than non-monarchies at preventing 
protests), as it was clear that all the countries in questions displayed high levels of 
mobilization – in both pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring time periods. Moreover, 
none of the countries in question successfully prevented protests in terms of 
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number, size, geographic dispersion, ideological diversity of the protest coalition 
or mitigating the demands and goals of protests.  If Hypothesis H1 is false – if it is 
not the case that monarchies were more successful than republics in preventing 
mobilization—then the fact that monarchies survived the Arab Spring much better 
than republics entails that they must be better at withstanding protests. 
The evidence in this dissertation does not support, however, either of two 
possible mechanisms for withstanding protests.  The evidence does not show that 
monarchies were better than republics in controlling protests (hypothesis H2a), 
nor does it show that monarchies displayed a pattern of prevention and control in 
the face of protests that was distinct from that of republics (H2b). 
Implications  
If monarchical regimes neither prevent protests better than republican 
regimes, nor control protests better, nor demonstrate a pattern of state responses to 
collective action that is different from republics, what are some of the 
implications? 
The monarchical advantage thesis holds that monarchies survive better 
than republics for a variety of reasons.  Many of these—such as monarchy’s 
purported greater legitimacy, or monarchy’s alleged abilities to build cross-cutting 
alliances—should manifest themselves in the form of less protest against 
monarchical regimes.  Whether measured in number, intensity, or in terms of 
whether the protesters pursue mostly policy or political changes, rather than 
regime change, the evidence presented in this dissertation undermines this version 
of the monarchical advantage thesis.   
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If the monarchical advantage thesis holds that it is not in preventing 
protest, but in controlling protests once they emerge or in responding to protests 
in a way that is distinct from republics that makes monarchies more durable, the 
evidence presented in this dissertation again tends to contradict these views.  
It will be noted by the reader that the principal finding of this dissertation 
is a mixed or negative finding. This dissertation has not explained how the 
monarchical advantage operates. But, it also did not set out with this as a goal. 
What the dissertation does is to unpack assumptions about the mechanisms by 
which monarchies survived the protests of the Arab Spring. With that in mind, the 
findings still carry powerful implications for our understanding of the operation of 
the monarchical advantage. We know that the survival of Jordan and Bahrain 
even when confronted with protests is not because of some inherent ability, 
bestowed by monarchy, to prevent or control protests. We know that, when 
confronted with protests, there is not a pattern of response that differentiates the 
monarchies, as a group, from the republic. 
The dissertation does not directly challenge alternative explanations for 
the survival of Middle East monarchies, such as cross-cutting elite coalitions, 
hydrocarbon or patronage rents, or external support mechanisms, as explored by 
other scholars. But are the findings represented here compatible with those other 
explanations? Some may argue that the monarchical advantage lies in the special 
ability to forge clientelist coalitions and thereby short-circuit the ability of the 
opposition to mobilize. The findings presented here cast doubt on this variable.  
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Recall that the two monarchies were chosen to explore intra-monarchy 
variance and determine, albeit indirectly, if the mechanisms proposed by other 
scholars would make any difference in terms of the regimes’ ability to prevent, 
control, or demonstrate different patterns in their responses to protests.   
According to Herb’s work, dynastic monarchies are more stable because 
the centripetal forces of the royal family serve as a ubiquitous institution, 
preventing the infiltration of widespread opposition and increasing the “ability of 
the ruling elites…to solve internal disputes without threatening their control of the 
state.”24 Linchpin, monarchies, like Jordan, do not utilize the same strategy. 
Instead the king both reigns and rules, but he does so from “above the fray” of 
politics, acting as the impartial arbiter of last resort.25 
In this sense, the dissertation contributes to Michael Herb’s and Russell 
Lucas’ work on the potential differences between linchpin and dynastic 
monarchies. While I do not delve deeply into differences between Jordan and 
Bahrain in terms of the institutional effects of the linchpin versus dynastic 
monarchy categories, the findings demonstrate both similarities and differences 
between the two monarchies. On the one hand, we see that patterns of protest 
demands and state responses to collective action in Jordan, a linchpin monarchy, 
are different from those in Bahrain, a dynastic monarchy. In terms of the events in 
each monarchy during the pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring protests, Jordan had 
the fewest protests and Bahrain the most. On the other hand, the monarchies’ 
overall ability to prevent and control protests are similar. The evidence presented 
                                                 
24 Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern 
Monarchies, 253. 
25 Herb, 223. 
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in this dissertation tends to contradict the view that either dynastic or linchpin 
monarchies provide an institutional advantage that allowed either monarchical 
regime to prevent or control protests. Moreover, neither monarchy was able to do 
this better than the other, nor did the two monarchies differ substantially from 
Tunisia.  
 Connecting the implications for contentious politics and those for 
monarchical advantage and Middle East politics, the dissertation also speaks to 
how incumbents respond to protest. The data presented here show that patterns of 
response are not determined by whether a regime is a monarchy or republic. 
Regardless of type, all these regimes had a hard time keeping people off the 
streets, even with the array of tools at their disposal – propaganda, concessions, 
repression, and cooptation – to try to stop them.  
Those studying protest waves and cycles may find useful data in the event 
counts presented in Chapter 7. Those interested in regime responses to protests 
may find useful the distinctions and definitions that underlie the matrix of 
Prevention/Control-Persuasion/Coercion  
Many of the theoretical implications overlap with substantive ones as well. 
As Dafna Rand has already pointed out, policymakers before the Arab Spring not 
only believed in the durability of Middle East regimes, but that any policy 
changes would be regime-led rather than championed by popular grassroots 
movements.26  This should lead both scholars and policymakers to revisit views of 
civil society in both monarchies as well as non-monarchies. Scholars and 
policymakers similarly overlooked the potential for change in the region, and 
                                                 
26 Rand, Roots of the Arab Spring, viii–ix. 
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instead focused – not unreasonably – on the causal factors that explained 
authoritarian resilience. But in the process, scholars too lost sight of the 
groundswell of bottom-up mobilization against ostensibly ossified regimes.27  
While scholars appear to have learned from this myopic approach and 
made appropriate course corrections, this dissertation further demonstrates a 
failure of that pattern of thinking. Not only did citizens in republics mobilize to 
topple entrenched regimes, based on this dissertation, we can now see the same 
potential among motivated citizens in the region's monarchies as well. Dafna 
Rand saw autocrats struggling to contain strained societal forces rather than 
resting on their laurels. She and others believed that regimes may indeed have 
reached a point where their "upgrading" strategies may be tested and fail.28 This 
dissertation tested whether monarchies were the exception to this rule. Though 
they survived, we can see that they are subject to the same stressors and are 
likewise, far from failproof.  
Asef Bayat's view of new "refolutions" – those that seek aggressive 
sociopolitical and economic reform but without the bloodshed and chaos of 
revolutionary upheaval – led by previously under-examined sectors of the region's 
civil society actors and "ordinary" people, is furthered by this dissertation.29 
Though not intentionally, this dissertation contributes to the line of inquiry 
sparked by Bayat’s view of the Arab Spring as “revolutions without 
revolutionaries” – i.e., that the protests of the Arab Spring were remarkable in 
                                                 
27 Rand, viii–ix. 
28 Rand, 5. 
29 Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Stanford 
University Press, 2013); Asef Bayat, Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the 
Arab Spring (Stanford University Press, 2017). 
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their ability to mobilize and resist. They came to the streets in some cases to 
overthrow the regime, but with no plan for reforming or rebuilding institutions in 
the aftermath.30 The Jordanian hirak may have dissolved, and the protests receded 
from the streets, but they hardly disappeared. They simply went underground and 
continued their activism in different arenas and using different methods. After the 
legal opposition groups abandoned the uprising in Bahrain, splinter groups of 
grassroots movements continued nightly pitched battles with security forces, with 
no foreseeable goal, for months. Yet, returning to Bayat's argument, that 
"revolution in terms of change, and in terms of having a vision about change, and 
about how to [wrest] power from the incumbents...was quite lacking" in the Arab 
Spring uprisings was as much present (as he argues) among Egypt's 
revolutionaries, as my interview respondents indicate it was among the Jordanian 
hirak.31  
Robustness of Findings and Future Directions 
We cannot prove or disprove the existence of the monarchical advantage 
using such a limited sample. But this work does provide a theoretical and 
methodological launching pad for future testing. We know that there is evidence 
of the monarchical advantage when it comes to withstanding protests (H2). But 
there is no support for the hypotheses that monarchies are better at preventing 
protests (H1), better at controlling protests that do occur (H2a) or that monarchies 
                                                 
30 Bayat, Revolution without Revolutionaries. 
31 Linda Herrera and Heba Khalil, “Critical Voices in Critical Times: Revolution without 
Revolutionaries, an Interview with Asef Bayat,” OpenDemocracy - NAWA (North Africa, West 
Asia), December 14, 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/linda-herrera-
heba-khalil/critical-voices-in-critical-times-revolution-withou. 
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demonstrate a different pattern of state response than non-monarchies when 
confronted with collective action (H2b).  
Expanding the Study 
Going forward, how do we expect the findings to hold up as we expand 
the sample? Are the findings in Jordan and Bahrain generalizable to other 
countries in the region? What patterns might we see if we expand this inquiry 
throughout the region? The findings of this dissertation present three cases 
without significant variation on the ability to prevent or control protests. As we 
expand the inquiry throughout the region we will encounter cases that 
experienced significant protests and others that did not, and introduce a level of 
variation that is not present in the current sample. 
Remaining Monarchies 
The remaining monarchies in the region may be divided into linchpin 
monarchies (Morocco (0.13%)) and dynastic monarchies (Saudi Arabia (0.01%), 
Kuwait (0.0%), Oman (0.1%), Qatar (0.0%), and the Emirates (0.0%)).32 The 
Moroccan monarchy as the only other linchpin monarchy is most immediately 
comparable to Jordan But, as Mohamed Daadaoui illustrates, ritualistic political 
culture and the institution of the Makhzen that surround the regime go some way 
in explaining its survival against both opposition forces in the parliament and 
                                                 
32 For the purposes of comparing basic levels of mobilization between other regimes in the region 
that might be included in future analyses, I am parenthetically including the percentage of 
population involved in protests as of May 2011 from the dataset compiled by Kirk and Wilson. 
See Kirk and Wilson, “New Visualization Design Project: Protests and the Media.” Again, it 
should be noted that this data comes from a snapshot of the uprisings up to May 2011. The raw 
data is available as a Google Documents Spreadsheet at http://bit.ly/2pmb7XI 
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popular protests.33 Morocco and Jordan are frequently compared by both scholars 
and policymakers. Only a systematic examination of the same hypotheses 
presented here will illustrate just how far those similarities carry. 
Expanding the study to the other monarchies in the region will introduce 
variation on several variables. Including Kuwait (0.00%), for example, would 
both continue the systematic examination of dynastic monarchy and introduce 
variation on both prevention and control, as Kuwait experienced few protests and 
successfully controlled them. The same variation would be introduced by 
including Qatar (0.00%) and the Emirates (0.00%).  
Conversely, Kuwait is frequently compared with Bahrain in terms of the 
sectarian cleavages, but Kuwaiti political activism has historically taken a 
different path and tone with the Al-Sabah regime. Including Kuwait would also 
add intervening variables of potentially differing grievances. Until 2009, Kuwait 
held the highest Human Development Index score in the Arab World and the 
highest level of female political participation.34  
The remaining monarchies of Saudi Arabia (0.01%) and Oman (0.1%) 
may have experienced mobilization at comparable levels to Jordan (0.1%). The 
Saudis, for example, likewise failed to prevent protests, but largely managed to 
mollify initial protests with monetary concessions. Later protests, particularly in 
the predominantly Shi’a Eastern province, looked similar to those just across the 
                                                 
33 Mohamed Daadaoui, Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen 
Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011); Daadaoui, Mohamed, “A Moroccan 
Monarchical Exception?,” Foreign Policy: The Middle East Channel, December 13, 2012, 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/a_moroccan_monarchical_exception.  
34 Ahmad Faraj, “Kuwait Ranks Top among Arab States in Human Development - UNDP Report,” 
Kuwait News Agency, August 25, 2009, 
https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=2021741&language=en. 
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causeway in Bahrain. Saudi forces likewise utilized greater repression to put 
down protests based on sectarian grievances.  
Remaining Republics 
Continuing the comparative nature of the research arc moving forward 
also requires examining different republics. But as in the expanded sample of 
monarchies, we will also find variation in prevention (H1) and control (H2a). But 
we will also encounter republics that managed to withstand protests rather than 
fall. Arguably the next most testable case is Egypt (2.4%). Beyond Egypt, several 
of the remaining republics either saw protests but withstood them (H2) because 
the protests fizzled or were effectively controlled (H2a). Such regimes include 
Algeria (0.01%), Lebanon (0.05%), and Iraq (0.03%). Other republics have seen 
initial uprisings devolve into horrific and destabilizing civil wars. In the latter 
category we must consider those regimes that survived (H2), but devolved into 
civil war in defense of the regime (i.e., while attempting to control protests (H2a)) 
and those that fell (failure of H1 and H2) but experienced civil war after the 
regime fell (e.g., Libya (0.4%), and Yemen (0.4%)). 
Within the remaining sample of republics, we likewise see variation 
among the variables and hypotheses of the initial study. If being a monarchy is a 
specific condition for survival, according to monarchical advantage, this suggests 
that being a non-monarchy should leave these republics vulnerable. As I 
mentioned above, however, there is variation among republics that survived, those 
that effectively controlled and withstood protests, and those that did not withstand 
286 
protests either fell and devolved into civil war after the fact or that withstood 
protests but, while exerting strategies of control, devolved into open conflict.    
Epilogue 
The Hashemite and Al-Khalifa regimes survived the vociferous protests of 
the Arab Spring. The kings remain enthroned, comfortably above the fray of 
quotidian politics. My research questions specifically addressed the relationship 
between monarchical advantage and popular protests. This dissertation examined 
whether these monarchies, compared to the Ben Ali regime, survived the Arab 
Spring uprisings because they were able to effectively control protests and 
whether they exhibited different patterns of response in controlling protests than 
non-monarchies. But, as of this writing, the tremors of aftershocks continue, 
especially in Jordan. Confirming, on one hand, existing theories of monarchical 
advantage, the monarchs have reason to feel at least somewhat secure based on 
my findings – they have been able to withstand protests. Yet, the aftershocks 
themselves only underscore these regimes’ inability to prevent future protests. 
Perhaps more alarming, the findings presented here should serve as a caveat for 
the kings: they have also not been able to prevent or control protests and they 
exhibit patterns of response in controlling protests no different than their 
republican counterparts. 
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Appendix A 
Codebook 
I. PROTESTER DEMANDS CODES 
DEMAND CODE 
CORRUPTION 
End to Generalized Corruption POL_GENCORRUPT 
End to Parliamentary Corruption POL_PARLCORRUPT 
End to Police Corruption POL_POLICECORRUPT 
End to Security/Intelligence Services 
Corruption 
POL_MUKHCORRUPT 
End to Monarchy/Royal Family 
Corruption 
POL_MONARCHYCORRUPT 
Specific Individual Corruption POL_CORRUPT_INDIV 
_PM 
_MP 
_MIN-EDU 
_MIN-INT 
CRITICISM OF REGIME ACTIONS OR PERSONNEL 
Criticism of Regime's Character POL_CRITQ_REGCHAR_GROUNDS 
Criticism of regime's legitimacy e.g., Criticism of Regime Legitimacy = 
POL_CRITQ_REGCHAR_LEGIT 
Criticism of regime in general POL_CRITQ_REGGEN 
Criticism of the Monarchy POL_CRITQ_MONARCHY 
Criticism of the King POL_CRITQ_KING 
Criticism of Prime Minister or MPs POL_CRITQ_PM or POL_CRITQ_MP 
Criticism of Other Elites POL_CRITQ_OTHELITE 
Criticism of Policymakers POL_CRITQ_POLICYMAKERS_NA
ME OF TARGET(S) 
Criticism of Policy POL_CRITQ_POLICY_TYPE POLICY 
Criticism of Actions of Agents of the 
State 
_Police_Gendarmerie_Military 
POL_CRITQ_AGENT 
_POLI 
_GEND 
_MIL 
Criticism of Regime 
Reaction/Repression 
POL_CRITQ_REPRESS 
Solidarity with pro-reform 
demonstrations 
POL_SOLIDDEMOS 
ECON_SOLIDDEMOS 
CALL FOR SPECIFIC ACTIONS 
Demand for Human Rights reforms POL_REFREG_HUMRIGHTS 
Demand for political participation POL_REFREG_POLPART 
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Reform Regime Structure_Institution POL_REFREG 
_NEWCONST 
_ELECTIONS 
_MUKH 
_POLICE 
_JUD 
_PARL 
_EDUC 
Removal of Specific Personnel POL_REMPERS_INDIV  
_PM  
_MP  
_MIN-EDU  
_MIN-INT 
Removal/Fall of Regime POL_FALLREG 
Release of Political Prisoners POL_REL_PRISON 
Resignation of Government POL_RES_GOVT 
Removal of security services from 
streets 
POL_REM_MUKH 
Removal of police from streets POL_REM_POLICE 
Removal of military from streets POL_REM_MIL 
ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES 
Economic critique or demand for 
general economic reforms 
ECON_REFORM 
Unemployment ECON_UNEMP 
Poverty ECON_POVERTY 
Price increases; 
Austerity measures 
ECON_CRITQ_PRICES 
ECON_CRITQ_AUSTERITY 
Nepotism/Corruption with economic 
consequences 
ECON_CORRUPT 
Against neoliberal development 
policies 
ECON_NEOLIBDEV 
COUNTERPROTESTS 
Support for 
regime 
 CP_POL_SUPPR
EG 
 
Denouncing 
opposition/protest
ers 
 CP_POL_DENO_
OPPPROT 
 
Shared grievance with opposition 
protesters but support government 
CP_POL/ECON_SHRGRIEVE_SUPP
REG 
Shared grievance with opposition 
protesters but prefer negotiated 
solution/working through institutions 
CP_POL/ECON_SHRGRIEVE_NEGO
T 
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II. REGIME ACTION OR REACTION 
ACTION CODE 
PREVENTION 
Arresting activists or leaders before 
collective action 
PREV_ARRACTLEAD 
Harrassing/intimidating 
activists/leaders before collective action 
PREV_HARACTLEAD 
Harassing/intimidating/Arresting 
protesters/participants before collective 
action 
PREV_HARPART 
PREV_ARRPART 
Arresting/Harassing misc citizens PREV_ARRCITIZ; 
PREV_HARCITIZ 
Arresting/Harassing/Intimidating 
members of the press or bloggers 
PREV_ARRPRESS 
PREV_HARPRESS 
Arresting/Harassing civil society or 
NGO organizations or members 
PREV_HARCIVNGO 
Co-optation or Corporatism of NGOs 
or other civil society organizations 
PREV_COOPCORPORATE 
Delegitimize Opposition activists or 
protesters by kompromat 
PREV_DELEGACT/DELEGPROT 
PREV_DELEGACT_KOMPROMAT 
PREV_DELEGPROT_KOMPROMAT 
Delegitimize Opposition by propaganda PREV_DELEGOPP_PROP 
Enacting curfew or emergency laws 
prior to a collective action event; 
PREV_CURFEW 
PREV_EMERLAW 
Physically breaking up opposition 
networks prior to collective action 
PREV_BRKNET 
Censorship or controlling discursive 
space online 
PREV_CENSCONTONLINE 
Censorship or controlling discursive 
space in the press/in print 
PREV_CENSCONTPRINT 
Censorship or controlling discursive 
physical space (e.g., meetings, coffee 
shops, clubs) 
PREV_CENSCONTPHYS 
Restricting Freedom of Expression PREV_FREEEXP 
Restricting Freedom of Assembly PREV_FREEASS 
Restricting Access to Physical Protest 
Sites 
PREV_ACCESS 
Threatening Individual's Job or 
Livelihood 
PREV_THREATINDJOB 
Threatening Family Members Jobs or 
Livelihoods 
PREV_THREATFAM 
PREV_THREATFAM_JOB 
Regime concessions_type PREV_REGCONC 
_STMT_REGRET 
_STMT_RIGHTSNORMS 
_ALLOWDEMO 
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_POLREFORM 
_ECONREFORM 
_POLICYCHNG 
_REVDEC (Reverse Decision) 
_FIREPM/MP 
_FIRESHUFFCAB (Fire/shuffle 
cabinet) 
_PUNISHAGENTS 
_FREEPRISONERS 
 
CONTROL 
Enacting curfew or emergency laws 
after a collective action event; 
CONTROL_CURFEW; 
CONTROL_EMERLAW 
Arrest leadership day of collective 
action 
CONTROL_ARRLEAD 
Arresting protesters/participants day of 
or at collective action 
CONTROL_ARRPART 
Disperse protesters with tear gas CONTROL_DISP_GAS 
Disperse protesters with water cannon CONTROL_DISP_WATER 
Disperse protesters with lower level 
physical violence (i.e., batons, less than 
lethal weapons but not water cannons 
or tear gas) 
CONTROL_DISP_LTL_VIOL 
Regime agents' disperse protesters with 
lethal violence against protesters 
(selective but more than 
CONTROL_DISP_LTL_VIOL) 
CONTROL_DISP_VIOL 
Targeted killing/assassination CONTROL_ASSASS 
Regime violence by proxy (i.e., 
baltajiyya; counterprotesters) 
CONTROL_REGVIOL_PROXY 
_BALT 
_COUNTERPRO 
Overwhelming violent crackdown by 
regime 
CONTROL_CRACKDOWN 
_POLI 
_GEND 
_MIL 
Arresting/Harassing misc citizens CONTROL_ARRCITIZ; 
CONTROL_HARCITIZ 
Detainment/Torture of activists during 
or after collective action 
CONTROL_DETTORACT 
Detainment/Torture of participants 
during or after collective action 
CONTROL_DETTORPART 
Collective punishment related to 
collective action 
CONTROL_COLLPUN 
Collective punishment targeted to those 
affiliated with activists or protesters. 
CONTROL_COLLPUN_TARGACT 
CONTROL_COLLPUN_TARGPROT 
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Delegitimize Opposition activists or 
protesters by counterprotest 
CONTROL_DELEGOPP_COUNTER
PRO 
Delegitimize Opposition activists or 
protesters by kompromat 
CONTROL_DELEGACT/DELEGPRO
T 
CONTROL_DELEGACT_KOMPRO
MAT 
CONTROL_DELEGPROT_KOMPRO
MAT 
Delegitimize Opposition by propaganda CONTROL_DELEGOPP_PROP 
Threatening Individual's Job or 
Livelihood 
CONTROL_THREATINDJOB 
Threatening Family Members Jobs or 
Livelihoods 
CONTROL_THREATFAM 
CONTROL_THREATFAM_JOB 
Regime concessions_type CONTROL_REGCONC 
_NEGOTOPPOS 
_STMT_REGRET 
_ALLOWDEMO 
_POLREFORM 
_ECONREFORM 
_POLICYCHNG 
_REVDEC (Reverse Decision) 
_FIREPM/MP 
_FIRECAB (Fire/shuffle cabinet) 
_PUNISHAGENTS 
_FREEPRISONERS 
Threaten to shutter NGOs,professional 
associations/unions, political 
parties/societies, or opposition groups 
CONTROL_THREATNGOCLOSE 
CONTROL_THREATPARTYSOCICL
OSE 
CONTROL_THREATASSOCUNION
CLOSE 
CONTROL_THREATOPPCLOSE 
Shutter NGOs, professional 
associations/unions, political 
parties/societies, or opposition groups 
CONTROL_NGOCLOSE 
CONTROL_PARTYSOCICLOSE 
CONTROL_ASSOCUNIONCLOSE 
CONTROL_OPPCLOSE 
 
III. FRAMING/COUNTERFRAMING 
FRAME/COUNTERFRAME CODE 
National Unity 
Cross-cleavage unity 
FRAME_NATLUNITY 
FRAME_CROSSCLEAVEUNITY 
Pro-regime frame co-opting or taking 
credit for pro-reform organizations' 
claims/demands/successes 
FRAME_CO-OPT_REFORM_MSG 
General nationalist framing device or 
campaign 
FRAME_PRO-
REFORM_NATIONALIST 
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PREV_FRAME_NATIONALIST 
CONTROL_FRAME_NATIONALIST 
Targeted/Specific nationalist framing 
device or campaign 
PREV_FRAME_TARGNATIONALIS
T 
CONTROL_FRAME_TARGNATION
ALIST 
Pro-regime group counterframing 
device or campaign praising reform 
efforts or regime policy. 
PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEP
OLICY 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAI
SEPOLICY 
Pro-regime group counterframing 
device or campaign praising regime's 
character. 
PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISER
EGCHAR 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAI
SEREGCHAR 
Pro-regime group counterframing 
device or campaign praising leader's 
character. 
PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEKI
NG 
PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEP
RES 
PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEM
PS 
PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEP
M 
PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEO
THELITE 
CONTOL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAIS
EKING 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAI
SEPRES 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAI
SEMPS 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAI
SEPM 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAI
SEOTHELITE 
Frame/Counterframe device or 
campaign pledging loyalty to leader or 
regime 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_LOY
ALTYKING 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_LOY
ALTYPRES 
CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_LOY
ALTYREG 
Frame/Counterframe chastising 
protesters as troublemakers or for 
working outside established channels of 
politics. 
CONTROL_FRAME_CHASTISEPRO
TEST 
Frame/Counterframe device or 
campaign accusing OR warning against 
PREV_FRAME_ENDANGER 
PREV_FRAME_WARN_ENDANGE
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activists/leaders/protesters/opposition 
of damaging reputation, economy, or 
politics or endangering the country 
 
Frame/Counterframe device or 
campaign accusing OR warning against 
activists/leaders/protesters/opposition 
of collaboration with outside forces or 
of being terrorists. 
R 
PREV_FRAME_DAMAGE_REP 
PREV_FRAME_WARN_DAMAGE_
REP 
_ECON 
_POL 
CONTROL_FRAME_ENDANGER 
CONTROL_FRAME_DAMAGE_REP 
_ECON 
_POL 
PREV_FRAME_COLLUDE 
CONTROL_FRAME_COLLUDE 
PREV_FRAME_TERROR 
CONTROL_FRAME_TERROR 
Frame/Counterframe device or 
campaign accusing 
activists/leaders/protesters/opposition 
of inciting violence by security forces. 
CONTROL_FRAME_OPPINCITE 
Pro-reform frame for constitutional 
reform; 
FRAME_PRO-REFORM_CONST 
Pro-reform frame for economic reform; FRAME_PRO-REFORM_ECON 
 
 
